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What explains diverging calls for reform and revolution in Africa over the past ten 
years? African countries have made substantial strides toward actual democratic devel-
opment, including a concerted effort to address corruption. As African democracies 
have strengthened, calls by citizens for anti-corruption reform have grown, highlighting 
the progress that is being made. Yet, in recent years, some anti-corruption movements 
have called instead for revolution - completely replacing the state or seceding alto-
gether. What explains these calls for revolution? I argue that we need to understand 
how different types of corruption shape contentious goals. When corruption generates 
material benefits, citizens lose trust in politicians but do not lose trust in the system. In 
response, they call for reform, seeking to improve the system. When corruption gener-
ates systemic benefits (distorting the system altogether), citizens lose trust in the insti-
tutions and instead call for revolution. I test this using individual-level data from survey 
experiments as well as large-n surveys, and group-level data using statistical analysis 
of protest events as well as case studies. I find strong support that types of corruption 
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This dissertation is the product of a decade of study, work, and interest in the destructive 
impact of corruption in Africa. My interest in African corruption emerged from a simple 
question that I asked while writing my master’s thesis: given the abundant wealth of 
the African continent, why are African countries so poor and conflict-ridden? One need 
only scratch the surface on any given question about development, poverty, or conflict 
to encounter the stain of corruption lurking below. I was able to cultivate hands-on 
experience with this question while working on democratization and post-conflict sta-
bilization in Africa. At the core of this work is a human story that is both troubling and 
all too common: government corruption in developing countries metastasizes like can-
cer, slowly capturing and then deteriorating the ability of government institutions to 
fulfill their promised duties. When governments fail, they do not ‘reset’ like a video 
game; instead, they persist, growing steadily worse. Through all of this, citizens are 
forced to survive in a country where, at best, the government is either increasingly un-
interested in serving the people, and at worst, is actively predatory toward them. My 
fascination with corruption is that in many situations, corruption is the primary culprit 
responsible for the ongoing cycles of poverty, conflict, trust, and underdevelopment. 
Data Collection 
Data collection for this dissertation was supported by grants from the University of 
Maryland and the Association for the Study of Middle East and Africa, which allowed 
me to conduct fieldwork in Nigeria and South Africa. While in Nigeria, I worked with 
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Mashinini, who not only conducted excellent survey research, but also provided me 
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ication of several of my students at the University of Maryland in collecting novel data 
on corruption: Luke Navritil, Andrew Englander, and Maxine Turner. 
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“My father [Frank Chicane] has been my political school for as long as I can 
remember and, for most of my young life, he provided me with front-row tickets 
to a daily screening of How to Build a Democratic South Africa … It’s probably 
because of this that I find myself at odds with my father. His work in building a 
‘rainbow nation’ is at odds with my desire to break it. Where he seeks to build 
unity, I seek to fragment it. My dad believes that we can change through reform, 
while I believe we can only improve through revolution.” (Chikane, 2018) 
Africa’s Third Wave 
Africa has experienced three great ‘waves’ of protest in the past seventy years. The first 
wave occurred while African countries remained under the yoke of colonial rule. Un-
satisfied with being governed by a political system designed to extract natural resources 
and relegate them to second-class status, Africans rose up in revolution, demanding an 
end to colonization and the complete transformation of government from predatory to 
subservient. Beginning largely in the 1950s, across the continent, colonial powers at-
tempted to fend off highly organized liberation movements. In Kenya, the British vio-
lently put down the Mau Mau independence movement. In Algeria, the French fought 
the Front de liberation nationale (FLN). By the mid-1960s, most African countries had 
successfully become independent (Branch, 2011). 
Africa’s second great wave of protest occurred following the end of the Cold War and 
the reconfiguration of geopolitics away from a bipolar system. As great power support 
for one-party autocratic and authoritarian parties fell in the 1990s, Africans once again 
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rose up in large numbers, this time demanding democratic reforms. Tired of democracy 
in name only, Africans pushed for the introduction of multi-party elections and greater 
civil liberties. Over the following two decades, in fits and starts, African governments 
began to make meaningful progress toward true democracy. At the time of writing, 
Nigeria has just completed its sixth multiparty election. In the past few years, African 
leaders have been constrained by institutions, including in Kenya, South Africa, the 
Gambia, and even in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Africa’s third wave of protest emerged alongside the Arab Spring (Branch and 
Mampilly, 2015). Yet, while the Arab Spring was widely reported around the globe 
despite its relatively paltry gains, Africa’s third wave has been largely underreported 
despite its effective challenge to government corruption, economic inequality, and 
democratic weakness. The third wave has accompanied several major developments in 
African society. First, an emerging “new middle class” independent of the government 
has increasingly organized, supported, and mobilized into contentious anti-government 
action (Lofchie, 2014). Second, African governments have been surprisingly receptive 
to the demands of protesters – particularly those demanding an end to the endemic 
corruption that has hindered African development since independence. These develop-
ments have forced African governments to make serious transitions toward improving 
governance and taking anti-corruption seriously, including calls by the National As-
sembly in the Gambia to prosecute corrupt government officials (Africa Research 
Bulletin, 2012b). In Kenya, the Auditor-General has openly criticized the opacity of 
Kenyan politicians and their wealthy lifestyles, and in January of 2019, the government 
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hired a British attorney to prosecute corrupt officials (Africa Research Bulletin, 2019b). 
The Tanzanian president fired six ministers following allegations of graft (Africa 
Research Bulletin, 2012a) And recently, the Ghanaian government appointed a special 
prosecutor to examine issues of corruption surrounding the ruling party (Africa 
Research Bulletin, 2019a). 
Yet, despite these meaningful steps taken toward democracy and reducing corruption, 
Africa’s third wave has witnessed the emergence of revolutionary and, in some cases, 
anti-democratic movements that have picked up steam. This divergence of goals is puz-
zling. Why do some contentious groups – who regularly voice anger at corruption – 
seek out reform while other groups – also angry about corruption – lead calls for revo-
lution? And why do these revolutionary groups, including some who advocate for the 
complete secession from the state, find renewed vigor at the same time that African 
democracies are making real progress toward fulfilling the demands of protesters? This 
dissertation seeks to understand this very phenomenon. In order to do so, it examines a 
critical aspect of contention that help explain contentious patterns in Africa’s third 
wave. Government corruption has been a mainstay in the contentious claims of Africa’s 
third wave of protest, yet scholars have mostly overlooked the important distinctions 
between different types of corruption. This dissertation addresses this oversight. It ex-
amines how different types of corruption generate different contentious outcomes, and 
finds strong evidence that contentious groups shape their calls for reform or revolution 




Consider two recent social movements that arose during Africa’s third wave that incor-
porated claims of corruption at the core of their contentious frames: the sustained fuel 
subsidy protests that rocked Nigeria in 2012 and the ongoing revolutionary secessionist 
movement conducted in the southern region of Nigeria known informally as Biafra. 
These cases will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6; right now, I draw upon their outline 
to frame the case. In 2012, fuel subsidy cuts were met by broad coalitions of protesters 
incensed at the nerve of the government’s application of austerity measures despite its 
brazen and endemic corruption. The protests began with contentious frames centered 
on fuel subsidies, but soon transformed into mass anti-corruption protests that paved 
the way for future anti-corruption organizing by civil society organizations and labor 
unions (Mark, 2012; Hari, 2014). The declaration of the end of fuel subsidies brought 
into sharp focus for Nigerians the rampant material corruption – the kleptocratic theft 
and greed at elite and senior levels – that has long hindered economic development. 
Protesters initially called for the reinstatement of fuel subsidies. But, as protests grew 
and with the election of a new president, protesters began to organize around explicitly 
anti-corruption messages, demanding the prosecution of corrupt elites and the inde-
pendence of institutions (Sahara Reporters, 2015). These protests sought reform – an 
improvement to existing policies and institutions in order to improve government per-
formance and the provision of public goods and services. 
In Nigeria’s southern region of Biafra, renewed calls for secession grew from whispers 
in the late 2000s to cries and shouts in the period of 2014 to 2018. Two major 
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revolutionary groups – the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), the Movement for the 
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) – have led the charge for the 
independent secession of Biafra, and have focused on placing systemic forms of cor-
ruption central to their claims. Three major grievances can be found in their contentious 
frames. First, police and security force corruption and the illegal detention of prominent 
Biafran separatist leaders. Second, the fraudulent nature of what these groups perceive 
to be rigged elections. Finally, the (perceived) forceful exclusion of the Igbo people 
from positions of power in the executive branch, military, and the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Pro-Biafran contention has regularly proclaimed the 
government to be corrupt, and has demanded revolutionary action rather than reform. 
Both of the contentious movements above – reformist protesters responding to material 
corruption and revolutionary protesters responding to more systemic forms of corrup-
tion – seem like they should behave similarly. These groups inhabit the same country 
and inherit the same government. Furthermore, each group has explicitly stated that 
corruption is a primary mobilizing factor. Yet, one social movement seeks reformative 
goals while another seeks revolution. Why, in a single state and voicing the same 
charges of corruption, did these groups decide to mobilize differently?1 
The answer to this puzzle requires a deep dive into the theoretical substance of what 
                                                 
1 In the Biafran case, anger over sentiments of corruption – both material and systemic – date back to 
the period immediately following Nigeria’s independence. During this time, Igbos increasingly felt anger 
at the control that northerners held over the levers of political power and the distribution of petroleum 
rents that were largely sourced from the southern region that became known as Biafra (Campbell, 2013; 
Arnold, 2017). Activation of Biafran secession in Africa’s third wave draws upon the long, contentious 
history between Nigerian southerners and the rest of the country (Smith, 2014). 
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precisely is meant when scholars, policymakers, and activists mean when they speak 
about corruption. Corruption is an omnibus term, and its complexity is evident through 
the numerous working definitions employed in past scholarship. When these groups – 
or when protesters in South Africa and revolutionaries in Burundi – rise up against 
government corruption, what type of corruption are they responding to? This distinc-
tion, I argue, helps explain the diverging contentious coalitions that emerge in response 
to corruption. 
Why Focus on Corruption? 
Contentious politics are driven by many factors, so why do I focus in on the impact of 
corruption? In the African context, corruption has occupied a central role in state, eco-
nomic and social development. Since the emergence and development of the post-
World War II humanitarian assistance practice, policymakers and scholars have fixated 
on questions of why. Why do African countries remain poor? They are resource-rich 
and have relatively small populations. Why are African countries prone to violence? 
Why have African governments followed such similar governance trajectories – from 
colonialism to autocracy to weak democracies? These issues – poverty, conflict, poor 
governance – have fueled popular discontent amongst Africans, motivating them to 
take to the streets to protest their governments. The answers to these questions of why 
may seem elusive to some, but a close examination of African governance – or a hand-
ful of conversations with citizens - reveals that the underlying problem of corruption is 
tied to nearly every major malfunction of the African state. 
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Corruption causes consequences that help tip protesters into action. As I describe in 
Chapter 6 of this dissertation, when South African students rose up in 2015 to form the 
#FeesMustFall movement, they may have been ‘tipped’ by the declaration of a 10 per-
cent increase in their tuition fees, but this tipping point was salient only because it came 
following the widescale looting of hundreds of millions of dollars from the National 
Student Financial Aid Scheme by ANC connected students and party-members. 
Defining Corruption 
Since the end of the Cold War, scholars and policymakers alike have developed a great 
interest in government corruption. For those interested in African politics, this focus 
was doubly important, as the end of bilateral great power politics meant that African 
nations might have a chance at a ‘second liberation’, free from American and Soviet 
influence that often propped up corrupt leaders in favor of regional stability. From the 
World Bank to USAID to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), anti-corruption pro-
grams were pushed in order to give African governments a kick-start in controlling the 
rampant corruption that characterized many regimes. Organizations like the World 
Bank and the IMF have generally referred to corruption as “the abuse of public office 
for personal gain.” This definition has been widely adopted in scholarship (Klitgaard, 
1991; Lambsdorff, 2007; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016), and this definition has 




Based on this definition, two major corruption indices were introduced. In the mid-
1990s, Transparency International presented its Corruption Perceptions Index (2018), 
which provided a single index per country per year designed to give an overall view of 
how corrupt a given nation was. Similarly, the World Bank’s Governance Index 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006) generated a ‘control of corruption’ score that 
purported to measure the level to which a government had, intuitively, control of its 
corruption. In order to provide detailed information for businesses interested in invest-
ing in developing nations, The PRS Group developed an index that measured corrup-
tion within a larger Country Risk index (2015). Despite widespread popularity and us-
age by scholars, indices are problematic. First, indices assume a unitary definition of 
corruption across the world. Second, the indices make no distinction in terms of which 
types of corruption are most prevalent in a given country, and no weighting is given to 
sources of corruption. 
The result is a series of indices that provide some insight into levels of corruption in a 
given country, but do not specify what the character of that corruption is. In most cases, 
this is perfectly fine; country-level indices provide a high-level overview of overall 
levels of graft and dysfunction and can serve as a quick way to measure political and 
economic risk in a given countries. There are, of course, shortcomings to this approach. 
                                                 
2 For a detailed discussion of the different definitions of corruption, see Johnston (1996), Heidenheimer 
(1989), and van Klaveran (1989). 
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For example, unified indices overlook citizen experiences of corruption, general per-
ceptions of corruption, or the political context in which corruption is practiced. These 
perceptions condition citizen behaviors and responses to government corruption. And 
importantly, these indices are unable to measure variation in types of corruption, which 
means that despite substantially different structures of corruption, countries like Cam-
eroon and Nigeria are ranked nearly identically. This obscures substantial differences 
between the two countries: while rampant looting is widespread in Nigeria, elections 
are generally competitive, whereas in Cameroon, president Paul Biya has rigged elec-
tions and captured the state to the extent that Cameroon is essentially a repressive one-
party system (O’Donnell and Gramer, 2018). 
Beyond the comparative limitations of these indices, there is the matter of the gulf be-
tween universal definitions of corruption and local experiences of corruption. As many 
scholars have pointed out, corruption means different things to different people at dif-
ferent times (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006). From gifts to bribes to practices of 
patronage, practices vary widely across the world, a fact that the universalistic defini-
tions fail to capture. At its core, this incompatibility hinges on the salience of the ideals 
of democratic governance to the individual making an evaluation of a violating act. To 
those for whom democratic ideals are strong and salient, intolerance of violating acts 
is higher. To those for whom democratic ideals are either weak or not salient, tolerance 
of violating acts is higher. This helps to explain why policymakers in Washington or 
Geneva develop definitions of corruption that do not sync up with definitions of cor-
ruption adopted by Nigerians or Kenyans. 
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These shortcomings have important implications in studying the effects of corruption 
on outcome variables of interest. For example, using these highly aggregated defini-
tions, scholars have arrived at mixed results in determining whether corruption helps 
or hinders democratic development (Heidenheimer, 2004; Bauhr and Charron, 2018) 
and economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Méon and Sekkat, 2005), generates the onset of 
conflict (Le Billon, 2003; Neudorfer and Theuerkauf, 2014), and motivates terrorism 
(Rotberg, 2003; Teets and Chenoweth, 2009). These competing outcomes are not due 
to scholarly error nor are they due to weakness in the collection of corruption data 
(which are extremely difficult to capture).3 Instead, I argue, these competing outcomes 
emerge because important regional, national, and sub-national variation in the types 
and effects of corruption are overlooked when relying on highly-aggregated data. 
Scholars have already begun to develop more nuanced approaches to understanding 
how types of corruption produce different effects and remain in place through different 
mechanisms. Three principal schools of thought have emerged. First, the economic-
legalistic school defines corruption largely in material and legal terms, focusing on the 
way in which corrupt acts violate the law and generate ‘shadow’ economic benefits 
(Lowenstein, 1989; Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Rose-Ackerman and Soreide, 2013). For 
these scholars, corruption is primarily used to transform public office into private 
                                                 
3 I base this on two years of hands-on experience working with a governance organization tasked with 
collecting base corruption and governance data across all of Africa. Even with the strictest coding guides, 
collecting meaningful data is difficult. The data that I collected on the African Integrity Indicators project 
with Global Integrity fed directly into the World Bank Governance Indicators as well as into the Ibrahim 
Index of African governance. 
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enterprise, violating legally codified ideals regarding the relationship of the individual 
official to the office itself. As Rose-Ackerman and Palifka note, these definitions rely 
heavily on the assumption that an a priori expectation of bureaucratic governance will 
be observed (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016). When a government does not exist, 
or when it is ruled arbitrarily by leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire4 (Deibert, 
2013), it could be considered hard to make a legal case that corruption has occurred. 
Despite this weakness, the economic-legalistic approach touches upon an important 
aspect of corruption – that it transforms public roles into private entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities. 
A second school of study focuses on acts that violate norms and ideals of governance. 
Scholars in the normative-motivational school focus on the manner in which corrupt 
officials betray the confidence placed in them by their constituency (Bayley, 1989; 
Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine, 1989; Philp, 2008). The confidence is the product 
of a matrix of norms that serve to generate expectations of behavior with regards to the 
public official by citizens. Of particular note is the way in which corrupt officials put 
themselves ahead of those they were elected to serve. Friedrich (1989) notes that, “[cor-
ruption] is deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of pri-
vate gain at public expense. Like the economic-legalistic school, the normative-moti-
vational school focuses on the way in which corruption engenders a transformation. 
                                                 
4 Zaire is the name given to what is now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo by its former 
dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. 
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The focus of this school, however, is on the transformation of norms within an over-
arching normative framework. The normative-motivational school embraces Plato’s 
general ideas about pristine metaphysical ideals, arguing that corruption is the deviation 
from such ideals (1997). This school links definitions of corruption to normative ideals, 
defining certain acts as corrupt becomes contingent on the presence and strength of a 
given norm. 
A third school examines the manner in which corruption transforms structures of gov-
ernance into structures of power-perpetuation  (Scott, 1989; Johnston, 2005, 2014). The 
structural-redistributive school focuses largely on politics of redistribution 
(Wantchekon, 2003; De La O, 2013; Stokes et al., 2013) and patronage (Bratton and 
van de Walle, 1994, 1997; Grindle, 2012), describing the different types of ‘machines’ 
that grow around formal and informal practices of clientelism, patronage, and market 
domination by political elites. This school of thought focuses on the transformation in 
political structures from programmatic bureaucratic distributive structures into non-
programmatic personalistic distributive structures. As such, this school does well in 
theorizing about the growth of between-group inequalities, which generally arise fol-
lowing the implementation of non-programmatic distribution. This school of study also 
addresses an important issue that the other schools do not; namely, the manner in which 
structures of corruption not only survive their creators, but whether such structures 
themselves can transform officials within the system. 
These approaches to understanding corruption have provided important clarity to the 
scholarship on government dysfunction; however, they generally focus on the act of 
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corruption rather than the benefit generated.5 Yet, the benefit (or spoil) generated is 
worthy of study for several reasons. First, examining corrupt spoils provides insight 
into how and why corrupt actions occur in the first place, and provide policy-relevant 
information about the institutional weaknesses that allow corrupt misconduct to occur. 
Second, corrupt spoils are closely linked to social consequences borne by citizens. Ma-
terial corruption siphons money and resources from the state, channeling it away from 
much-needed development projects and into private bank accounts. Systemic corrup-
tion distorts mechanisms of accountability, disenfranchising and marginalizing citizens. 
These consequences are all important, but are also quite different to one another. In 
order to address this, I develop a typology of corruption that builds on these definitions 
while focusing on the type of corrupt spoil generated by any given type of corruption. 
The Argument 
Let us first return to the puzzle at hand. Why do some movements respond to corruption 
by seeking reform while others seek revolution? In this dissertation, I argue that this 
puzzle can be solved by paying attention to the type of corruption that reformative and 
revolutionary movements agitate against. Different types of corruption generate differ-
ent benefits, and as discussed in the previous section, these benefits have different con-
sequences. Because social movements are incentivized to clearly declare their griev-
ances, studying the varying effects of different types of corruption on social movements 
                                                 




Generally speaking, I argue that corruption generates either material or systemic spoils. 
Material spoils are those that are designed to enrich elites or to be distributed via pre-
bendal patronage networks. When the violation is material in nature, I expect citizen 
responses to favor reformative or limited-aims contention designed to advocate for ei-
ther the reparation of governance structures or the alteration of distributional structures. 
Because material corruption does not alter the fundamental relationship between the 
state institution and the citizen, citizens will retain levels of trust in the institutions 
themselves, seeking instead to replace those in power. 
Systemic spoils are those that distort the system to reduce accountability and accrue 
power and access to some individuals and groups, thereby reducing the access to power 
of other groups. Systemic corruption likely leads to revolutionary contention, through 
which activists, radicals, and combatants seek to restructure the very nature of the state 
itself. Because systematic corruption transforms the relationship between the state and 
the citizen at a fundamental level, citizen trust in institutions are corroded to the point 
in which contentious organizations seek the replacement of the system itself, rather 
than simply repairing a broken system. 
Why Focus on Africa? 
“Happy families,” wrote Tolstoy, “are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its 
own way.” (Tolstoy, 1877) There is truth to these words, certainly; however, what the 
opening line to Anna Karenina omits is that, while unique in their suffering, there are 
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general patterns of dysfunction. So, too, I argue, is the case with corruption. Further-
more, I would argue that these patterns are often structured along regional lines. It is 
no surprise that, following the end of the Cold War, post-Soviet states developed similar 
dysfunctions of governance and patterns of corruption to one another. It is thus the case, 
I argue, with most African states. A number of factors encourage the grouping of Afri-
can countries into a ‘family’, including liberation processes, structures of government, 
and cultural expectations surrounding corruption. 
Depending on how one counts, there are 54 African countries6, of which the majority 
attained independence between 1950 and 19657. Of the countries currently on the Af-
rican map, only five did not attain independence during this period8. A novel configu-
ration of factors exerted a centripetal force on African developmental paths. Most Af-
rican countries emerged into independence in the midst of the Cold War, joining the 
non-aligned bloc, and playing the dominant powers against one another. In 1963, the 
Organization of African Unity was formed, encompassing most African nations, and 
codifying a general set of rules to govern African development. Additionally, African 
independence movements and early post-colonial governments shared ideological 
                                                 
6In this figure, I do not include European-held territories, such as Mayotte or Saint Helena. Furthermore, 
I do not include Western Sahara or Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic because they are not universally 
recognized as nation-states. 
7The exact number is somewhat difficult to calculate, because many of the “original” independent Afri-
can states have merged or split up over time. For example, Zanzibar and Tanganyika merged to form 
Tanzania. Sudan split in 2011 into Sudan and South Sudan. 
8South Africa, South Sudan, Eritrea, Egypt, and Ethiopia. 
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motivations with one another, including political pan-Africanism and African socialism. 
The majority of African countries are unitary presidential republics that experienced a 
‘second liberation’ following the end of the Cold War. With some exceptions, most 
African states are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse. 
The unique (and, arguably, shared) history of most African countries led Peter Ekeh to 
famously describe ‘two publics’ in African life. In his seminal article, Ekeh (1975) de-
lineates two competing publics that are in dialectic with one another. The ‘primordial 
public’ is the moralistic realm in which Africans play central roles in African history, 
social structures, and governance. The primordial public is one in which leaders pro-
vide for their constituents to reinforce ‘primordial’ group bonds. The ‘civic public’ is 
an amoralistic realm in which Africans are divorced from their history and traditional 
norms of governance. In the civic realm, colonialist ideology – built on western extrac-
tion of resources from Africa – leads African leaders to extract freely from the state. 
Thus, the civic public – that which westerners view as the modern governance space – 
is a realm of extraction, while the primordial public is a realm of provision and moral 
authority. This ‘dual publics’ structure leads to behavior in which leaders extract as 
much as possible from the state in order to provide for their in-groups, who are often 
their ethnic or religious members. This is known as ‘prebendalism’ (Joseph, 1987), and 
is a form of governance that is common across the African context. 
Finally, African countries rate similarly to one another in most existing corruption in-
dices. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Sub-Saharan 
Africa as the lowest scoring region of the world in its most recent (2018) index. The 
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average score is 32 out of 100, and most African countries score similarly 
(Transparency International, 2019a). Below, Figure 1 displays a choropleth of Trans-
parency International’s ratings of corruption across Africa. Most countries are deep red, 
indicating high levels of corruption. 
FIGURE 1 - AFRICAN CORRUPTION IN THE CPI 
 
These factors, I argue, provide reason to treat Africa as a ‘family’ of nations whose 
governmental dysfunctions bear striking resemblance to one another. Corruption is a 
universal problem; however, I am deeply skeptical of theories and results that claim 
universal application. Across Africa, corruption has presented as a persistent obstacle 
that has delayed African development and manifested itself in relatively similar ways 
across the continent. For this reason, I limit the focus of this work to Africa, though I 
recognize that it may have application elsewhere. 
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Methodology and Summary of Findings 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 lays out the proposed argument in detail, 
explaining why we should expect to observe diverging contentious outcomes from dif-
ferent types of corruption. The chapter establishes the link between the proposed struc-
tural aspect of corruption (type of violation committed and subsequent spoil generated) 
and levels of institutional trust, which in turn affects whether social movements seek 
reformative or revolutionary goals. In order to test the theory and its attendant hypoth-
eses, I marshal evidence from both macro- and micro-level analysis. In order to estab-
lish a causal linkage between different types of corruption and calls for reform and 
revolution, I begin in Chapter 3 by drawing from two field survey experiments con-
ducted in Nigeria and South Africa. This evidence is particularly important because it 
minimizes the chance of endogenous interference in the relationship between percep-
tions of material or systemic corruption and reported calls for reform or revolution. 
In Chapter 4, I draw heavily from the Afrobarometer survey data, which provide a com-
parative look at the political and social opinions of African citizens across the continent 
over multiple rounds of inquiry. This provides individual-level analysis that allows me 
to tease out the important role that perceptions of corruption play in driving anti-gov-
ernment opinions and evaluations of the system. Following this, in Chapter 5, I draw 
from event-level data on protests and riots in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa in order 
to draw correlational inferences about the links between corruption-oriented grievances 
and revolutionary or reformative goals. Finally, in Chapter 6, I then present case studies 
from three countries – Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa – which allow me to draw 
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from historical analysis and interviews conducted while in the field. These case studies 
help develop a thick narrative about the link between different types of corruption and 
diverging contentious goals. Chapter 7 reviews my findings and offers scholarly and 
practical interpretations of the findings. 
Across my analysis, I find strong support for the primary and secondary hypotheses. 
First, I find consistent support that exposure to material corruption drives support for 
reform while exposure to systemic corruption drives support for revolutionary conten-
tion. This remains consistent across each empirical methodology. Second, I find that 
exposure to material corruption reduces trust in politicians but not government institu-
tions, while exposure to systemic corruption reduces trust in government institutions 
substantially. The focus on trust acts as a mechanism through which I am able to help 






A Theory of Corruption and Contention 
Introduction 
This chapter lays out the foundation for the primary argument made in this dissertation; 
namely, that different types of government corruption shape whether contentious or-
ganizations seek reformative outcomes or revolutionary outcomes. In order to do this, 
the character of different forms of corruption are examined to understand how a corrupt 
act like elite theft is different from a corrupt act like electoral fraud. At the crux of the 
argument is a view of corruption that focuses on a core aspect of any given act of cor-
ruption; namely, the manner in which a corrupt act violates normative expectations of 
the government. Corruption is, at its core, the violation of a set of expectations or rules 
designed specifically to generate spoils. These spoils may be material in nature, or they 
may be systemic in nature. Understanding how corrupt acts violate expectations and 
generate spoils helps provide the groundwork for predictive hypotheses regarding the 
manner in which forms of corruption help shape contentious politics. 
The theory argues that government corruption shapes contentious politics by way of 
social and institutional trust. As detailed below, corrupt acts tend to focus on two types 
of spoil: money and power. When corruption generates material benefits, citizens lose 
trust in politicians but not government institutions, and rally together to demand reform. 
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When corruption revolves around distorting the system, citizens lose trust in the insti-
tutions themselves, and come together to demand revolution. 
This theory focuses on contentious politics. The evidence marshalled in the dissertation 
consists of a subset of contentious politics: social movements. I use the term ‘conten-
tious politics’ in a broad sense, encompassing what McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (2001) 
call ‘collective political struggle’. At its core, this term refers to collective action by 
groups within society to challenge the government. These challenges may be reforma-
tive or revolutionary in nature. Reformative action seeks to improve an existing system, 
often through improved redistribution of resources, the expansion of representation or 
accountability. Revolutionary action, on the other hand, seeks to replace or transform 
the very nature of the system. In this dissertation, I measure the impact of corruption 
on social movements; however, the theory is expected to extend to violent militant and 
terrorist groups. 
Reformative and Revolutionary Claims in Africa’s Third Wave 
Africans have long been under-recognized for their spirited and brave defense of de-
mocracy. Citizens, organizations, and unions have taken the fight against venality to 
the streets in many African countries, often defying high costs of mobilization, includ-
ing imprisonment, and death. In Zambia, protesters took to the streets to protest elite 
theft, calling for reform (AFP, 2017), and following the ouster of former president 
Yahya Jammeh, the new Gambian government responded to citizen pressures to clamp 
down on corruption (Transparency International, 2019b). Much of modern African 
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contentious politics emerged out of the development of a class of well-educated African 
evolués under colonial rule who, both within their respective countries and across the 
continent, developed theories and strategies of anti-colonial thought and pan-African 
solidarity that shaped ideologies and strategies of contention (Arnold, 2017). 
Whereas pro-independence contention generally focused on fighting the inherent moral 
corruption of colonial regimes, post-independence contention was shaped by emerging 
salient social cleavages that reasserted themselves as Africans assumed control over the 
levers of power in their countries. In Kenya, the President Jomo Kenyatta relied heavily 
on mobilizing his ethnic base of Kikuyus, one of Kenya’s major ethnic groups. In tak-
ing this decision, Kenyatta shirked advice given to him by advisors to appeal broadly 
across the country (Branch, 2011), and set into place a powerful tradition of ethnic 
politics that continues to shape Kenyan politics today. As a result, much of Kenyan 
contention aligns along ethnic boundaries. The same can be said for Nigeria, whose 
independence was quickly shaken by an attempted ethnic secession by the Igbo and 
Ijaw in the Niger Delta (Arnold, 2017) following concerns over the balance of power 
between the major ethnic groups in the country. While the secession failed, Nigerian 
contention remains ethnically and religiously driven; Boko Haram in the north seeks 
an Islamic state, whereas the Biafran agitators in the south seek ethnonationalist auton-
omy from the state. Next door, in Cameroon, Anglophone separatists rise up against the 
corrupt rule of Paul Biya, who favors the majority francophone population of the coun-
try over its English-speaking inhabitants in the northwest. 
When citizens call for government reform, they are in effect stating that, while they are 
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dissatisfied with the current direction or management of the state, they believe the state 
system itself is strong or effective enough to be worthy of revising. By modifying or 
introducing new policies, the state could be made better. In 2015 in Nigeria, President 
Muhammadu Buhari was elected on exactly this promise: to improve the government 
by reducing corruption. President Buhari was well-known for his strict self-control and 
dislike of corruption, and pledged to make the system work again for the Nigerian peo-
ple.  
On the other hand, some movements call for government revolution, demanding deep 
systemic or structural changes to the system itself. This is what occurred in Burkina 
Faso in 2014, when broad groups of citizens rose up to ouster corrupt president Blaise 
Compaore after he announced his decision to seek an extra-constitutional third term in 
office (Mampilly, 2014). In 2007 in Kenya during the aftermath of a highly fraudulent 
election, presidential challenger Raila Odinga “called for a million-man march against 
State House’ ‘civilian coup’ (Hornsby 2013, 764). Kenyans took to the streets in protest 
and riot demanding new elections, which devolved quickly into ethnic-based slaughter. 
This political crisis led to a power-sharing agreement and the development of a new 
constitution (Daniel Wesangula 2017). In 2014 in Cameroon, activist Aboubakar Sid-
diki was arrested and jailed in response to his quasi-revolutionary calls for change in 
the country with a president that had been in power, at the time, for 32 years (BBC New 
2017). 
In 2018, President Paul Biya of Cameroon marked his 35th year in power, ten years 
after subverting the constitution to remove term limits (BBC News 2018b). In the 
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decade since the removal of the term limits, broad coalitions of many Cameroonians 
have risen up against Biya in peaceful protest, often suffering abuse and detention at 
the hands of Cameroonian security forces (Searcey and Essomba 2018). In 2016 and 
2017, thousands of Zimbabweans took to the streets of Harare to protest kleptocracy 
by the ruling elite; namely, President Robert Mugabe (Jeffrey Moyo 2017). The protests 
were made up of citizens young and old, who rallied around calls for change following 
the arrest of anti-corruption activist and pastor Evan Mawarire (Reuters 2017). 
Unpacking the Dependent Variable: Diverging Contentious Goals 
The concept of classifying social movements in Africa can be found in work by Fer-
rante (2003) and Falola & Nasong’o (2016), who classify four types of social move-
ments: (a) regressive, (b) reformist, (c) revolutionary, and (d) counter-revolutionary. 
Because regressive and counter-revolutionary protests are often pro-government and 
supportive of existing status quo (not to mention existing networks of corruption), I 
focus instead on the reformist and revolutionary. According to Falola and Nasong’o, 
reformist social movements target “some specific feature of society as needing change” 
whereas revolutionary movements “seek broad, sweeping, and radical structural 
changes to a society’s basic social institutions or to the world order” (page 12). 
Recent work by Branch and Mampilly (2015) has detailed the importance of under-
standing localized versus generalized contention, and has pointed to the important role 
that different grievances and structures of governance play. Mueller’s recent work 
(2018) expounds the important role that class structures play in African protest; the 
middle class and civil society class is often responsible for shaping high-minded 
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contentious goals and frames of social movements, while the lower-class provides 
much of the manpower that drives successful movements against the government.  
I contribute to this scholarship by detailing how social movements adopt different con-
tentious goals as they rise up against the government. Rather than referring to all protest 
as ‘revolution,’ I differentiate between contention designed to reform the existing sys-
tem and contention designed to revolutionize the system. These two goals are different 
from one another in how they conceive of the state as it is and the state as it should be. 
Drawing from Falola and Nasong’o, I define the two contentious goals of interest as: 
Reformative Contention seeks to restore the existing system to either an idealized 
form of what the system should be, or to a specific form that the system once was. For 
South Africans facing the machine politics of today’s ANC and political system, the 
halcyon days of Nelson Mandela’s rule serve as a reminder of what the system once 
was, and still could be. For Nigerians, demands for democracy align with specific nor-
mative expectations about what the government could be, if allowed to develop 
properly. 
Revolutionary Contention, on the other hand, seeks to radically reshape the govern-
ment into an entirely new leviathan. Calls by the Economic Freedom Fighters in South 
Africa to reform the state as a Marxist parliamentary republic qualify under as revolu-
tion under my proposed typology. When Boko Haram demands autonomy and seces-
sion from the north to create a theocratic Islamic state, it is proposing a truly revolu-
tionary movement; one in which the new government would be unrecognizable from 
its prior shape. 
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Consider two examples of broad anti-corruption contention that responded directly to 
elite venality. In 2014, following 27 years of rule by President Blaise Compaoré, Burk-
inabé citizens rose up in revolution against the president. Compaoré had come to power 
on in 1987 after the second of his career coups. In 2014, facing the end of his term, 
Compaoré and his political party sought to change the constitution to keep him in power 
indefinitely. In response to this, citizens rose up in revolution, pushing the leader into 
exile and demanding a new constitution (Mampilly, 2014). As a result, the Burkinabe 
were able to fundamentally reshape the founding document of their government – the 
constitution. 
In 2016 in South Africa, on the other hand, citizens rose up in protest against president 
Jacob Zuma’s capture of the state by demanding reforms to the existing democratic 
system (Onishi, 2017). Zuma, who had muscled his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, out of 
power in 2007, spent his presidential tenure mired in corruption scandals. When the 
tenor of those scandals reached a crescendo, protesters did not call for the fall of the 
system – just the fall of Zuma – which occurred in early 2018 when Zuma was replaced 
by Cyril Ramaphosa. As a result, the system remained in place – it had been reformed 
rather than revolutionized. 
Linking Types of Corruption to Diverging Contentious Goals 
In this section, I dig deep into the relationship between the dependent variable, diverg-
ing contentious goals, and the key explanatory factor: different types of corruption. In 
the previous chapter, I detail why I focus on the important and central role that corrup-
tion plays in driving contentious mobilization. Below, I detail previous scholarship on 
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the role that corruption plays in driving the onset of contention and conflict. While the 
scope of this dissertation centers on social movements, there is a substantial literature 
that addresses corruption and the onset of violent conflict. The theory presented in this 
dissertation seeks to explain not only social movements, but violent conflict in future 
iterations. As such, I include scholarship on violent conflict to strengthen the argument. 
I begin with an open question in political science: is corruption even related to the onset 
of conflict and contention? Scholarship thus far has returned mixed results. In part, the 
problem is studying corruption itself. Corruption is the endogenous dysfunction of in-
stitutional norms and laws that emerge endogenously from society. I am attempting to 
then measure contention – an endogenously driven phenomenon – as a response to 
corrupt governments. All of this endogeneity makes analysis daunting and complicated 
and suggests caution when making bold assertions about the relationship between cause 
and effect. 
There are numerous examples of mixed evidence when examining corruption’s rela-
tionship to democratic outcomes. One example is the complicated relationship between 
corruption and democratic development. Scholars have arrived at mixed conclusions 
(Klašnja, Tucker and Deegan-Krause, 2014) as to whether corruption mobilizes voting 
behavior (Kostadinova, 2009) or subdues it (Caillier, 2010). Does democracy hinder 
corruption (Chowdhury, 2004; Fjelde and Hegre, 2006), enable it (Wantchekon, 2003), 
or is the relationship more complex (Drury, Krieckhaus and Lusztig, 2006; Rock, 2009; 
Grindle, 2012)? The answer is not readily forthcoming. Another example, which is the 
focus of this dissertation, is the relationship between corruption and political contention 
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and conflict. Scholars have arrived at strikingly contrary results when measuring 
whether corruption begets conflict and terror (Teets and Chenoweth, 2009; Agbiboa, 
2013; Shelley, 2014; Suleiman and Aminul Karim, 2015). 
The evidence that social movements have been greatly motivated by a central and core 
concern over government corruption during Africa’s third wave is strong. In South Af-
rica, citizens have regularly risen up against state capture (Ivor Chipkin, 2017; Onishi, 
2017; John Campbell, 2018), exorbitant school fees (Ndelu et al., 2016), and poor gov-
ernance and service delivery at the municipal level (Lancaster, 2018). In Kenya, civil 
movements have taken the vanguard in protesting against electoral fraud and rigging 
(de Freytas-Tamura, 2017d) and the rampant machine politics of the government 
(Mariita, 2018). In Cameroon, citizens braved the truncheons of the police to protest 
Paul Biya’s attempt to remain ‘president for life’ (Moki Edwin Kindzeka, 2016). In 
Burkina Faso, citizens also stood up against constitution-rigging, forcing Blaise Com-
paoré from office and demanding a new constitution be written (Carol, 2016). A sub-
stantial body of scholarship has demonstrated the effectiveness of social movement 
campaigns demanding (and often achieving) reformative or revolutionary change in the 
face of blatant government corruption (Shelley, 2005; Johnston, 2012; Abdallah et al., 
2014; Beyerle, 2014). 
The evidence becomes more uncertain when linking corruption to the onset of political 
conflict and violence. Here, the scholarship provides mixed results. Le Billon (2003) 
argues that corruption does not drive conflict, but is instead a symptom of circum-
stances with high levels of political uncertainty. Worth noting, however, is that Le 
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Billon did not engage in any rigorous qualitative or quantitative empirical testing. With 
that noted, Le Billon should be credited for bringing to the fore an important and un-
derrepresented empirical question. Furthermore, Le Billon examined the relationship 
between corruption and the termination of war, as well as the rate of conflict recidivism 
(2008) in post-conflict zones. Le Billon argues that corruption impedes development 
aid, which in turn weakens peace-building endeavors and increases the likelihood of 
conflict. But Le Billon remains skeptical about corruption’s power to motivate conflict 
and contentious political action. 
Drawing on Le Billon’s work, Fjelde (2009) argued that corruption might actually de-
crease the likelihood of conflict. Using the PRS ICRG data on corruption, Fjelde argues 
that leaders flush with ill-gotten corrupt spoils can essentially ‘buy off’ potential chal-
lengers. The work focuses largely on petroleum-rentier states, and finds that within 
such states, corruption actually reduces the likelihood of conflict onset. Similarly, Ar-
riola’s (2009) work finds that the strategic use of patronage by leaders reduces political 
instability. These arguments are intuitive and strong, and I view my work as building 
on them by adding nuance rather than challenging them directly. 
Neudorfer and Theuerkauf (2014), on the other hand, argue that corruption increases 
the likelihood of ethnic conflict by generating inter-ethnic inequality and grievances. 
Neudorfer and Theuerkauf draw from the same data as Fjelde – the PRS data on cor-
ruption – but expand the sample to include non-rentier states. They find that high levels 
of corruption are substantially and significantly more likely to lead to the onset of eth-
nic civil war. As corruption increases from its lowest level (0) to its highest observed 
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level (36), the probability of ethnic war approaches 100 percent.9 
A related body of literature argues that corruption generates opportunities for conflict 
and terror (Rotberg, 2009). Shelley (2014) details the manner in which corruption pro-
vides opportunities to skirt laws and regulations, providing terrorists with the means to 
engage in violence. This forms the basis of what might best be termed the ‘facilitation’ 
argument. Teets and Chenoweth (2009) argue that the facilitation argument is the only 
argument with empirical credibility, and that corruption simply does not motivate con-
flict by way of grievances. There is reason to believe the facilitation argument: recent 
gains by Al Shabaab in Kenya are largely due to bureaucratic incompetence flamed by 
rampant corruption (Higgins, 2015). 10 
More recently, evidence has emerged that more clearly demonstrates linkages between 
perceptions of government corruption and the onset of contentious politics. Chayes 
(2015) examines the relationship between corruption and conflict by detailing what 
citizens on the ground actually say about it. She describes how Boko Haram, an Islamist 
terrorist group, initially grew in response to government corruption. “Corruption was 
everywhere,” Chayes quotes, “and no development. People thought that if they imple-
mented shari’a, corruption would be cleaned out.” Citizens respond positively to at-
tacks against the corrupt police, even if by groups that they otherwise oppose: “Even 
                                                 
9 See page 1870 in Comparative Political Studies 47(13), in which Figure 1 demonstrates predicted ef-
fects of corruption on ethnic war. 
10 Their test, however, is flawed. First, the tests for facilitation and motivation are tested with different 
dependent variables. Second, and more strangely, both the facilitation and motivation tests arrive at vir-
tually the same statistical results, yet Teets and Chenoweth argue that the facilitation argument is statis-
tically supported, whereas the motivational argument is not. 
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among Nigerians who disapprove of [Boko Haram’s] aims, the violence elicits a degree 
of approval. ‘When they attacked police stations … people were happy.’” Other work 
has shown that perceptions of corruption are positively correlated with support for 
Boko Haram (Deckard and Pieri, 2017). 
Agbiboa (Agbiboa, 2013, p. 147) makes a similar case: “…many of the members at-
tracted by Boko Haram are animated by deep-seated socioeconomic and political griev-
ances, such as poor governance and elite corruption.” Walker (2012), Onuoha (2014), 
and Lubeck (2010) provide support for the argument that, more than simply facilitating 
conflict and terror, corruption motivates citizens to join terror groups and participate in 
terroristic activities. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the rebel group M23 
claimed corruption to be a primary motivating factor, going so far as to set up its own 
form of an anti-corruption commission (Waza, 2013), though reports seem to indicate 
that M23 practiced a significant amount of corruption on its own. For Kenyans, cor-
ruption and brutality by security forces helps not only to facilitate Al-Shabaab’s move-
ments into Kenya, but makes easier their calls for mobilization by young, disaffected 
Kenyans (Allen, 2015). 
Material and Systemic Corruption 
Having now reviewed the literature linking corruption to the onset of contentious pol-
itics, I return to the puzzle at hand: if corruption motivates social movements and pro-
tests, why do some anti-corruption movements pursue reformative goals while others 
pursue revolutionary goals? I argue that two different types of corruption – material 
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and systemic – drive diverging contentious outcomes. I draw from Wechsle (2016) in 
denoting the importance between these two specific forms of corruption. Examining 
these different types of corruption accomplishes two outcomes. First, it sheds light onto 
the mixed findings of previous scholarship; because previous conflict scholarship has 
used highly aggregated measures for conflict and has overlooked social movement ac-
tivity, the results did not reflect the important effects of different types of corruption. 
Second, it provides a theoretically meaningful way to understand how and why varia-
tion in types of corruption matter for contentious politics outcomes. 
I begin by building on the definition that corruption is the abuse of public power for 
personal gain, and I infuse Philp’s (2008) emphasis on the violation of norms of gov-
ernance that makes corruption so egregious. To do so, I center the norms around a 
generalized form of the social contract, in which the government provides certain goods 
and services to citizens in return for their cooptation into the political system. These 
goods and services extend beyond security and healthcare; they include Rawlsian goods 
such as fairness, Weberian goods such as bureaucratic impersonality, and Rothstein’s 
emphasis on bureaucratic impartiality. But why measure corruption in relation to de-
mocracy? Most African governments claim to be democratic. In doing so, they enshrine 
standard democratic norms and ideals into their constitutions. For example, as of 2018, 
all African governments have explicitly outlawed corruption, all but four have insti-
tuted independent mechanisms to report police abuse and misconduct, and 40 of 54 
countries have established independent commissions to ensure fair and free elections 
(Global Integrity, 2016). Despite these assurances on paper, African governments 
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routinely fall short of enforcing them. 
The key contribution that I make is to focus on the spoil generated by the act of cor-
ruption. The act may be the theft of state goods for personal gain by an elite, the mis-
appropriation of goods and services for distribution via patronal networks, or the de-
frauding of elections. Between these two components (the ideal and the act) is the first 
transformation, by which the act violates the foundational essence of the ideal. This 
transformation is primarily defined by the substance of its violation: material violations 
concern the misappropriation and theft of material goods and services, such as money, 
whereas systemic violations concern the transformation of the nature of the state itself. 
The act of corruption generates spoils to the benefit of the corrupt. This is the primary 
purpose of corrupt acts. This is the secondary transformation inherent in the process of 
corruption; corruption transforms public goods and state resources into personal spoils.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I describe a novel approach to understanding corrup-
tion not as a static construct, but instead as a dynamic process. In a sense, I argue that 
syndromes of corruption are not static, but instead are the product of constant acts of 
corruption. I draw this insight from work in the social movements literature that con-
siders contention itself to be a dynamic process (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). 
The result is a strong, more comparative understanding of corruption that can help ex-
plain small- and large-scale political contention. Here, I adapt this to better understand 
corruption. 
I begin from the starting proposal that we think of corruption as a portfolio of acts that 
violate antecedent Platonic ideals of governance. Corruption describes, at its core, the 
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deviation from ideals of bureaucracy and democracy, replacing them with personalized, 
non-programmatic behavior and patterns of distribution. 
The word ‘corrupt’, in the idealistic social sense, denotes the decay – purposeful or not 
– of a set of principles that govern social behavior. In his theory of forms, Plato dis-
cussed the deviation from ideals as a form of social corruption, and identified such 
deviation as the primary political concern of civilization (1997). It is from here that I 
embark. The first component of the process of corruption is indeed the set of metaphys-
ical ideals upon which governments are built. Many forms of government – from de-
mocracies to communist regimes or military juntas – can derive their laurels from such 
ideals. For the sake of this text, and because nearly every African government considers 
itself to be democratic, I focus on the ideals of democracy. 
These ideals span a familiar spectrum. Democracies, on the whole, are built on ideals 
of political representation, equality of citizens before the law, fairness, equality of eco-
nomic and social opportunities, formal methods of distribution, and the provision of 
citizen safety by government security forces. To say that few democracies uphold all – 
or even most – of these ideals is uncontroversial. But the rhetoric of democracy speaks 
to these ideals. Ideals are then codified within the precepts of the state. Most African 
states have constitutions in which they detail a battery of human rights, representational 
processes, bureaucratic institutions, and other ideals. 
These ideals – fairness, representation, equality, security – constitute the foundation of 
modern contract theory. From the focus of Hobbes (1651) and Locke (1690) on the 
exchange of freedom for basic political protection and governance to ideals of fairness 
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(1999), contract theory provides a concrete platform for understanding normative ex-
pectations of interactions between the state and citizens. Of all forms of governance, 
democracy is perhaps the most connected to what Rousseau called the social contract 
(2013). Rothstein (2011) argues compellingly that the fundamental nature of fair gov-
ernance is governance built on the principles of impartiality. In this sense, Rothstein 
expands the Rawlsian contractarian approach by arguing not just that justice is the ap-
plication of institutional impartiality, but that corruption is the violation of governance 
structures in that it distorts impartiality, imputing non-programmatic preferences into 
institutions and networks of distribution. In doing so, Rothstein provides some of the 
most credible and important theoretical ground upon which to anchor our understand-
ing and operationalization of corruption. 
I build on Rothstein’s intuition by further embedding corruption in to the larger ques-
tion of the social contract. Impartiality may be the core foundation of justice and fair-
ness, but valuing fairness presupposes that the ideal of fairness is built into the social 
contract. The contract consists of certain expectations about the behavior inherent in 
government-citizen relationships. At the core of the social contract is the assumption 
that the metaphysical ideals of democratic governance are platonic ideals, and that their 
violation and corrosion is inherently a denigration of the social contract itself. This, 
then, forms the foundation of the theory of corruption; at its core, corruption is corrup-
tion precisely because it erodes the social contract by violating codified forms and ide-
als. 
In framing corruption as such, its definition becomes both more straightforward and 
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more strongly grounded in both theory and observable implications. Political corrup-
tion occurs when an act by a government official or group of officials deviates in spirit 
and practice from the enshrined ideals. When elites use their power and privilege to 
skim money from state coffers and deposit it into their personal bank accounts, ideals 
concerning the separation of officeholder from office are violated. When elites distrib-
ute state funds unequally in order to develop networks of patronage, ideals regarding 
programmatic and impersonal distribution are violated. When presidents stuff ballot 
boxes and engage in electoral fraud, ideals regarding representation and electoral mech-
anisms are violated. And when elites co-opt security forces in order to repress citizens 
in order to maintain their access to state resources, ideals regarding the security and 
safety of citizens are violated. 
I now introduce a typology of corruption that parses between material and systemic 
types of corruption. Material corruption refers to official misconduct with regard to 
state funds and resources. When a political elite, such as the President, siphons state 
resources and diverts them to his personal bank account, material corruption has taken 
place. When a state governor or leader redirects state funds to favor one group over 
another in exchange for political loyalty and support, material corruption has taken 
place. In some cases, material corruption takes the form of bribe solicitation by elites 
in return for a construction contract. In other cases, leaders proffer clientelistic offers 
to citizens in exchange for their votes, or provide hospitals and clinics while leaving 
other regions in the country without adequate medical care. 
The root of this category is the misuse by an official of state funds, and the spoil being 
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distributed is generally fiscal in nature. Material corruption violates numerous ideals 
pertaining to the use of state resources. For example, the Weberian (1978) principle of 
bureaucratic governance argues that the officeholder and the political office are them-
selves two separate entities, and that officeholders cannot ‘capture’ the office and use 
its resources as a personal trust fund. Furthermore, bureaucratic ideals of distribution 
are generally merit-based or equality-based, yet systems of patronage and clientelism 
corrupt these ideals by transforming the property of the whole (state development funds, 
etc.) into the property of the few. 
Material corruption, while deleterious to the state, does not directly challenge the dem-
ocratic structure of the state. Presidents and leaders may be corrupt, yet the system itself 
remains relatively unthreatened. For example, the Nigerian presidency has survived, 
despite the turnover of every elected leader since 1999. Because material corruption 
does not directly threaten the structure of the state, citizens should be more likely to 
engage in non-violent protest, directing their contentious efforts toward changing lead-
ership instead of changing the system. Thus, where material corruption is prevalent, 
citizens should be more likely engage in protests and strikes by way of civil society 
organizations such as the anti-corruption and governance reform organization, CLEEN, 
in Nigeria instead of mobilizing using force or violence (Johnston 2012; Rose-Acker-
man and Carrington 2013). 
Material corruption generates a tangible impact on citizens through two primary mech-
anisms of change. First, material corruption reduces the overall amount of material re-
sources available for use in state development. Simply put, even if the state did want to 
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engage in genuine state development, the money ‘just isn’t there’. Nigeria’s former 
military dictator, Sani Abacha, was known to have stolen over five billion dollars of 
petrodollars that had originally been slated for purpose of development and state im-
provement. Second, material corruption redefines public goods into private or club 
goods. 
Material corruption, in addition to the tangible effects on citizen lives detailed above, 
entails a series of significant transformations that substantively change the nature of 
state-citizen interactions themselves. The first is rule of law, which describes the overall 
adherence to the law within the state. Material corruption operates precisely through an 
informal weakening of the application and strength of formal rules. The presence of 
rampant material corruption indicates that either the proper legal rules and statutes are 
not in place, or that such rules have been weakened through customary deviant prac-
tices, resulting in weak expectations regarding adherence to such laws by government 
officials. The second transformation addresses mechanisms and expectations of ac-
countability. Material corruption relies largely on administrators and auditors to ‘turn a 
blind eye’ and ignore corruption. In doing so, mechanisms for checks and balances as 
well as holding officials accountable are weakened. 
When corruption occurs, the relationship between the citizen and the state is itself trans-
formed. Material corruption is generally accompanied by a disconnection between cit-
izens and their governments (such as in the case of theft), or demonstrates favoritism 
that leads some groups to be ‘in’ while other groups are left ‘out’. Similarly, the rela-
tionship between different nodes of the state are transformed. Material corruption 
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demonstrates spheres of blindness that allow for the continuation of corrupt practices 
and the sidestepping of regulation. Pervasive material corruption reinforces these 
spheres of blindness’. 
Scholars of distributional politics (such as clientelism and patronage) may be hesitant 
to endorse a view of corruption that includes these political behaviors. After all, distri-
butional politics are viewed as normal throughout many regions in the world. African 
politics have long relied on systems of ‘prebendal’ patronage politics that link patrons 
to political subjects (Ekeh, 1975; Joseph, 1987; Schatzberg, 2001). Yet, patronage in 
the modern state system operates by illegally siphoning funds from the state in order to 
provide material benefit to some citizens and not others. The largesse of each patron is 
the result of looting and corrupt procurement practices that funnel and siphon state 
funds away from the public and into private hands. Moreover, patronage is increasingly 
considered corrupt as expectations of African democracies grow (Ogundiya, 2009). 
The second category in this axis is systemic. Unlike material corruption, systemic cor-
ruption is a purposeful distortion of the system. When elites engage in electoral fraud 
by stuffing ballot boxes or gerrymandering, this is systemic corruption that betrays the 
basic principles of democracy and government and corrodes expectations that the state 
will actually fulfill its democratic promise. When elites co-opt security forces to repress 
dissent in order to cover up or maintain access to state coffers, this is systemic corrup-
tion that betrays the promises of security and protection offered to citizens by the state. 
Instead of acting as a protector, the state itself becomes a predator. 
The root of this category is the restructuring of the political system by officials seeking 
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to retain power. The spoil for distribution is thus related to power – either through direct 
access or indirect representation. The basic ideals and principles of democracies require 
accountability of politicians to citizens, yet electoral fraud strips the accountability 
power of voting from citizens. Most modern democracies claim to protect their citizens 
through the use of internal and external security forces, yet the cooptation of security 
forces by leaders often leads to the targeted marginalization and discrimination of cer-
tain groups within a population. 
Systemic corruption, unlike material corruption, directly threatens the democratic ide-
als of the state. When leaders engage in widespread electoral fraud, such as President 
Kibaki in the 2007 Kenyan election or attempt to modify the constitution to remain in 
power, such as Paul Biya in Cameroon in 2016 or Nkurunziza in Burundi in 2015, 
citizens understand that the very nature of their government is at stake. Such systemic 
corruption casts a shadow over the future of the nation, calling into question its demo-
cratic nature. In most nations in which the system has been captured by corrupt leaders, 
repression follows. When police and military forces engage in coercive corruption at 
the end of the barrel of a gun, citizens feel less physically secure and experience higher 
levels of general uncertainty. As such, citizens should be more likely to engage in vio-
lent contention, such as riots, political violence, and even terrorism. 
Systemic corruption imparts transformative change on the nature of the state and its 
engagement with citizens. First, systemic corruption directly impacts rule of law by 
changing the very content and nature of the rule of law and formal rules. Whereas ma-
terial corruption diminishes the rule of law through skirting the law, systemic 
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corruption sets about to change it altogether. In doing so, such corruption changes the 
nature of the state and shapes future state-citizen interactions in favor of the govern-
ment. Second, systemic corruption fundamentally reduces and alters formal systems of 
governance, both within the government itself and by citizens. Within the government, 
checks and balances are diminished and done away with altogether, whereas with citi-
zens, the primary method of accountability – the electoral system – is reconfigured 
either as ineffective or is done away with completely. 
In doing so, material corruption effects a third transformation: it disempowers citizens, 
transforming them from (theoretically) empowered citizens into largely powerless sub-
jects. Consider Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe has corrupted the system so thor-
oughly that he is now a ‘democratically elected’ tyrant ruling over his subjects. This 
transformation operates laterally as well, consolidating power from across the govern-
ment into a small cadre or winning coalition. This reduces intragovernmental checks 
on control, such as the independence of anti-corruption agencies or the judiciary. 
Fifth, systemic corruption greatly reduces the opportunities for citizens to engage pol-
iticians and the political apparatus as a whole. This reduction in political opportunity 
structures has a tangible impact on the ability of citizens to use legal, non-violent pro-
test when making demands of the government, potentially narrowing the universe of 
impactful contentious political actions. The sixth transformation expands this reduction 
in citizen options by reducing time horizons. Systemic corruption, because it directly 
impacts the structure and rules of government, likely reduces the ability of citizens to 
‘vote the rascal out’. The impact of contention over time is thus distorted, and citizens 
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have little reason to expect that consistent protest, over time, will effect positive change 
in the government. 
Typology of Corruption 
I populate a typology by mapping specific instances of different types of corruption: 
elite theft, patronage, electoral rigging (or fraud), and police/security force corruption. 
These types of corruption were selected because they are highly salient and present in 
the general African experience.11 Across the continent, African leaders have generally 
engaged in elite-level theft, including Kenyan autocrat Daniel Arap Moi, South African 
president Jacob Zuma, and Cameroon’s Paul Biya. Similarly, prebendal (‘patronage’) 
politics abound; scholars have demonstrated the prevalence of electoral clientelism in 
Benin (Wantchekon, 2003; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013) and patronage across the 
continent (Arriola, 2009). Electoral fraud and rigging also remain problematic and 
widespread. The past three Kenyan elections were rife with allegations of fraud and 
rigging, to the point where the 2007 election resulted in an unprecedented power-shar-
ing agreement , the 2012 election resulted in the development of a new electoral com-
mission , and the 2017 election was overturned by the Supreme Court of Kenya 
(Hornsby, 2013; BBC, 2017). Similarly, Nigerian elections have often been suspected 
of fraud (Kerr, 2013), and many in the Igbo community in Nigeria’s south have 
                                                 
11 Of course, there is no singular “African experience,” nor do I assert that variation across countries 
should be minimized. There are important differences at every level of analysis. West African experi-




historically called for boycotts on the elections as a result12 (Opejobi, 2019). Finally, 
police corruption is widespread on the continent, affecting Kenyans (Daily Nation, 
2018), Mozambicans (Kyed, 2017), South Africans (Faull, 2017), and Ghana (Beek, 
2017). 
This prediction is not all-encompassing; I do not claim that all responses to elite theft 
are the same, or that all responses to security co-optation are the same. This is, in part, 
because types of corruption are not often easily distinguishable. Where there is elite 
theft, there is often patronage or security co-optation. Instead, I argue that the nature of 
the type of corruption drives a higher likelihood of certain forms of citizen response, 
be it non-violent or violent, and in either broad or narrow coalitions. Moreover, I do 
not assert that these four types of corruption are the most important or even the most 
prevalent forms of corruption experienced in Africa. There is a strong argument to be 
made that, while these are perhaps the most damaging to African states, the most prev-
alent forms of corruption are petty forms of corruption experienced on a daily basis by 
citizens attempting to obtain official documents or to simply access public goods. 
Material Corruption is corruption designed to generate material benefits for either a 
small cohort of elites or for politically relevant groups within the population. By mate-
rial benefits, I refer to a number of potential gains. In many cases, material corruption 
directly generates the benefit of wealth to a leader and his elite cohort. This form of 
                                                 
12 As discussed in Opejobi 2019, this trend was reversed at the last minute in 2019, when several seces-
sionist groups advocated for southern Igbos to participate in elections. 
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looting, which I describe as elite theft, has been prominent across many African coun-
tries. For example, in Nigeria, former military dictator Sani Abacha siphoned away 
over $5 billion from the African state to his own personal bank account (Smith, 2015). 
In South Africa, former president Jacob Zuma used millions of taxpayer dollars13 to add 
luxury elements to his personal residence, including an amphitheater, a pool, and a re-
ception center (Madonsela, 2014). In other cases, material corruption involves distrib-
uting state funds, public goods, and development projects to some politically relevant 
groups in order to shore up political support. This has been the case in many African 
countries, where leaders have distributed Chinese development aid disproportionately 
to their home regions (Dreher et al., 2014). 
Material corruption is the source of a substantial amount of frustration in the African 
context, but it is relatively concordant with Ekeh’s ‘two publics.’ Leaders take from the 
civic public and give within the primordial public. In doing so, they strengthen their 
‘primordial14’ governance networks at the expense of their duties to the larger popula-
tion within the ‘civic public.’ In short, material corruption is considered to be corruption, 
but is also expected with the existing prebendal system that pervades most African sys-
tem. As such, I argue that material corruption is likely to reduce trust in individual 
politicians or political parties but not trust in the institutions themselves. 
                                                 
13 Converted from South African Rand for the purpose of discussion here. 
14 For many reasons, using the term ‘primordial’ is extremely problematic in the African context. West-
ern narratives have traditionally portrayed African politics as backwards and tribal, and the word pri-
mordial conjures pre-modern and pre-civilized sentiments that are both demeaning to Africans and re-
flective of colonial opinions of western superiority and African inferiority. I use this term only because 
it is the terminology used by Ekeh. 
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Systemic Corruption is that which distorts the system itself in order to generate ben-
efits of power and political access. Defining systemic corruption is more difficult than 
defining material corruption for two reasons. First, most scholarship has focused on 
corruption as a material endeavor, which conditions the conversation to revolve around 
elite theft and other such material violations. Consider the police as an example. The 
police provide a public service – namely, the provision of security and support of justice. 
When police demand low-level bribes, they are regularly recognized as having acted 
corruptly. They violated their mandate in order to generate a small, personalized benefit 
for themselves. Yet, when police engage in wide-spread intimidation and violence, of-
ten at behest of a politician, this is not discussed as corruption. But the same principles 
remain – the provision of the public good of security and justice has been violated in 
order to generate political benefits for some and not for others. 
Second, much of I consider to be systemic corruption has been discussed in the schol-
arship by other names. Electoral interference, gerrymandering, and constitutional ma-
nipulation all entail the violation of expected norms and principles of governance in 
order to generate personalized benefits, often by enabling those in power to enact prac-
tices that reduce accountability (Glasius, 2018). Aren’t these acts separate from corrup-
tion? I argue that they are not – and that they may be considered part of what Johnston 
referred to as ‘syndromes of corruption’ – networks of privilege and power that enrich 
and empower elites by rigging systems and re-writing rules (2005). 
For example, I include forms of blatant vote-rigging and fraud, which are generally 
‘safe’ to consider as corrupt. But I also include electoral intimidation and attempts to 
 
46 
remove term-limits as acts of systemic corruption. Take the removal of term-limits, 
which is perhaps the hardest case to justify. If term limits are changed via legal mech-
anisms, how can it be corrupt to do so? Recall from Chapter 1 that the third major 
school of thought on corruption focuses on the violation of expected norms and princi-
ples of governance. When a president attempts to change the constitution in order to 
remain in power indefinitely, he is using his power to violate both the spirit and text of 
the constitution. Most constitutions are designed specifically to provide the public with 
a major public good – the check against unbridled executive power. As a public good, 
this ensures that power will be transferred periodically, and that corrupt and authoritar-
ian elites will be ousted. In seeking to change the constitution to remove term limits, a 
president has decided to violate the public good in order to generate for himself the 
private good of continued access to power. I argue that systemic corruption is likely to 
reduce citizen trust in the system itself. Citizens are likely to see the government as 
‘rigged,’ and should be more likely to seek out revolutionary alternatives. 
Four Types of Corruption 
Below, I detail four types of corruption that are common to the African experience. The 
first two are material in nature, while the second two are systemic. These are by no 
means the only forms of corruption that matter in the African context; however, they 
are all highly salient, particularly with regard to contentious politics. Each of the forms 
of corruption discussed in this dissertation are government corruption – I do not include 
corruption by non-government organization, religious leaders and institutions, busi-
nesses, or other actors. That is because this dissertation seeks to understand variation 
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in types of anti-government contention, and thus it examines only forms of corruption 
that the government can reasonably be held accountable for. Moreover, the majority of 
the corruption within this dissertation falls under the category of ‘grand’ corruption 
rather than ‘petty corruption.’ This distinction has been shown to be important in the 
scholarship on corruption (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000; Nystrand, 2014); 
however, research has shown that while grand corruption is linked with the onset of 
civic action, petty corruption is not (Drugov, Hamman and Serra, 2014). 
ELITE THEFT 
Elite theft refers to forms of material corruption that include high level theft by political 
elites of state resources and funds. Elite theft is also known widely as ‘kleptocracy.’ 
Elite theft, such as that conducted by kleptocratic leaders such as Sani Abacha of Ni-
geria or Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, results in the development of a personal fiscal 
largesse often located in foreign and offshore bank accounts (Ndikumana and Boyce, 
1998; Chayes, 2015; Smith, 2015). Elite theft violates ideals of separation between of-
fice and officeholder as outlined in Weber’s works on bureaucracy. In doing so, elite 
theft generally benefits a small number of elites in the ruling coterie. In countries such 
as Equatorial Guinea, where the entire oil industry is owned by the ruling family, pov-
erty reigns supreme (McFerson, 2009). The result is that elite theft substantially reduces 
the ability of state economies to grow (Mauro, 1995), leaving Africans more destitute 
than they were at independence (Ghazvinian, 2008).  
PATRONAGE 
Patronage has received perhaps the most dedicated attention by scholars, and occupies 
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a central role in traditional discussions of corruption15. In short, patronage is the prac-
tice of leaders distributing state funds strategically within its population in order to 
shore up political stability and/or support. Patronage violates the Rawlsian principle of 
fairness (Rawls, 1999) and Rothstein’s principle of impartiality (Rothstein and Uslaner, 
2011), transforming public goods from the ‘civic public’ and distributing them to one’s 
political base within the ‘primordial public.’ In doing so, patronage practices result in 
the siphoning of money away from institutions and programs that could benefit every-
one and the investment of that money into particular groups based on favoritism. The 
result is that some groups have access to more financial aid and better public goods and 
services while others are left out. 
Arriola (2009) has shown that leaders successfully use patronage to shore up political 
stability by giving access to certain groups within a population to state resources. 
Stokes et al. (2013) have demonstrates how clientelism is particularly effective in gen-
erating support from poor voters that might otherwise choose to punish corrupt leaders, 
and Grindle (2012) has shown that the provision of jobs via patronal networks has 
played a vital role in consolidating political power in consolidating democracies. Pat-
ronage, then, is a strategic form of corruption designed to empower certain groups 
within the population. 
                                                 
15 The foundational text on political corruption by Heidenheimer, Johnston, and Levine (1989) dedicates 




Electoral fraud – the process of stuffing ballot boxes, reneging on constitutional term 
limits, and engaging in voter intimidation – has not often been associated with studies 
of corruption. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, para. 8) describe electoral fraud as 
the “[m]anipualation of election results, through vote buying or threats to the electorate, 
or by falsification or destruction of votes.” Yet electoral fraud is corruption of the high-
est order; it not only generates spoils of power, but results in the severe weakening of 
democratic ideals and deracination of electoral expectations by voters. When leaders 
are able to circumvent democracy, constituents begin to understand that the system it-
self has become corrupted, and that the democratic ideals promised by the government 
– accountability and representation – are not long for this world. 
Electoral fraud generates the spoil of continued access to power, which distorts mech-
anisms of accountability and allows leaders to engage in acts of authoritarianism 
(Glasius, 2018). In some countries, only a few benefit from such a spoil; the President 
and his cronies remain in power, and the rest of the population is excluded from power. 
This is particularly the case in personalistic regimes, which largely characterize African 
regimes (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). These regimes engage in systemic corruption by 
‘fixing’ the system so that elections automatically return support for the incumbent, or 
by making it difficult for challengers to compete. 
But, do violations of electoral rules – and constitutional manipulations – that allow 
presidents to remain in power qualify as corruption? Recent scholarship indicates that 
this form of violation does indeed conjure perceptions of corruption. In his chapter on 
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electoral rules, Klaas (2018) describes the calculus of electoral rigging as “the fraud-
ster’s dilemma,” and Charles Manga Fombad describes the corrupting and delegitimiz-
ing effects of executive breaches of the constitution. Fombad (2017) details the use of 
bribery in Uganda and Nigeria to force change, and also describes cases in Namibia, 
Senegal, Burundi, and Eritrea in which presidents simply decided to break the law and 
ignore term limits. According to Fombad’s research, of the nine successful legal bids 
to remove term limits, six relied on what Rose-Ackerman and Palifka define as either 
bribery or “exchange of favors”16”Of the five legal bids to remove term limits that did 
not succeed, three relied on bribery and “judicial fraud.”17 
POLICE & SECURITY FORCE CORRUPTION 
The final form of corruption refers to the systemic dysfunction of the police and secu-
rity forces that has been well-documented in the African context (Ruteere, 2011; 
Wambua, 2015). This includes both concerns of police/security extraction of bribes 
from citizens (Beek, 2017) as well as bureaucratic and practical malfeasance in which 
the benefits of protection and order are systematically extended to some segments of 
the population and withdrawn or withheld from others (Kyed, 2017). Police/security 
force corruption generates several spoils at different levels. At the level of the individ-
ual officer, the spoil generated is largely defined by the number of bribes any given 
officer was able to extract. More importantly, at the organizational level, police/security 
                                                 
16 In their typology of corruption, “exchange of favors” is defined as the “exchange of one broken rule 
for another.” 
17 Defined by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka as “a decision based on any … type of corruption, or threats 
to the judge, rather than the merits of the case.” 
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corruption generates spoils of political influence and control by providing protection 
and rule of law for some groups and not others. In the Niger Delta, police and security 
forces have been co-opted to repress indigenous groups seeking better treatment by the 
government (Okonta and Douglas, 2003), violating their role as providers of security 
and justice in favor of generating political benefits for elites. 
Across Africa, police/security force corruption remains one of the most salient and mo-
bilizing symptoms of state dysfunction. In Kenya, police brutality has been widely re-
ported against political protesters and opponents (Auerbach, 2003; Mavenjina, 2017), 
and in Zimbabwe, the police have traditionally been used as mob-style enforcers for 
the ruling ZANU-PF political party (Kasambala, 2008; Godwin, 2011). In 2014 in Bu-
rundi, the police arrested a prominent anti-corruption activist in order to disrupt his 
ability to participate in an anti-corruption protest  (Radio France cited in (Raleigh et al., 
2010)). In doing so, police and security forces across Africa transform the provision of 
the public goods of security and justice into selective benefits for either themselves 
(when soliciting bribes) or politicians (when engaging in politically-motivated policing 
and repression). 
How Do Types of Corruption Shape Diverging Contentious Goals? 
When government corruption is material in nature, citizens lose trust in politicians but 
do not lose trust in the system. Material forms of corruption constitute violations of the 
democratic promise, but are traditionally concordant with prebendal governance norms. 
As such, when citizens perceive material corruption, they should be more likely to 
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mobilize in favor of government reform. When elites raid state coffers for themselves, 
they do not fundamentally shape the state system; instead, they pilfer from the state in 
a manner that could be reversed by either replacing the leader or adding policies that 
introduce transparency and accountability. Similarly, when elites redirect state funds to 
specific ethnic groups via networks of patronage, the system itself may not be affected. 
This is perhaps most evident when countries elect new leaders, who promptly redirect 
patronage to different groups within society. 
On the other hand, when government corruption is systemic in nature, citizens will lose 
trust in the system itself. Due to the distorting effects that systemic forms of corruption 
have on government institutions, citizens will be less likely to believe that the system 
could work in the first place. Systemic corruption leads to feelings that the system is 
broken beyond repair. When citizens perceive systemic corruption, they should be more 
likely to mobilize in support of revolution. When citizens perceive the system to be 
unfixable and captured beyond repair, the solution is likely to center on revolutionary 
goals, such as demanding deep structural changes or an entirely new constitution. In 
cases such as Mugabe’s Zimbabwe or Biya’s Cameroon, the political and governance 
systems have been molded to the contours of individuals or political parties, requiring 
changes to the fundamental systems of governance and the state. 
Two primary sets of hypotheses of this dissertation emerge. The first set focuses on the 
diverging contentious goals that emerge from exposure to different types of corruption.  
Hypothesis 1a: when citizens perceive material corruption, citizens will be more likely 
to demand reform. 
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Hypothesis 1b: when citizens perceive systemic corruption, citizens will be more 
likely to demand revolution. 
The second set focuses on the trust mechanisms that connect perceptions of corruption 
to 
Hypothesis 2a: when citizens perceive material corruption, they will lose trust in spe-
cific politicians rather than in the system itself. 
Hypothesis 2b: when citizens perceive systemic corruption, they will lose trust in gov-
ernment institutions themselves. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented a theory linking variation in types of corruption to 
diverging contentious outcomes. I have argued that material corruption reduces trust in 
politicians, but does not substantially reduce trust government institutions themselves. 
Because of this, citizens mobilize in pursuit of reformative goals. Systemic corruption, 
on the other hand, reduces trust in the system itself, and leads citizens to pursue revo-
lutionary goals. 
In the next chapter, I present causal evidence of this by drawing upon two survey ex-
periments conducted in Nigeria and South Africa. Following this, I expand the analysis 
to include individual-level analysis of the Afrobarometer data. Together, these two 
chapters provide strong evidence that perceptions of different types of corruption have 





Causal Linkages of Types of Corruption 
and Reform or Revolution 
Introduction 
I begin by introducing evidence of a causal linkage between perceptions of different 
types of corruption (material and systemic) and revolutionary sentiments. Specifically, 
I test this using two survey experiments that were conducted in Nigeria and South Af-
rica, and use a variable to proxy for revolutionary intent. Experimental evidence is par-
ticularly useful when analyzing the relationship between endogenous variables such as 
perceptions of corruption and revolutionary sentiment. For obvious reasons, these two 
variables are likely highly endogenous to one another; individuals who perceive cor-
ruption are likely to use that information to inform their overall support for revolution-
ary sentiments, and individuals who believe the system should be reformed or revolu-
tionized are likely to perceive corruption differently. In order to address this, I use two 
survey experiments to impose an exogenous and random treatment of the four types of 
corruption presented in the previous chapter. I find that when respondents are exposed 
to treatments of material corruption, they are more likely to state that the system needs 
reform. When respondents are exposed to systemic forms of corruption, they are more 




The chapter proceeds as such: first, I address a growing literature of experimental meth-
ods in examining corruption. I then present the methods of both experiments, detailing 
the treatments and dependent variables. I then present the results of the experiment in 
Nigeria, followed by the results of the experiment in South Africa.  
Experiments in Corruption Studies 
Scholars have increasingly relied on experimental methods to study the effects of cor-
ruption. In part, this is due to the highly endogenous nature of corruption, which can 
frustrate attempts to derive causality between corruption and a dependent variable. The 
use of experiments in studying corruption is still in its infancy, but has led to an im-
pressive catalog of findings.18 There have largely been three experimental approaches 
to understanding corruption: (1) field experiments, (2) laboratory experiments, and (3) 
exploiting so-called ‘natural experiments’. 
Wantchekon (2003, 2011) helped pioneer the use of field experiments with his studies 
on clientelism in Benin. These studies demonstrated that clientelistic promises do gen-
erate positive electoral outcomes for political candidates, particularly incumbents. 
Along similar lines, De La O (2013) finds that government handouts via conditional 
cash transfers help to mobilize voters in support of incumbent candidates. On the other 
hand, experiments have shown that when voters are informed about corruption (rather 
than made promises of a clientelistic nature) in the government, voters turn out in 
                                                 
18 See Wantchekon and Serra’s (2012) work on experimental evidence in studying corruption for a de-
tailed overview as well as individual studies. 
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smaller numbers (Chong et al. 2012, 2015). Laboratory experiments have also helped 
generated impressive results. Abbink et al. (2000, 2002) have helped to demonstrate 
the importance of reciprocal relationships in networks of bribery and corruption, and 
Rothstein and Eek (2009) have convincingly demonstrated that exposure to corruption 
– even at a petty level – results in significantly reduced trust. 
Natural experiments have generated significant buzz with regard to understanding cor-
ruption, because they offer an internally coherent and externally valid opportunity to 
explore the effects of corruption. Recent work by Ares and Hernandez (Chong et al. 
2015) has documented the deleterious effect of corruption scandals on trust in politi-
cians, which is replicated in the survey experiment conducted for this chapter. Ares and 
Hernández (2017) exploited the uncovering of a corruption scandal while the European 
Social Survey was conducted, finding that corruption degrades trust in politicians, and 
that this distrust crosses partisan lines. 
Less frequently, scholars have employed survey experiments to examine the impact of 
corruption on social behavior and perceptions. Wechsle (2016) employed such a tech-
nique in India, testing elite theft versus vote buying, and found that when corrupt spoils 
were distributed as club goods rather than private goods, respondents had a signifi-
cantly more positive view of the politician. Klašna and Tucker (2013) demonstrate that 
perceptions of corruption vary in different countries with high or low expectations of 




The data include survey experiments conducted in Nigeria and in South Africa. With 
very few exceptions, the survey experiments are identical. The survey experiment in 
Nigeria was conducted during a 3-week period in June 2017 during field research in 
Nigeria. The experiment was conducted by six trained Nigeria enumerators, each of 
whom was native to their location of research, and thus fluent in local languages and 
customs. Enumerators were trained at Lead City University in Ibadan, Nigeria, and 
were equipped with paper copies of the survey experiment in English. Enumerators 
were instructed to read the survey in English, and to translate concepts and specific 
words into local languages when necessary. 
The survey was initially designed to be nationally representative, with intention to treat 
600 respondents. This would result in national representation with a confidence level 
of 95 percent and a sampling error of 4 percentage points. Once in-country, financial 
limitations caused one of the randomly selected sampling states (Anambra) to be dis-
counted from the sample. As a result, five states, including both the current (Abuja) and 
former capital (Lagos) were selected for sampling. The revised sample produced an 
intention to treat 540 respondents. In the end, the total number of responded treated 
was 529, resulting in a sampling error of 4.26 percentage points. 
The survey experiment in South Africa was conducted during a two-week period in 
August 2018 during field research in Johannesburg. The experiment was conducted by 
three trained enumerators, each of whom were highly familiar with Gauteng province. 
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Enumerators were recruited via the political science department at the University of 
Johannesburg, and were trained directly by me. The research budget for the South Af-
rica trip was substantially smaller than that for Nigeria, and as a result, the survey was 
limited to Johannesburg and Soweto in Gauteng province. The sampling schedule in-
cludes an intention to treat 495 respondents. In total, 344 observations were recorded. 
Locations & Sampling 
SAMPLING INSTRUCTIONS 
In order to ensure complete randomization, enumerators were instructed to arrive at the 
center of each primary sampling unit (PSU). PSUs were located at the third-adminis-
trative district level. They were then instructed to face in a random direction. Using a 
deck of four cards, enumerators then picked either the Ace, Two, Three, or Four card 
from a shuffled pile, which in turn directed them to either: (a) continue straight, (b) turn 
90 degrees and begin walking, (turn 180 degrees, or (c) turn 270 degrees. Enumerators 
then picked every fifth domicile to conduct an interview. In order to ensure that the 
sample did not exclude working respondents, enumerators occasionally included mar-
ket stalls in which multiple potential respondents were working. 
Once a household was selected, the enumerator randomly selected a respondent from 
within the household. This was done in accordance with established practice from the 
Afrobarometer project. In each PSU, enumerators interviewed at minimum 7 males and 
7 females, and randomly selected the gender for the remaining interview. If an enumer-
ator sought a female respondent, he asked how many Nigeria women over the age of 
18 resided at the house. The initials of each qualifying respondent were recorded. Then, 
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using his card deck, the enumerator randomly selected a card, and asked to interview 
the individual whose initials matched up with that card. Therefore, if four women re-
sided in a household and the enumerator selected a 3-card, the third woman would be 
interviewed. 
EXPERIMENT 1: NIGERIA 
In total, five out of thirty-six states in Nigeria were included in the sample. Sampling 
was conducted using stratified random sampling. Sampling was conducted methodi-
cally, beginning with the selection of first-level administrative districts (states). At the 
highest level, five states were selected. Two states – the former and current capital – 
were purposively included to ensure that the centers of political and social power were 
included in the sample. After that, one state from each of the three major geopolitical 
zones were included. From the South, Rivers State was included. From the North, Kano 
State was included. And from the West, Oyo State was included. Sampled districts are 
below in Table 1. 
Once the five first-level administrative states were selected, second-level administra-
tive districts were randomly selected. The number of districts selected per state was 
derived by the respective population of each state. Therefore, more populous states, 
such as Lagos and Kano, received more PSU locations than less populous states, such 
as the Federal Capital Territory. Because the Federal Capital Territory hosts Nigeria’s 
current capital city (Abuja), the state was purposefully oversampled by assigning four 
PSUs rather than three. 
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TABLE 1 - SAMPLED STATES & DISTRICTS IN NIGERIA 
State Locations ITT T 
Oyo State Oluyole, Itesiwaju, Ibadan North East, Irepo, Ibarapa Central, 
Ibadan South East, Egbeda 
105 101 
Lagos State Kosofe, Shomolu, Ikeja, Amuwo-Odofin, Lagos Mainland, Eti 
Osa, Ajeromi-Ifelodun, Ojo, Oshodi-Isolo 
135 130 
Kano State Ungogo, Tsanyawa, Tarauni, Rogo, Rimini Gaod, Makoda, 
Gwale, Gaya, Garun Mallam 
135 133 
Federal Capital Gwagwalada, Bwari, Kwali, Municipal Area Council 60 60 
Rivers State Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Andoni, Obio/Akpor, Abua/Odual, De-
gema, Port Harcourt, Emuoha 
105 105 
Note: ITT = “Intended to Treat”, T = “Treated” 
EXPERIMENT 2: SOUTH AFRICA 
In South Africa, the survey took place in Gauteng province (see Table 2 below). As a 
result, the responses can be said to be representative of individuals living in Gauteng, 
but cannot be said to be representative of South Africa as a whole. While this is unfor-
tunate, Chapter 6 established that the vast majority of contention occurs in Johannes-
burg. Moreover, on several occasions, enumerators reported verbal and physical har-
assment in some of the more dangerous regions (for example, Diepsloot). For the sake 
of ensuring the safety of all enumerators, very dangerous regions were sometimes 
changed to neighboring, safer regions. This may introduce bias into the data. Finally, 
the data were collected using tablet computers in South Africa rather than the pen and 
paper method used in Nigeria. 
TABLE 2 – SAMPLED DISTRICTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
District Locations ITT T 
Johannesburg Braamfischerville, Ennerdale South, Sandton, Sunninghill, 
Tswelopele, Waterval 
135 142 
Soweto Devland, Jabavu, Mapetla, Moroka, Phiri 90 88 
Roodeport North Riding, Weltevredenpark 90 83 
Randburg Victory Park 30 31 
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Survey Sections & Treatments 
The survey experiment consists of six sections. The first section collected meta infor-
mation on the conditions of the interview, including whether it was done in an urban or 
rural area, the number of adults in the household, the time of the interview, and the 
presence of public goods, services, and facilities in the region. The second section col-
lected basic demographic information. This included basic information, including age, 
gender, employment, education, and other relevant information. 
The third section queried respondents on their general political, social, and economic 
views of respondents. This included their perceptions of the government’s treatment of 
their respective ethnic and religious groups, the present economy of the country, their 
personal living conditions, their relative living conditions, the state and future of the 
respondent’s country’s democracy, levels of general trust, and levels of civic participa-
tion. It also included pre-treatment questions about social trust, freedom of association, 
and government legitimacy. The questions were largely based on (and in some cases, 
identical) to questions found in the Afrobarometer dataset. This was by design, so as to 
increase the comparability between datasets. 
Treatments 
The fourth section included the treatments of each type of corruption. Treatments in-
cluded small vignettes highlighting different forms of corruption prevalent across Af-
rica and in Nigeria and South Africa. This includes: (a) elite theft, (b) patronage, (c) 
electoral fraud, and (d) police corruption. The vignettes presented in Nigeria and South 
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Africa were nearly identical, save for small changes to adapt the surveys to each country. 
Below, in Table 3, I present the Nigerian prompts. The South African prompts are avail-
able in the appendix. The vignettes for the material treatments were worded as such: 
TABLE 3 - MATERIAL TREATMENTS 
Elite Theft Patronage 
“Nigerian political elites and Ogas, including 
heads of state such as the president or leader, 
have been caught stealing large sums of money 
from the state for themselves. Sani Abacha was 
said to have stolen billions from the state and 
from citizens. When heads of state steal from 
the state, they often keep the money for them-
selves and their family, buying expensive cars 
and houses in foreign countries instead of using 
the money to help Nigeria.” 
“Nigerian politicians and Ogas, including presi-
dents and state governors, often distribute public 
funds and services to specific groups within the 
state but not to others. Funds are often distrib-
uted along ethnic or geographic lines. This can 
include favoring some groups with access to 
jobs, education, training, and public services. 
When elites do this, some groups benefit and 
other groups suffer.” 
The vignettes for the systemic treatments are presented below in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 - SYSTEMIC TREATMENTS 
Electoral Fraud Police Corruption 
“Nigerian presidents and political elites have 
been known to engage in election-rigging and 
voter fraud. Some politicians have been accused 
of stuffing ballot boxes or intimidating voters 
for the opposition. In the 2007 election, there 
were reports that political parties attempted to 
buy votes at the ballots. In the past, some presi-
dents such as Olusegun Obasanjo have even 
tried to change the constitution to run for a third 
term.” 
“In the past, the Nigerian police have been 
known to solicit bribes from citizens, as well as 
arrest and detail citizens unfairly and without 
charges. In some circumstances, police corrup-
tion has fueled abuses against citizens. In other 
circumstances, the police have favored some 
groups and targeted others. Some have alleged 
that the police operate on behalf of politicians 
and/or businesses.” 
The fifth section queried respondents on their levels of trust, ranging from social trust 
in one’s in-group, out-group, ethnic group, and religious group, as well as trust in var-
ious institutions. These institutions include trust in electoral courts, the tax agency, and 
the police. Furthermore, respondents were asked about their trust in different political 




The sixth and final section queried respondents on feelings of government legitimacy, 
as well as a respondent’s hypothetical willingness to engage in collective action. With 
regard to legitimacy, respondents were asked about the major problems of the govern-
ment, ways in which the government could be improved, and how closely the govern-
ment represents the people. With regard to collective action, respondents were asked 
about how willing they might be to join a group that engages in protests, strikes, or 
demonstrations. It then asked whether respondents were seeking out information from 
their religious community, trade community, or ethnic community when making a de-
cision about engaging. Finally, respondents were asked about which types of conten-
tious groups they believed to be most effective. 
Variables 
QUESTIONS ON REVOLUTION 
The primary dependent variable asks respondents to evaluate the overall legitimacy of 
the government. The question is structured on a three-part ordinal scale, and asks re-
spondents to evaluate government legitimacy by focusing on the severity of the gov-
ernment’s problems. Each of the three responses were designed to correspond with the 
theory that when citizens perceive material corruption, they seek reparative solutions, 
and when they perceive systemic corruption, they seek revolutionary corruption. The 
question was worded as follows: 
Let’s think about the government for a moment. Many people claim that the 
Nigerian government has significant problems. Others have more confidence 
in the government. Please decide which of the following statements you agree 
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with the most: 
Following this question, which was put to respondents by the enumerators, respondents 
were asked to select one of three responses: 
1. “Our system doesn’t have any major issues - it functions well already” 
2. “Our system has problems, but they can be fixed by replacing or improving 
specific policies”, or 
3. “Our system is broken - it can’t be fixed. We need a new system built from 
scratch.” 
The first response corresponds closely with what Hirschman (1970) would have termed 
‘loyalty.’ For those individuals that believe the system doesn’t have any major issues, 
the likelihood of joining either a reformative or revolutionary protest movement is low. 
The second response corresponds more closely with Hirschman’s “voice” option; that 
is, citizens who believe that the government could be fixed if only the right policy was 
in place, or perhaps certain individuals were removed from office. Consider, for exam-
ple, the Nigerian Labor Congress’ (NLC) participation in the #EndImpunityNow move-
ment that began during the first stages of Africa’s third wave (Hinshaw, 2012; Sahara 
Reporters, 2015). The NLC did not seek the overthrow of the state; they specifically 
sought policies that would improve governance in Nigeria.19 The third response corre-
sponds most closely with Hirschman’s “exit” option. For an individual that believes 
                                                 
19 See the photo of one of their rallies in the supplemental materials. 
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that the system is broken beyond repair, the only remaining option is to build a new 
system from scratch, which would constitute revolution.20 
Why query respondents about their evaluations of the system rather than simply asking 
them whether they would undertake revolutionary action against the government? 
There are two reasons for this. First, asking respondents about revolutionary intent is 
not only unlikely to elicit honest responses, but is likely to generate distrust between 
the enumerator and respondent, potentially leading to a premature conclusion of the 
survey. In the fifth Afrobarometer round, respondents were asked if they had ever “used 
force or violence for a political cause.”21 Nearly 90 percent stated that they “would 
never do this.” Put simply, asking about potentially illegal activities forces respondents 
to evaluate how much they trust the enumerator in relation to the potential conse-
quences of admitting a taboo and incriminating sentiment. Surveying citizens in devel-
oping countries about highly sensitive topics such as revolution must be done artfully. 
With low levels of trust between an enumerator and respondent who have just met one 
another, questions about intention to engage in revolution – or even support for revo-
lutionary groups – might trigger concerns that the enumerators might actually be work-
ing for the federal government. Second, equipping enumerators with surveys that ask 
about support for or engagement in revolution would likely put enumerators at risk of 
                                                 
20 I do not measure the impact of different types of corruption on the likelihood of mobilization for the 
reason that this research distinguishes between different types of mobilization rather than between 
whether citizens do or do not mobilize. 





physical violence or police harassment or detention. 
If the systemic corruption treatment is effective, and if citizens are more likely to re-
spond to systemic corruption with revolution claims than with reformative claims, then 
respondents who receive the systemic treatment should report higher mean values on 
the dependent variable. 
Using prescriptive questions to evaluate legitimacy and propensity toward revolution 
is both necessary and problematic. It is necessary because feelings of revolutionary zeal 
are, for obvious reasons, sensitive in nature – particularly in countries with histories of 
political violence. Nigeria has experienced major revolutionary violence in both the 
north and south. South Africa has experienced very little revolutionary violence. Two 
major problems emerge from direct questions. Firstly, while in theory revolution and 
violence need not be linked, in practice, the two have often gone hand in hand. There-
fore, questions on revolution would likely draw out those citizens who support political 
violence, confounding the results. Secondly, it is likely that a direct question would 
have required respondents to trust the enumerators that the results would not be com-
municated to the government. This likely would have resulted in respondents deciding 
either not to respond to the question, or to select a less ‘intense’ answer. 
QUESTIONS ON TRUST 
Questions on trust in several different institutions were also asked immediately follow-
ing the treatment (and preceding the questions on system legitimacy). Institutional trust 
is measured by trust in three crucial institutions of the state. First, respondents were 
asked about trust in the electoral system. The electoral system – particularly, the 
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commission – is a crucial component of procedural conceptions of democratic states. 
Because elections are the primary mechanism by which groups can compete for control 
of state power and access to resources, it is important that Africans view electoral com-
missions are legitimate and independent. This involves maintaining trust in the elec-
toral commission. 
The second institution queried is the tax system. The tax system is the primary mecha-
nism by which modern states extract funding from citizens. Taxes are important be-
cause – at least in theory – they fund public goods, which are designed to accrue bene-
fits to the population at large. If states are believed to be highly corrupt, citizens should 
be unlikely to trust the tax system because they believe their taxes are simply lining the 
pockets of corrupt leaders. In a prebendal patronage system, groups compete for access 
to tax revenue; however, in a systemically corrupt system, competition for those re-
sources is fundamentally slanted. 
Finally, respondents were asked about their trust in the police. The police represent the 
government institution that citizens are most likely to encounter on a daily basis. The 
police are charged with the enforcement of the law and the provision of security and 
justice as public goods. When the police engage in corrupt behaviors, including abuse 
and solicitation of bribes, citizens are likely to lose trust in them. 
Data Structure & Balance 
In total, the survey experiment data from Nigeria contains 528 observations. Below, 
Table 5 displays the treatment balance for the samples in Nigeria. I include relevant 
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demographic information, including age, gender, employment, and other important pa-
rameters of comparison. The balancing statistics indicate that the treatments are re-
markably balanced. None of the parameters are substantially different from one another, 
nor are they statistically distinct from one another at traditional levels of statistical sig-
nificance. The balance table indicates that respondents who received the systemic treat-
ment are on average 2 years older than those that received the material treatment. The 
difference comes close to statistical significance with a p value of 0.06.22 
TABLE 5 - TREATMENT BALANCE IN NIGERIA 
 Full Sample 
Material Treatment 
(Elite Theft &  
Patronage) 
Systemic Corruption 
(Electoral Fraud & 
 Police Corr.) 
Diff. 
(P value) 
Respondents 528 267 265 - 
Age 34.54 33.55 35.69 0.06 
Percent Female 48.86 46.79 50.95 0.34 
Employed 1.43 1.46 1.41 0.62 
Percent Urban 52.84 50.18 55.51 0.22 
Education 5.84 5.87 5.81 0.72 
Percent Hausa 19.51 21.13 17.87 0.34 
Percent Fulani 4.73 4.53 4.94 0.82 
Percent Igbo 10.79 12.83 8.74 0.13 
Percent Yoruba 33.33 33.21 33.46 0.95 
Percent Christian 57.76 56.98 58.55 0.71 
Percent Muslim 39.96 41.13 38.78 0.58 
Below, Table 6 presents the treatment balance data from the South Africa experiment. 
Like the data in Nigeria, the treatments are well-balanced. The only parameter that is 
statistically distinct across treatments is the percentage of respondents who are Zulu. 
Zulu respondents were about twice as likely to receive the material treatment as the 
systemic treatment. 
  
                                                 
22 These results are plotted out in the Appendix on page 240. 
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TABLE 6 - TREATMENT BALANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 Full Sample 
Material Treatment 
(Elite Theft &  
Patronage) 
Systemic Corruption 
(Electoral Fraud & 
 Police Corr.) 
Diff. 
(P value) 
Respondents 344 182 162 - 
Age 40.20 39.90 40.45 0.75 
Percent Female 49.70 51.64 47.53 0.44 
Percent Urban 68.60 68.13 69.13 0.84 
Education 6.05 5.96 6.15 0.33 
Percent Black 13.08 12.63 13.58 0.79 
Percent White 19.18 15.93 22.83 0.10 
Percent Xhosa 7.26 6.59 8.02 0.61 
Percent Zulu 9.88 13.73 5.55 0.01 
Percent Atheist 15.40 17.58 12.96 0.23 
Percent Christian 36.04 34.06 38.27 0.41 
Results 
Experiment 1: Nigeria 
HYPOTHESES 1A & 1B: REFORM OR REVOLUTION 
The first set of hypotheses find strong support from the Nigerian survey experiment. 
The results are presented below in Table 7. The average treatment effect (ATE) of the 
material corruption treatment on overall sentiments of system brokenness is substan-
tially lower than the average treatment effect of systemic corruption. In simpler terms, 
this means that respondents who received the systemic corruption treatment are more 
likely to believe that the system is broken beyond repair than respondents who received 
the material corruption treatment. To remind readers: a value of 1 indicates that re-
spondents believe that there is nothing wrong with the system. A value of 2 indicates 
that respondents believe that the system is flawed, but can be repaired. Finally, a value 
of 3 indicates that respondents believe the system is broken beyond repair. The results 
show that the material ATE equals 2.00, which corresponds exactly to the statement 
that the system can be repaired. The systemic ATE rests at 2.11, and is statistically 
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distinct from the material ATE beyond conventional 95 percent confidence levels. 










How broken is the system? 2.00 2.11 -0.22 -0.01 0.03 
On a scale from 1 to 3, a difference of 0.11 may seem small; however, there are several 
reasons that this result is meaningful. First, it provides exogenous and causal support 
to the hypothesis, and is statistically significant at conventional 95 percent confidence 
levels. Second, the result was generated via a relatively abstract survey experimental 
treatment in which respondents were exposed briefly to a description of hypothetical 
corruption. Given this, the effect is actually rather larger; it indicates that even relatively 
limited exposures to systemic corruption affect perceptions of system legitimacy in 
meaningful ways. Third, it is worth noting that while the answers range from 1 to 3, the 
theory distinguishes between the values at 2 (the system is flawed but can be repaired) 
and 3 (the system is broken). As such, the range of interest is primarily between 2 and 
3, meaning that the ATE represents an 11 percentage point increase in respondent like-
lihood of indicating that the government is broken beyond repair. These effects are 
meaningful indeed. 
In order to further analyze the results, Table 8 below breaks out the responses by per-
centage to demonstrate the inter-treatment variation. This presents two interesting 
points of analysis. Firstly, it reveals that the vast majority of respondents believe that 
the system has problems, but could be fixed by improving specific policies. This indi-
cates, at minimum, a belief that the system carries at least some merit with most 
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respondents. Secondly, one observes that, for respondents who received either of the 
two systemic forms of corruption, the proportion of responses indicating ‘no major 
problems’ decreases, while the number of respondents who selected “broken and needs 
to be rebuilt” increases. Notably, in the Nigerian context, respondents who received the 
electoral fraud treatment are 8.1 percentage points more likely to state that the system 
is broken and needs to be rebuilt from scratch than the material treatments. This sug-
gests that Nigerians view the electoral system as central to the legitimacy of the state. 
Respondents who receive the electoral fraud treatment are also the least likely to indi-
cate that there are ‘no major problems.’ 
TABLE 8 – EVALUATIONS OF THE SYSTEM IN NIGERIA 
 “No major 
problems” 
“Problems, but can 
be fixed” 
“Broken, and needs 
to be rebuilt” 
Material Corrup-
tion 
20.20% 59.55% 20.25% 
Elite Theft 19.2% 60.8% 20.0% 
Patronage 21.2% 58.3% 20.5% 
Systemic Corrup-
tion 
14.60% 59.40% 25.95% 
Electoral Fraud 13.3% 58.5% 28.1% 
Police Corruption 15.9% 60.3% 23.8% 
Note: Percentages in table are by row, gray bold rows are averages per treatment. 
In order to unpack this further, I present the ATE of each of the four types of corruption 
below in Figure 2. On the left of the figure are the two types of corruption that were 
included in the material treatment: (1) elite theft and (2) patronage. On the right are the 
two types of corruption that were included in the system treatment (3) electoral fraud 
and (4) police corruption. The results reveal several things. First, one will note that 
there is no meaningful substantive or statistically significant difference in the ATE of 
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either elite theft or patronage. This indicates that, while respondents may distinguish 
between these two forms of corruption in terms of their substance, they view them as 
having relatively equal implications on the overall legitimacy of the state. I suspect that 
this may be because both of these forms of corruption are linked to traditional prebendal 
politics in which ogas (‘big men’) extract funds from the state in order to both enrich 
themselves and to benefit their political base (Ekeh, 1975). 
Second, the ATE of both forms of systemic corruption are substantively much larger 
than the two material forms of corruption, and within systemic corruption, the ATE of 
electoral fraud corresponds with the highest willingness to state that the system is bro-
ken beyond repair. I interpret this to mean that Nigerians are keenly aware of the impact 
of the violation of the independence and fairness of elections; this suggests that Nige-
rians value highly the procedural electoral aspects of the state and democracy. 




Together, these results provide strong support for the first set of hypotheses. Respond-
ents who received the material corruption treatment were more likely to state that the 
system could be repaired while respondents who received the systemic treatment were 
more likely to state that the system was broken beyond repair. I now turn to the results 
of the treatments on the proposed mechanism (different types of trust) to see whether 
the second set of hypotheses finds support. 
HYPOTHESES 2A & 2B: TRUST MECHANISMS 
The second set of hypotheses states that material corruption should cause reduced trust 
in individual politicians while systemic corruption should cause reduced trust in gov-
ernmental institutions themselves. The results are presented below in Table 9. The re-
sults of the T-Tests show that the directionality of the hypotheses is correct, but that the 
hypotheses find only moderate support in the Nigerian context. Specifically, while 
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respondents who received the material treatment do report lower trust in the president 
than respondents who received the systemic treatment (Hyp. 2a), the ATE is substan-
tively small and statistically indistinguishable between the treatments. 










Trust in the President 2.15 2.16 -0.18 0.16 0.92 
Trust in Electoral Commission 2.13 2.06 -0.06 0.21 0.30 
Trust in Tax Authorities 1.87 1.78 -0.03 0.22 0.15 
Trust in Police 2.06 1.86 0.04 0.36 0.01 
In terms of trust in institutions themselves, the average treatment effects provide weak 
to moderate support for the mechanism hypotheses. Trust in each of the three govern-
ment institutions is substantively reduced when respondents received the systemic 
treatment, providing support for Hypothesis 2b. Reporting with 95 percent confidence 
p-values, trust in the electoral commission does not attain statistical significance. Trust 
in tax authorities demonstrates a larger diverging ATE, and the results indicate that, 
while the results are not statistically significant using a two-tailed T-Test, when instead 
measuring using a one-tailed interpretation (as is theoretically consistent with the hy-
pothesis), the results do attain significance at the 90 percent confidence level. Finally, 
trust in the police is substantially reduced by exposure to systemic corruption treat-
ments. The results attain statistical significance at the 99 percent confidence level, even 
in a two-tailed test. 
It is important to mention that two of the forms of trust – electoral and police – are 
directly addressed via the treatments. As such, it was expected that these two forms of 
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trust would be most affected. This is only partially the case; trust in the electoral com-
mission is the least affected by the systemic treatment, while trust in the police is most 
affected. There are likely several reasons for this. First, of the three institutions, the 
police are the most closely tied to the daily experience of Nigerians. The police inhabit 
the street level, and often harass and inhibit Nigerians who are simply out and about. 
Moreover, dysfunction in the police is most likely to directly affect the public goods 
and services received by Nigerians. When the police are corrupt, they fail (or refuse) to 
provide the public goods and services of security and justice, and this can easily have 
direct consequences on the daily lives of many Nigerians. 
The tax institution is perhaps the second most removed from the daily experience of 
Nigerians. Nigerians must pay taxes - though skirting the taxman has become some-
thing of a sport in Nigeria (Smith, 2007) – and thus feel the impact of taxes relatively 
closely. This is made all the more frustrating by the fact that the revenue collected by 
the tax services do not have a direct link to the improved provision of public goods or 
services. Finally, the electoral commission may be the most powerful of the institutions, 
but is also the furthest from the daily lives of Nigerians. The electoral commission is 
responsible for overseeing and accrediting elections, and thus its impact on society is 
high. At the same time, the institution is highly politicized and does not maintain any 
sort of quotidian presence visible to the average Nigerian. As such, it makes sense that 





I now turn to the use of a mediation model to determine the interactive effect of the 
exogenous treatments on institutional trust and revolutionary sentiments. Mediation 
models were developed in experimental psychology to test how a tertiary variable (m) 
affects the direct relationship between an independent variable (x) and a dependent 
variable (y) (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Within a mediated model, there may be a total 
and significant effect between the independent and dependent variables; however, such 
an effect is not required (Hayes, 2009; Rucker et al., 2011). This direct relationship is 
referred to as C, or the ‘Total Effect’. Within the mediated relationship, there are two 
additional linkage. The first regresses the mediator on the independent variable. This 
relationships is referred to as A. The second regresses dependet variable on both the 
independent variable and the mediating variable. This is known as Path B. Tradition-
ally, this indirect effect is determined by multiplying the unstandardized coefficients of 
A and B together. Once AB have been accounted for, C becomes C’, indicating that the 
total effect now includes not only the direct effect, but also the average causal mediated 
effect. 
Mediated effects have To do this, I impose parametric assumptions on the data and run 
standard linear regression models. Due to limitations with the mediation package23, this 
is the most efficient way to conduct the mediation analysis. The survey was 
                                                 




purposefully designed in such a way that this mediated relationship can be said to real-
istically exist. Immediately following the treatment, respondents provided overall sen-
timents of trust. After this, respondents were asked to evaluate the system. This means 
that, chronologically, respondents were randomly assigned an exogenous treatment, 
asked about trust, and then asked to evaluate the system. As such, the exogenous treat-
ment has a clear connection to both trust and system evaluations, but it is also very 
likely that answering questions about trust in the system primed respondents, further 
mediating their evaluations of the system. 
In order to analyze the mediated relationship, an additional step must be taken. Because 
the three relationships (A, B, and C’) are dependent on one another, the data needed to 
be subset to include only observations with complete cases. This reduced the dataset 
from 528 to 507, resulting in a slight loss of statistical power. 
Two mediation tests are run. Following Baron and Kenny (1986), the first test uses 
bootstrap analysis to test each of the mediating relationships (A and B), noting their 
size and statistical significance. Following this, a holistic test is run. In the first set of 
tests, bootstrapped linear regression is used to sample A, B, C, and C’ 1000 times with 
replacement. The variables incorporated into the test include: 
IV Whether the respondent received a material or systemic corruption treatment. 
M Overall levels of trust in political institutions. This variable was formed by av-
erage levels of trust in the police, the electoral courts, and the tax system. 
DV Evaluations of how broken the system is. 
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The results of the first test are found below in Table 10. Path A regresses the mediator 
on the independent variable, and reveals that exposure to systemic corruption is posi-
tively and statistically significantly correlated with trust in political institutions. The 
effect is substantively small, with a coefficient of -0.132, but statistically significant at 
convention levels of 95 percent confidence. Path B, for which I regress the dependent 
variable on both the mediator and independent variable, reveals that trust in political 
institutions plays a substantial role in mediating the relationship between corruption 
and evaluations of a broken system. Trust exhibits an inverse correlation with overall 
evaluations of the broken system; the coefficient is substantively large, at -0.225, and 
is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. When the mediator is 
included, the effect of exposure to different types of corruption is diminished substan-
tially, and is no longer statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level; how-
ever, it is significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The interaction AB is 0.03, 
which is very small and indicates that other potential mediators and covariates would 
substantially improve model fit. 
TABLE 10 – MANUAL CALCULATION OF MEDIATED EFFECTS 

















Next, I turn to the second mediation test, which tests these relationships holistically. 
Below, Figure 3 displays the overall mediated relationship. Similar to the initial test 
presented above, this mediation reveals the important work that trust plays in driving 
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the causal relationship between exposure to systemic corruption and evaluations that 
the system is broken beyond repair. In the figure below, the average causal mediated 
effect is statistically significant, but the direct effect is not. However, because of the 
strength of the average causal mediated effect, the overall relationship is substantively 
large and significant. 
FIGURE 3 – MEDIATED THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
 
The results of the mediated relationship provide support for the overall hypothesis. 
Next, I unpack the mediating effects of each type of trust. This is presented below in 
Figure 4. The figure includes three panels. The first panel mediates the direct relation-
ship via trust of the tax department. The middle panel displays mediation through trust 
of the electoral courts. Finally, the right panel mediates through trust of the police. This 
analysis demonstrates the importance of using a mediated model. Each panel includes 
three horizontal lines. The top line is the average causal mediated effect, or A. The 
middle line is the direct effect, or C. The bottom line is the total effect, C’. 




The results show that mediating the direct effects via a causal mediator results in sta-
tistically significant relationships that further strengthen support for the hypothesis that 
systemic corruption reduces trust in the system and increases overall sentiments that 
the system is broken. By imposing parametric assumptions via linear regressions, a 
truer sense of the exogenous effect of the treatments can be seen.  
Experiment 2: South Africa 
HYPOTHESES 1A & 1B: REFORM OR REVOLUTION 
In South Africa, the first set of hypotheses finds tepid support, though not in the aggre-
gate. Below, Table 11 displays the ATE for the material and systemic corruption treat-
ments. The results are indistinguishable from one another, both substantively and sta-
tistically. At first glance, this indicates that the theory does not travel well to the South 
African context. There are plenty of potential reasons for this. South African politics 
have been dominated since 1994 by a single political party (the African National Con-
gress, or ANC) that has not needed to engage in wanton electoral fraud in order to win 
elections. Moreover, the country has recently experienced several major corruption rev-
elations focused almost entirely on material forms of corruption; namely, personal 
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enrichment by the president and ANC elites. 
For the most part, the allegations of corruption against Zuma were material in nature, 
revolving around his taxes and illicit income that he drew from major businesses in 
which he was enrolled as a ‘ghost employee’ (Pauw 2017). At the same time as he 
enriched himself, Zuma pursued a course of co-opting individuals and institutions 
within the government in order to indemnify himself and facilitate his ongoing theft 
(Madonsela 2016), parceling out ministerial positions based on the preferences of busi-
ness partners such as the Gupta family (Basson and Du Toit 2017). As I detail further 
in the discussion section, these results may be interpreted as supporting the theory, 
though they do not provide support for the hypotheses as strictly stated. 










How broken is the system? 2.11 2.09 -0.10 0.14 0.77 
Why are the treatments indistinguishable in the South African context? In order to an-
swer this, I examine the proportional distribution of responses. These are presented 
below, in Table 12. What immediately stands out is the between-country differences in 
overall evaluations of the system. Whereas in Nigeria the category stating that the sys-
tem had problems, but that they could be fixed (the “reparative” response) essentially 
did not fluctuate, this same category of response fluctuates highly in South Africa. This 
fluctuation reveals interesting insight into how South Africans interpret the interaction 
between corruption and political institutions differently than Nigerians. In Nigeria, the 
“reparative response” received an average of 59.5 percent of total responses across 
 
82 
categories, with a standard deviation of 1.25. In South Africa, the “reparative response” 
receives an average of 66.3 percent of responses, with a standard deviation of 2.5 per-
centage points. There is thus twice the variability in South Africa than in Nigeria. More-
over, while an average of 17.4 percent of respondents in Nigeria stated that the system 
has no major problems, South Africans were substantially less likely to respond as such, 
with only 11.4 percent stating that there are no major problems. 
Because of this variability, the most important distinction in the South African context 
is that between citizens choosing the “reparative response” and the “revolutionary re-
sponse.” Looking more closely at these two categories, reveals mixed support for the 
first set of hypotheses. Electoral fraud is easily distinguished as the least salient to 
South Africans; respondents who received the electoral fraud treatment were between 
8 and 13 percentage points less likely than any of the other treatments to state that the 
system is broken and needs to be rebuilt. This is likely due to the absence of major 
electoral scandals in the South African context. The ANC is a political machine with 
few realistic challengers. 
TABLE 12 - EVALUATIONS OF THE SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 “No major 
problems” 
“Problems, but can 
be fixed” 
“Broken, and needs 
to be rebuilt” 
Elite Theft 9.4% 68.2% 22.4% 
Patronage 13.7% 63.2% 23.2% 
Electoral Fraud 15.7% 68.5% 15.7% 
Police Corruption 6.9% 65.3% 27.8% 
Note: percentages are by row 
What is also interesting is the similarity between the results from the Nigerian experi-
ment and the South African experiment. In both countries, respondents who received 
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the material treatments display essentially no difference in their evaluations of the over-
all system. Again, this does not mean that respondents do not distinguish between these 
forms of corruption theoretically, but instead indicates that they believe them both to 
have similar effects on the system. Strikingly, respondents who received the police cor-
ruption treatment are substantially more likely to state that the system is broken beyond 
repair. The police corruption ATE is 2.2, and is substantively larger than any of the 
other treatments. It is also statistically distinct at the 95 percent confidence level from 
any other treatment, which lends confidence to the finding that it is particularly salient 
in the South African context. 
Why do we observe such a large effect from police corruption and not from electoral 
fraud? Returning to the explanation provided earlier in this chapter, it is likely that the 
‘closeness’ of police corruption to the average South African plays a role. The electoral 
commission in South Africa has not been embroiled in any system-breaking scandals, 
unlike Nigeria’s highly contentious elections, and South Africans have not experienced 
any major electoral fraud at the national level like Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon, Uganda, 
and others. Moreover, police corruption is widely criticized in South Africa, and the 
police have been used particularly perniciously by local ANC leaders to quell service 
delivery riots – protests against the lack of public services that result from embedded 
corruption at the local township level. See Figure 5 below. 




HYPOTHESES 2A & 2B: TRUST MECHANISM 
In South Africa, the second set of hypotheses find partial support, and the directionality 
of the correlations align with expectations. Across the board, when exposed to systemic 
treatments, South African respondents reported lower trust in the system than their 
counterparts that were exposed to the material treatments. The results differ in two ways. 
First, the differential effect sizes are smaller than those found in Nigeria, indicating that 
perhaps the material/systemic divide is less pronounced to South Africans. This would 
make sense, given the massive charges of both material and systemic corruption of 
former president Jacob Zuma. Second, the standard errors are larger. This is likely the 
result of a smaller sample size than the Nigerian survey experiment. 
The survey included questions on levels of trust in both former (and disgraced) presi-
dent Jacob Zuma as well as his replacement (and former deputy) Cyril Ramaphosa. 
Because the survey experiment was conducted in 2018 (the same year that Zuma was 
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forced from office and Ramaphosa ascended), the effects of corruption treatments 
should be particularly pronounced. Below, Table 13 displays the ATE of the material 
and systemic treatments on levels of trust in the presidents (Hyp. 2a) and institutions 
(Hyp. 2b). 
TABLE 13 - AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON TRUST IN SOUTH AFRICA 







Trust in former President 
Zuma 2.13 2.19 -0.26 0.15 0.59 
Trust in President Ramaphosa 2.87 2.96 -0.24 0.05 0.21 
Trust in Electoral Commission 2.72 2.81 -0.23 0.06 0.24 
Trust in Tax Authorities 2.72 2.87 -0.29 0.01 0.07 
Trust in Police 2.39 2.64 -0.42 -0.07 0.00 
The results indicate that across the board, exposure to material corruption reduces trust 
in both politicians and institutions more than exposure to systemic corruption. Curi-
ously, this holds even for trust in the police. Most of the effects are relatively minor, 
and the ATE for material and systemic treatments are generally smaller than 0.10. How-
ever, trust in the tax authorities and in the police are more thoroughly affected by ex-
posure to material corruption. There may be two reasons for this. First, the South Afri-
can Revenue Service (the tax authority) has long been considered a major impediment 
to outright graft in the country. The Revenue Service (SARS for short) was a major 
player in the multi-year personal enrichment scandal of Jacob Zuma, and Zuma worked 
hard to isolate and then capture the institution in order to remove any barriers to his 
ability to loot the state (Pauw, 2017). Second, in the years preceding the implementation 
of the survey experiment, South Africa has been rocked by a seemingly endless cascade 
of protests and riots (protests hereafter) pertaining to the delivery of public goods and 
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services. These service delivery protests have brought into the spotlight the disconnec-
tion between tax revenue and the provision of goods and services, particularly regard-
ing the disproportionate effect of lack of service on the poor. 
Discussion 
The use of a survey experiment was designed to measure individual-level factors in 
mobilization into different contentious organizations while allowing for causal state-
ments to be made. The survey experiment in Nigeria provided strong support for hy-
potheses 1a and 1b, while the survey experiment in South Africa did not. Similarly, the 
survey experiment in Nigeria provided support for the hypothesis that exposure to sys-
temic corruption reduces trust in institutions, while the survey experiment in South 
Africa provided support for the hypothesis that exposure to material corruption reduces 
trust in individual politicians. 
A word of caution is merited for treating the survey experiments as equivalent. The 
survey experiment conducted in Nigeria is nationally representative, was conducted by 
six enumerators and a research assistant, and covers all of the major geopolitical re-
gions of Nigeria. As such, it more accurately represents the opinions of Nigerians from 
across the country. The survey experiment in South Africa covers only a single first-
level administrative district, was conducted principally by two enumerators, and is not 
nationally representative. While every effort was made to ensure that the survey exper-
iment does represent as accurately as possible the views of South Africans, it is simply 
not realistic to assume that the views found within the most densely populated and 
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politically powerful region of the country truly represents the rest of the country. 
Taken together, the results of the survey experiments provide causal evidence for the 
argument that different types of corruption help explain variation in attitudes toward 
reform and revolution. They also provide support that different types of corruption also 
help shape different levels of trust toward the government. Because the results are 
causal in nature, they provide a strong cornerstone in the evidence-based argument that 
I am presenting. In order to build on this causal evidence, I now cast my nets wider to 
cover most African countries. Using survey data, Chapter 4 will test the same argument 
using correlational data from the Afrobarometer data that covers 34 countries over five 





Cross-National Evidence Linking Types of Corrup-
tion to Reform or Revolution 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I presented clear causal evidence from a survey experiment that 
exposure to systemic corruption leads respondents to be more likely to state that the 
system is broken. In order to further explore this, I now turn to a large body of cross-
country evidence by using the Afrobarometer dataset. To remind the reader, there are 
two proposed causal linkages hypothesized in this dissertation. The first is that expo-
sure to material corruption reduces trust in politicians (but not the system) and leads to 
calls for reform. The second is that exposure to systemic corruption leads to reduced 
trust in the system itself, and thus generates contentious calls for revolution. 
Due to limitations with the Afrobarometer data, I can test only the second proposed 
linkage, which I do in this chapter. In order to do this, I use two primary statistical 
models. The first analyzes whether exposure to systemic forms of corruption is corre-
lated with a reduction in trust in government institutions. The second model focuses on 
the proposed mechanism of trust and analyzes whether reduced trust in government 
institutions increases stated support for revolutionary actions. The rest of the chapter 
proceeds as such. First, I dig deeper into the important role that trust has played in the 
political science literature. This was only briefly addressed in Chapter 2, and is further 
elucidated here in order to emphasize how trust can serve as a link between perceptions 
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of corruption and revolutionary goals. Second, I analyze the first model linking percep-
tions of corruption to a reduction in trust. Third, I analyze the second model linking 
reduced trust to increased support for revolutionary statements. The models find strong 
support for the hypotheses presented in this dissertation.  
A Quick Primer on Corruption and Trust 
Trust holds an important and central role in political thought. For the majority of polit-
ical thought, trust is rather contractual in nature. “Encapsulated Trust” involves a con-
figuration of three components. The first, Person A, trusts the second, Person B, to 
fulfill Action X (Hardin, 1998). One can substitute “Person B” with “Institution B.” In 
this sense, trust is localized to a set of judgments by some actors about the intention 
and capability of another set of actors to behave in an agreed-upon manner. This con-
tractarian approach finds roots in Hobbes’ (1651) reciprocal submission of interest and 
effort between the citizen and the leviathan, Locke’s (1690) codification of the funda-
mental principles underpinning that trust, and Rousseau’s (1762) clarification that it is 
that exact trust-relationship that constitutes the essential underpinning of legitimate 
governance.  
The relationship between corruption and trust has implications for contentious politics. 
Much scholarship focuses on how corruption corrodes trust between citizens, making 
it difficult for them to cooperate. Rothstein (2005) describes this self-reinforcing circle 
as a ‘social trap,’ noting that the lack of social trust and social capital often preclude 
cooperative solutions that lift an afflicted community out of the trap. This is amplified 
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by the importance of state institutions as third-party mediators for interpersonal inter-
actions between citizens (Cook, Hardin and Levi, 2005), in which reliable states pro-
vide important context for understanding the trustworthiness of others. This coincides 
with North’s (1990, 1991) view that institutions serve as impartial coordinators of in-
teractions between citizens by reducing transaction costs. Uslaner (2008) convincingly 
captures the relationship between high levels of inequality that lead to low levels of 
trust, and thus lead to corruption. 
But whereas the social trust literature has generally looked at corruption as the outcome 
of low social trust, I instead take corruption as a starting point, arguing instead for its 
influence on resultant levels of social trust. This approach is centered on institutions, 
and built on a similar body of work. Delhey and Newton (2003) demonstrate that honest 
governments help foster conditions in which citizens can work together with less fear 
of others in society reneging on their promises. This is mirrored in the trust literature, 
which has noticed that the mere absence of the state actually disincentivizes coopera-
tion and trust (Levi, 1998). 
Types of Corruption and Trust in Politicians and Institutions 
As argued in Chapter 2, the theory predicts that material corruption will reduce trust in 
politicians while systemic corruption reduces trust in institutions. This is because ma-
terial corruption often works within socially accepted systems of patronage while sys-
temic corruption violates those systems. Institutional trust taps into what some scholars 
have called legitimacy. Lipset (1959) argues that legitimacy is the “degree to which 
institutions are valued for themselves, and considered right and proper.” Legitimacy 
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and institutional trust are likely endogenous to one another and responsive to systemic 
corruption. As citizens perceive systemic corruption distorting government institutions, 
they are likely to lose trust in the system while simultaneously re-evaluating the insti-
tutions as less ‘right and proper.’ 
The evidence that material corruption generates adverse impacts on citizen trust in pol-
iticians is relatively well-defined. In a recent article, Ares and Hernández (2017) exploit 
a natural experiment to demonstrate that the discovery of a major material corruption 
scandal in the ruling party leads to a precipitous decline in citizen trust of politicians, 
though that effect decays relatively quickly.  
There is also evidence that systemic corruption reduces trust in institutions. Rothstein 
and Eek (2009) use a cross-national experiment to demonstrate that institutional trust 
is reduced when police authorities have been shown to be corrupt. Interestingly, the 
experiment revealed that institutional trust in the police is lowest when no bribe has 
been offered, and increases significantly when a bribe has been offered by a citizen and 
refused by the police officer. This is particularly interesting, because it seems to indi-
cate that the mere calculation by a bribe-offeror that a policeman would be willing to 
accept a bribe sends the signal that the police may very well be corrupt. 
Limitations to the Empirical Testing 
I turn now to the empirical tests, which draw from the Afrobarometer data. There are 
limitations to using the Afrobarometer data that means that only half of the mechanisms 
can be tested. For example, it is not possible to cleanly test Hypothesis 2a, which 
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proposes that perceptions of material corruption reduce trust in individual politicians 
rather than the system itself. This is because there is no single variable that directly 
measures material corruption. There are questions about how corrupt the government 
is as a whole, as well as how corrupt individuals within the government are; however, 
these questions do not parse between material and systemic forms of corruption. There 
are, on the other hand, several questions that directly test perceptions of systemic cor-
ruption as well as several questions that test levels of trust in government institutions. 
As a result, only one of the two mechanism hypotheses can be tested: hypothesis 2b 
that emphasizes that perceptions of systemic corruption reduce trust in government in-
stitutions. 
Moreover, models using Afrobarometer data can make correlational inferences, but 
cannot be said to make causational inferences. This is a limitation of nearly all obser-
vational data, and is the reason that this dissertation begins by marshaling causal evi-
dence from the survey experiments run in Nigeria and South Africa. Having listed these 
two limitations, I now present the empirical evidence in the form of two models. The 
first model examines the linkage between how perceptions of systemic corruption cor-
related with reduced overall levels of institutional trust. This tests Hypothesis 1b. The 
second model examines how reductions in institutional trust correlate with increased 
willingness to use revolutionary methods; namely, using political violence. 
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Model 1 – How Systemic Corruption Shapes Institutional Trust 
Data 
In order to analyze this, I turn to the Afrobarometer data (2016). The Afrobarometer 
data consist of six cross-national household surveys conducted from 2000 to 2015. The 
surveys cover many issues, including citizen perceptions of corruption, evaluations of 
government performance, trust (social and otherwise), socioeconomic evaluations, and 
more. Over the course of each round, more African countries have been added, leading 
to a complete dataset of over 204,000 observations. The result is the most robust survey 
data available from a continent in which data have been scarce or questionable. 
Method 
The first model examines Hypothesis 2b, which proposes that systemic corrupt viola-
tions should result in diminished trust in government institutions. The Afrobarometer 
include questions on levels of trust in specific institutions, such as the police and elec-
toral courts, as well as trust in a general question about how well the government is 
handling corruption on the whole. There are some challenges to using these data. First, 
there are concerns about tautological implications of measuring perceptions of corrup-
tion government institutions and then measuring levels of trust in those same institu-
tions. Theoretically, this relationship makes sense; however, statistically, it runs several 
risks. First, it is likely that there is high endogeneity between perceptions of corruption 
and overall levels of trust in government institutions. This challenge was addressed in 
the previous chapter via the use of survey experiments. Second, in this chapter, rather 
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than speaking of causal relationships, it is important to speak of correlational relation-
ships. 
Testing the Mechanism: How Systemic Corruption Shapes Institutional Trust 
In order to test this, I generate a variable to measure institutional trust. This variable is 
comprised of the average of three institutional trust variables: trust in the electoral com-
mission, trust in the courts, and trust in the police. Trust in the electoral commission 
speaks to citizen trust in the democratic machinery of the state. Trust in the courts 
speaks to citizen expectations that the legal system is fair and legitimate. Trust in the 
police speaks to citizen trust in the coercive apparatus of the state, as well as the insti-
tution that most citizens are most likely to encounter. Taken together, these three pro-
vide insight into a citizen’s general evaluations of the institutions of the state. Because 
the variable is composed of three ordinal scales and then averaged, it generates a quasi-
continuous variable that ranges from 0 (no trust) to 3 (high trust), with a median of 
1.667 and a mean of 1.606. This is visualized below in Figure 6, which shows levels of 




FIGURE 6 - DENSITY OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
 
Independent Variables: Systemic Corruption 
I regress two forms of corruption on institutional trust. Police corruption and electoral 
rigging, both forms of systemic corruption, provide information about two of the four 
types of corruption found in the typology. Electoral rigging represents a systemic form 
of corruption that generates private goods, while police corruption generates club goods. 
Including both allows me to measure whether types of distribution matter in driving 
the relationship between perceptions of corruption and levels of institutional trust. Both 
variables are ordinal, ranging from 0 (no corruption) to 3 (high corruption).  
In order to measure electoral rigging, I draw from a question in the Afrobarometer data 
that asks respondents, “On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of 
the last national election, held in [the year of the last election]?” This question is the 
most appropriate to test perceptions of electoral fraud and rigging. While the question 
does not specifically stipulate the source of any potential problems with elections, the 
election itself is specified as the most recent national election. This reduces the 
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likelihood that respondents will focus on local or regional governments. It is likely that 
when evaluating problems with national elections, respondents will focus their atten-
tion on potential rigging and fraud conducted by the president and national level parties. 
Several possible responses were presented to respondents: 
1. Not free and fair 
2. Free and fair, but with major problems 
3. Free and fair, but with minor problems 
4. Completely free and fair 
Below, Figure 7 displays overall perceptions across Africa about the quality of elections. 
In general, a plurality of citizens report that their elections are completely free and fair. 
This is particularly pronounced in countries with relatively low levels of internal con-
flict, such as Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Lesotho, Madagascar, Senegal, and 
others. However, in countries where there is a history of recent of embedded conflict, 
such as Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Sudan, and Nigeria, the vast majority of 




FIGURE 7 - FREE & FAIR ELECTIONS 
 
The second systemic variable measures perceptions of corruption within the police 
force. This question is asked as follows: “How many of the following people do you 
think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Po-
lice?” The question is somewhat vague in the sense that it does not identify actual cor-
rupt behaviors conducted by the police. For example, it does not mention the solicita-
tion of bribes, the abduction and robbing of citizens, violence by the police against 
unarmed citizens, or any other forms of abuse that might be lumped into the larger 
category of corruption. Respondents were able to select one of the following responses: 
1. None 
2. Some of them 
3. Most of them 
4. All of them 
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Below, Figure 8 displays the overall perceptions of police corruption across Africa. 
Unlike evaluations of electoral fairness, which were slightly skewed in favor of think-
ing that elections are indeed fair, the vast majority of Africans view their police forces 
as highly corrupt. The countries in which police are seen to be the least corrupt are 
North and West African countries with large Muslim populations, such as Algeria, 
Burkina Faso, and Senegal. Additionally, Cape Verdeans report relatively high confi-
dence in the police. 
FIGURE 8 - PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION 
 
Covariates 
I include a number of important covariates to help control potential omissions within 
the model. The covariates are sourced from the Afrobarometer data, and are largely 
perceptions-based. This approach carries with it several strengths. First, it allows for 
individual-level variation that increases the statistical effect of each variable. This is 
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particularly important with economic and other country-level variables, as including 
World Bank data would simply result in the repetition of data about population or GDP 
across each respective country for each respective round. As such, these World Bank 
data could only explain cross-national variation and not sub-national variation. Second, 
I argue that perceptions are some of the most important – and often unfairly derided – 
factors to take into consideration for political analysis. How people perceive things is 
much more likely to shape their willingness to engage in political behaviors. For ex-
ample, perceptions are built directly into the core of Gurr’s (2011) work on relative 
deprivation. Perceptions drive grievances in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, and are 
largely perception-based (Smith, 2014). And perceptions often differ from experiences 
– particularly with corruption, and align with partisan preferences (Blais, Gidengil and 
Kilibarda, 2017) that are ostensibly exogenous to actual experiences of corruption. 
I begin by including a general question on respondents’ perceptions of how well the 
government is ‘handling corruption.’ Responses range from ‘very badly’ to ‘very well.’ 
Because corruption is the major focus of this dissertation, and because perceptions of 
corruption tend to draw upon latent frustration with levels of corruption on the whole, 
the inclusion of this question helps to ensure that the model is accurately capturing 
correlations between systemic forms of corruption and levels of institutional trust, ra-
ther than measuring more general feelings about corruption. 
Economic evaluations are an important factor in determining perceptions of corruption, 
and in order to address this, I include evaluations of the country’s present economy. 
This variable ranges from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good,’ and includes 5 ordinal responses 
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total. Citizens who feel optimistic about the economy are likely to judge the govern-
ment more leniently, and therefore including this is an important component of the 
model. Along the same vein, I include citizen perceptions of their current living condi-
tions. This is also a 5-point ordinal scale ranging from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good.’ This 
allows for analytical leverage to understand how citizens perceive their own living con-
dition in comparison with their perceptions of the national economy. Along the same 
lines, I include a variable that asks respondents to evaluate how they believe the econ-
omy will be doing in 12 months’ time. This incorporates a future-oriented outlook that 
might play an important role in determining overall tolerance for corruption. 
Importantly, perceptions of corruption are connected to overall demand for and percep-
tion of democracy. Citizens who strongly demand a Weberian or western-style democ-
racy are most likely to be impermissive of corruption. I draw from the Afrobarometer 
data to include a question on democratic satisfaction. This question asks respondents 
to evaluate the level of their respective government’s overall quality of democracy, 
ranging over four potential answers that move from from pessimistic (‘not a democ-
racy’) to positive (‘a full democracy’). Democratic satisfaction is included to control 
for general citizen evaluations of the country’s democracy. One key aspect of modern 
democracies is the equal treatment of all citizens. This is hardly upheld in most African 
democracies, and in order to address this, I include a question that asks citizens to rate 
how often the government discriminates against the respondent’s ethnic group. African 
governments have often employed ethnic politics in consolidating power and distrib-
uting corrupt spoils along lines of patronage. Citizens who feel mistreated by the 
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government should report lower levels of institutional trust. Furthermore, it is highly 
likely that political partisanship plays a major role in evaluations of the state. 
I also acknowledge the strong role that partisanship can play in determining perceptions 
of corruption. In many cases, one would expect that trust in institutions is very closely 
linked to trust in who is running the institutions. In order to incorporate this into the 
model, I include citizen trust of the ruling party. Those citizens who are partisan in 
favor of the ruling party should report lower trust in state institutions. This variable 
asks respondents to evaluate their overall trust in the ruling party, ranging from ‘not at 
all’ to ‘very much.’ This variable presents a potential statistical issue: is it very highly 
likely collinear with overall levels of institutional trust. Because partisanship is im-
portant from a theoretical perspective, I keep this covariate in the model; however, in 
the appendix I present the correlation between the two variables (0.603) and a density 
plot that shows that while they are highly correlated, they are not identical. This can be 
found on page 208. 
Finally, in order to measure legitimacy, I include a general evaluation of the perfor-
mance of the local government. Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of 
local government on African citizens (Fashagba, 2015; Le Van, 2015). Local govern-
ments serve as the primary set of institutions responsible for providing services to their 
constituent populations. While central governments often attract the public’s ire, citi-
zens in most African states are more closely linked to their local governments than to 




Below, Table 14 displays the expected correlations of the two independent variables of 
interests as well as the three covariates most likely to confound the results.  
TABLE 14 - EXPECTED CORRELATIONS 
Hypothesis Independent Varia-
bles 











Positive Negative Positive Positive Positive 
Results 
The results are found below, in Table 15. The results provide strong support for the 
hypothesis that perceptions of systemic corruption are inversely correlated with trust in 
institutions. Across each model, respondents who report high perceptions of police cor-
ruption also report low trust in government institutions. The correlational coefficients 
are substantively large and robust to the inclusion of covariates. Moreover, the results 
are statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. Similarly, evaluations 
of the freeness and fairness of elections are positively correlated with overall levels of 
institutional trust. Individuals who believe that elections were fairly conducted report 




TABLE 15 - CORRUPTION & INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
 DV: Institutional Trust  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 1.027*** 0.922*** 0.784*** 0.751*** 0.620***  
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) 
Hypothesis      
Police Corruption -0.249*** -0.242*** -0.224*** -0.181*** -0.173***  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Electoral Fairness 0.197*** 0.186*** 0.144*** 0.078*** 0.071***  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Covariates      
Handling Corruption 0.191*** 0.173*** 0.149*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Present Economy 
 
0.076*** 0.058*** 0.021*** 0.022***   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Living Situation 
 
-0.012*** -0.017*** -0.009*** -0.012***   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ethnic Treatment 
  
-0.041*** -0.017*** -0.016***    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Satisf. w/ Democracy 
  
0.151*** 0.067*** 0.059***    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Future Economy 
   
0.011*** 0.009***     
(0.002) (0.002) 
Trust in Ruling Party 
   
0.356*** 0.352***     
(0.002) (0.002) 
Local Gov't Perform. 
    
0.075***      
(0.003) 
AIC 257191.211 253103.503 207488.515 166047.630 150562.923 
BIC 257248.987 253180.454 207582.882 166159.624 150683.189 
Log Likelihood -128589.606 -126543.751 -103734.257 -83011.815 -75268.461 
Num. obs. 112349 111174 92661 83524 76979 
Num. groups: country 34 34 33 32 32 
Var: country (Intercept) 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.010 0.010 




Below, Figure 9 displays the predicted level of institutional trust based on the two sys-
temic corruption independent variables. When respondents reported that the police 
were not at all corrupt, they reported a mean level of institutional trust at 2.2, which 
correlates with a high level of trust. When some police were considered corrupt, insti-
tutional trust dropped to 1.8, and the dropped again to 1.5 when most police were con-
sidered corrupt. Finally, when all police were considered corrupt, institutional trust was 
reduced to 1.1. With regards to evaluations of electoral quality, the correlation also 
provides support for the hypothesis. When elections are deemed to have been neither 
free nor fair, trust in institutions averages a response of 1.06, which corresponds in real 
terms to a low level of trust. When elections are considered completely free and fair, 
trust rises to 1.9, which corresponds with high levels of overall trust. 





Model 2 – How Institutional Trust Conditions Revolution 
Having now tested the first step in the proposed chain (perceptions of corruption and 
institutional trust), I turn to measuring the relationship between overall levels of insti-
tutional trust and support for revolution. This corresponds with hypothesis 1b. As stated 
earlier in this chapter, because the data come from the Afrobarometer data, it is not 
possible to attribute causality to the relationships; instead, these are correlational tests 
that rely on the causal linkages demonstrated in the previous chapter. 
Testing support for revolution is tricky at the best of times due to the fact that few 
people would openly admit to supporting treasonous and illegal political goals. How-
ever, it is possible to proxy for support for revolution by looking at whether respondents 
believe political violence is politically justified. Why is this the case? Political violence 
is generally illegal in most African countries. Moreover, with a few exceptions, political 
violence is used primarily by revolutionary contentious groups. For example, in Kenya 
the majority of political violence has been used by revolutionary groups demanding to 
overthrow the democratically elected president in favor of installing their personal can-
didate. In Burkina Faso, violence erupted when revolutionary zeal against former pres-
ident Blaise Compaoré hit a fever pitch. In Nigeria, violence is used primarily by rev-
olutionary groups in the north (Boko Haram) and in the south (Biafran militias). 
Method & Data 
In order to test hypothesis 1b, I turn to the Afrobarometer data again. As mentioned 
above, I use support for political violence as a proxy for support for revolution. In this 
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case, the Afrobarometer data provide two very good tests for the hypothesis that insti-
tutional corruption is inversely correlated with desire for revolution. The first test looks 
at whether citizens believe that political violence is ever justified. The second test looks 
at whether citizens would be willing to use revolutionary violence. As one might expect, 
respondents are more willing to openly discuss the theoretical justification for violence 
than actually admit whether they themselves would be interested in performing vio-
lence in pursuit of a ‘just cause’. I test them both below. The first dependent variable 
measures justification of violence, while the second dependent variable measures will-
ingness to use violence. 
Models 
Because Afrobarometer data are, with few exceptions, structured as ordinal categorical 
data, I rely primarily on using cumulatively linked multilevel models with an ordinal 
logistic link. In short, these models are able to regress covariates on categorical data 
that are not numeric, but do have a clear ordinal structure. For example, questions on 
evaluations of personal well-being are structured as: “very bad,” “bad,” “neither good 
nor bad,” “good,” and “very good.” 
Ordinal models use a logistical link between categories, and generating predicted out-
comes is actually a matter of determining the probability that, given a certain amount 
of institutional trust, a respondent will select one of the ordinal categories in the de-
pendent variable. five ordinal responses indicating justification for violence. Examin-
ing predictions this way is particularly interesting, because it allows for nuanced 
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analysis of the marginal effects of institutional trust on the probability of each outcome 
category. 
Dependent Variable: Justification of Violence 
The first dependent variable is citizen reports of whether “the use of violence is never 
justified in [country’s] politics today” or whether it is indeed, “sometimes necessary to 
use violence in support of a just cause.24” This variable is interesting because it does 
not require citizens to implicate themselves in any violent misconduct, but instead looks 
at whether they think violence in search of a ‘just cause’ is ever justified at the theoret-
ical level. Of course, violence is not the same as revolution; many revolutions have 
been non-violent (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), and not all violent contention is rev-
olutionary. 
Looking at Table 16 below which summarizes the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns 
and Outcomes (NAVCO 3) data project (Chenoweth, Pinckney, & Lewis, 2017), I find 
support for the use of justifying violence as a measurement of revolutionary support. 
Within the NAVCO 3 data, reformative campaigns are significantly less likely to use 
violence. Of the total number of reformative campaigns, only 18.56 percent use entirely 
violent tactics. On the other hand, of the total number of revolutionary campaigns, 
32.12 percent use entirely violent tactics. As such, revolutionary campaigns are 73 per-
cent more likely to engage in violence than reformative campaigns. 
                                                 
24 Round3: question 51. Round 5: question 78. 
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TABLE 16 – TACTICS AND GOALS IN AFRICAN CONTENTIOUS MOVEMENTS 
 Reformative Revolutionary 
Violent 1356 (18.56%) 1142 (32.12%) 
Not-Violent 5717 (78.25%) 2382 (67.00%) 
Mixed 233 (3.19%) 31 (0.85%) 
Justification for violence varies significantly across Africa. Figure 10 below displays 
variation in justification for violence across the countries surveyed in the fifth round of 
Afrobarometer. These countries are sorted by respondents strongly supporting the state-
ment that violence is ‘never’ justified. At the left, Tunisia has the highest percentage of 
citizens (80.20) that strongly believe that violence is never justified. On the right, Na-
mibia has the lowest such percentage, at 22.20 percent. 
FIGURE 10 – JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE IN ROUND 5 OF AFROBAROMETER 
 
Covariates 
The covariates remain identical to those found in Model 1 in order to preserve continu-
ity across models. Because the Afrobarometer data rely on ordinal data, I use a cumu-
lative linked mixed model. This model evaluates ordinal data on a level-by-level basis, 
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and links each level with a logistic regression. Because the model allows for mixed 
effects, I include each country as a level of analysis. Using a multilevel model allows 
the model to more efficiently address imbalance in the data, particularly as some coun-
tries are more represented than others within the dataset. 
In the preceding model, I found that systemic corruption (measured by perceptions of 
police corruption and evaluations of the freeness and fairness of elections) significantly 
reduce levels of institutional trust. Institutional trust was measured as an average of 
each respondent’s reported level of trust in three state institutions: the police, the elec-
toral courts, and the tax institution. Here, I use two dependent variables: justification 
of political violence and use of political violence. I generate an institutional trust vari-
able only from the average of trust in the police and trust in the electoral courts.25 
Results 
Across each model testing justification for violence, the results provide strong support 
for the hypothesis that as institutional trust increases, support for revolution decreases. 
On average and holding all else equal, increased institutional trust is inversely corre-
lated with support for the use of political violence. This relationship is statistically sig-
nificant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. This relationship carries through from the 
bivariate regression to the full model including all covariates. The results are presented 
in Table 17. 
                                                 
25 The correlation between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ variables of institutional trust is 0.9483, which indicates 
that high similarity between the variables. 
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TABLE 17 – ORDINAL CUMULATIVE LINKED MIXED MODEL 
 DV: Justification for Violence  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Hypothesis      
Institutional Trust -0.316*** -0.321*** -0.270*** -0.190*** -0.195***  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) 
Cut Points (Taus)      
Tau 1|2 -0.573*** -0.345*** -0.426*** -0.558*** -0.617***  
(0.069) (0.072) (0.086) (0.092) (0.093) 
Tau 2|3 0.880*** 1.110*** 1.035*** 0.924*** 0.865***  
(0.069) (0.072) (0.086) (0.092) (0.093) 
Tau 3|4 1.750*** 1.982*** 1.943*** 1.850*** 1.790***  
(0.070) (0.073) (0.087) (0.092) (0.094) 
Tau 4|5 3.050*** 3.295*** 3.338*** 3.227*** 3.169***  
(0.073) (0.076) (0.091) (0.097) (0.098) 
Covariates      
Present Economy 
 
0.048*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.046***   
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Living Situation 
 
0.037*** 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.047***   
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ethnic Treatment 
  
0.093*** 0.072*** 0.073***    
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Satisf. w/ Democracy 
  
-0.050*** -0.050*** -0.051***    
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Future Economy 
  
-0.023* -0.028** -0.028**    
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Trust Ruling Party 
   
-0.054*** -0.057***     
(0.012) (0.012) 
Loc. Gov't Perf. 
   
-0.022 -0.025*     
(0.012) (0.012) 
Education 
    
-0.016**      
(0.005) 






AIC 134881.127 132603.849 95086.686 84111.175 83953.952 
BIC 134934.602 132675.023 95180.856 84220.851 84072.042 
Num. obs. 54858 53998 38596 34084 34030 
Groups (country) 31 31 27 27 27 
Variance: country: (Inter-
cept) 
0.131 0.131 0.129 0.132 0.130 




In order to better understand the correlation between institutional trust and support for 
violence (hereafter ‘revolution’), I calculate the marginal effects using a boot-strapping 
method that calculated effects based on observed values rather than statistical means. 
These are presented below, in Figure 11. The marginal effects provide the predicted 
probability of a respondent selecting one of the five categories based on the observed 
values of institutional trust and covariates. While there are five categories, the majority 
of the variation occurs in three, which I present below. On the left is the category in 
which respondents strongly agreed that political violence is never justified. In the mid-
dle is the category in which respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. On the right is 
the category where respondents strongly agreed that political violence is sometimes 
justified. Along the x-axis of each plot are the values of institutional trust, ranging from 
0 to 3. 
FIGURE 11 - PREDICTED MARGINAL EFFECTS OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR VIOLENCE 
 
The marginal effects display the large variation in the probability of respondents se-
lecting each category. On the left, holding all else equal, respondents who reported 
absolutely no trust (0) in government institutions were just under 35 percent likely to 
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state that they strongly agree that political violence is never justified. Respondents who 
have complete trust in institutions (3) are 48 percent likely to select this option. In short, 
respondents who have no trust in government institutions are 14 percentage points less 
likely than respondents who have complete trust to select the response that violence is 
never justified. Moving to the middle category (‘neither agree nor disagree’), respond-
ents who have no trust are just under five percentage points more likely to state that 
they are undecided. Five percentage points may seem small, but only about 13 percent 
of all responses select this option, which means that variation of just under five per-
centage points comprises more than 33 percent variation. Finally, individuals with no 
trust are twice as likely as individuals with high trust to state that they agree that polit-
ical violence is sometimes justified. 
In order to visualize the relationship in a more intuitive manner, I also run a mixed-
effects linear regression. The model includes the same covariates found in the cumula-
tive linked ordinal model, and the results are nearly identical. Because the linear model 
is designed to fit normally distributed continuous data, the results are not as statistically 
efficient as possible, resulting in slightly smaller effect sizes; however, the results pro-
vide additional support for the hypothesis that increased institutional trust is correlated 
with lower levels of justification for violence, and by proxy, revolutionary zeal. The 
results are found in the appendix in Table 30 on page 209. 
Dependent Variable: Use of Violence 
The second dependent variable asks respondents whether they personally would ever 
use force of violence or a political cause. This variable is, of course, problematic. Few 
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respondents are likely to think of themselves as potentially violent, and those that do 
are likely to hide that fact from a survey researcher. This is likely for a few reasons. 
First, it is taboo to admit aspirations of violence. Second, admitting willingness to con-
duct violence is potentially risky, particularly in mixed-regime countries in which such 
declarations may lead to jail-time or worse. As a result, the vast majority of respondents 
(89.24 percent) indicated that they have never used violence, and also that they never 
would use violence. A small percentage (7.42 percent) indicated that they would be 
willing to use violence if the right opportunity was presented. Of the remaining cate-
gories, which all require respondents to admit to having used violence at least once, 
only 3.34 percent picked one of those three categories. Frequencies are displayed below 
in Figure 12. 
FIGURE 12 – WOULD USE FORCE OR VIOLENCE FOR A POLITICAL CAUSE 
 
The results of the ordinal cumulative model reflect this highly skewed distribution. 
Below, Table 18 displays the results from this secondary test. The results provide strong 
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secondary support for the hypothesis. Across each of the models, institutional trust dis-
plays a statistically significant inverse correlation. This means that respondents with 
low levels of trust in the system are more likely to state that they would or have used 
violence. 
TABLE 18 – ORDINAL CUMULATIVE LINKED MIXED MODEL 
 DV: Would Use Violence for Political Reason  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Hypothesis      
Institutional Trust -0.171*** -0.182*** -0.104*** -0.078*** -0.067**  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025) 
Cutpoints (Taus)      
Tau 0|1 1.965*** 2.055*** 2.259*** 1.994*** 1.818***  
(0.099) (0.104) (0.122) (0.131) (0.143) 
Tau 1|2 3.233*** 3.323*** 3.511*** 3.225*** 3.040***  
(0.100) (0.105) (0.124) (0.133) (0.144) 
Tau 2|3 3.942*** 4.036*** 4.216*** 3.933*** 3.731***  
(0.102) (0.107) (0.126) (0.135) (0.146) 
Tau 3|4 4.910*** 4.998*** 5.257*** 4.983*** 4.796***  
(0.109) (0.114) (0.134) (0.143) (0.154) 
Covariates      
Present Economy 
 
0.085*** 0.080*** 0.101*** 0.105***   
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Living Situation 
 
-0.042** -0.030* -0.015 -0.011   
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
Ethnic Treatment 
  
0.187*** 0.191*** 0.190***    
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Satisf. w/ Democracy 
  
-0.034* -0.018 -0.025    
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Future Economy 
   
-0.124*** -0.133***     
(0.014) (0.015) 
Trust Ruling Party 
   
-0.011 -0.012     
(0.018) (0.019) 
Loc. Gov't Performance 
    
-0.043*      
(0.019) 
Education 
    












AIC 55702.002 54866.588 44101.245 39974.927 36166.902 
BIC 55756.203 54938.739 44189.227 40079.213 36286.949 
Num. obs. 61916 61019 48930 43938 39136 
Groups (country) 31 31 27 27 27 
Variance: country: (Inter-
cept) 
0.272 0.280 0.315 0.337 0.356 




Building on the causal evidence marshalled in Chapter 3, this chapter has used Afroba-
rometer data from across the continent to test the relationship at a larger scale. Overall, 
the results presented provide support for the hypothesis that institutional trust is in-
versely correlated with support for revolution, as measured by justification for violence 
as well as reported willingness to use (or previous usage of) violence. While the de-
pendent variables are imperfect, they do provide important insight into how citizens 
relate their trust in the government with a willingness to act out in revolutionary man-
ners. Trust is shown to play a major role in conditioning the boundaries of contention 
that citizens consider acceptable. In demonstrating this, this finding contributes to a 
large body of literature that has connected trust with social and political behaviors and 
outcomes. In the next chapter, I test the arguments more directly using geospatial data 
of contentious incidents. 
This chapter uses cumulative linked multilevel models with a logit-based ordinal link-
age to test the hypotheses. Because the data are ordinal data, these tests are the most 
appropriate for the occasion; however, linear regressions are included in the appendix 






Reform and Revolution at the Incident Level 
Introduction 
This dissertation has thus far argued that groups mobilize in support of either reform or 
revolution in response to different forms of corruption. Material corruption reduces 
trust in politicians and generates calls for reform. Systemic corruption reduces trust in 
the system itself, leading to calls for revolution. This is argument that interlocks two 
levels. At the first level, it examines how exposure to different types of corruption shape 
individual perceptions of trust and support for revolutionary statements and violence. 
At the second level, it argues that contentious organizations reflect these micro prefer-
ences by responding to different types of corruption with different contentious goals. 
When groups respond primarily to material corruption, they seek reformative goals. 
When they respond primarily to systemic corruption, they are more likely to see revo-
lutionary goals. 
This argument has been tested causally in Chapter 3 and correlationally at the individ-
ual level in Chapter 4. Yet, one important source of data remains untested – the actual 
protest and riot behavior of contentious groups. After all, thus far the data have only 
been able to provide information about what respondents say they would do/have done. 
In order to test whether reported contention links to actual contention, I now turn to 
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data that include observed incidents of protest and riot. This chapter is able to test both 
hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 1b. 
As I detail in the next section, groups engage in a variety of behaviors – revolutionary 
groups do not solely or strictly mobilize around systemic demands. To do so would be 
a missed opportunity for their organization to develop and extend a leading role in civil 
society. In South Africa, socialist organizations seek a revolutionary restructuring of 
the state (in particular, property rights). Yet, these groups – including the Economic 
Freedom Fighters – participate in many protests ranging across many grievances. As 
such, it is important to measure the actual behavior of the organizations by analyzing 
their behaviors. 
Such analysis has recently come to the fore of political science, with the introduction 
of highly used datasets such as the Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED), 
Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) and Global Terrorism Database (GTD). In 
South Africa, MunicipalIQ has developed a dataset tracking South Africa’s prolific ser-
vice-delivery protests. For the purpose of this dissertation, incidents serve an important 
role of locating contention in both time and space, which can be incorporated into the 
analysis. 
Restating the Hypotheses 
This chapter specifically focuses on the hypotheses that emerge from diverging corrupt 
violations. I restate these below. 
Hypothesis 1a: when citizens perceive material violations of the state – personal 
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enrichment, patronage, shrinking economic opportunities – they are likely to rise up 
with demands to reform the existing system. I argue that this is due in part to trust that 
the system itself could operate well if given the opportunity to do so. Removing a pol-
itician or changing a specific law are versions of reform that operate within the system 
as it is. 
Hypothesis 1b: when citizens perceive systemic violations of the state – subverting the 
constitution, rigging elections – they are likely to rise up with demands for revolution-
ary change. I argue that this is because systemic violations corrode trust in the system 
itself, leading citizens to seek outside options. This manifests as demands to overturn 
elections, scrap the constitution, or engage in socialist land reform efforts that funda-
mentally diverge from the principles of the government. 
Studying Incidents of Contention 
Why study incidents of contention? The theory makes predictions about individuals 
and their mobilization into groups, but says less about the individual protests, riots, and 
demonstrations that those groups will engage in. Yet, studying incidents provides im-
portant insight into the different behaviors of groups. For example, as we observe later 
in this chapter, social movement organizations engage in many types of contention. The 
revolutionary group, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB), often demonstrates with demands for independence (a revolutionary 
claim). But they also respond to more local issues – they protested the unfair detention 
of their members by the state, and even participated in protests about the price of fuel 
following the removal of subsidies by the government. Similarly, in South Africa, the 
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Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) primarily agitated on behalf of 
reform issues – demanding improved wages, women’s rights, and development. But in 
several rare cases, COSATU sought the overturning of an election and revolutionary 
land reform. 
Moreover, studying incidents of protest and riot allow for the inclusion of temporal and 
geographic information into statistical analysis. Time and space play important roles in 
social movements and revolution; protests against extractives corruption tend to occur 
in the regions most hard-hit by the externalities associated with the mining and petro-
leum industries. In Nigeria, this is in the South-South region of the Niger Delta. 230 
such protests occur in the data. In South Africa, extractives protests take place largely 
outside of mines. 66 such protests occur in the data. 
As I detail later in this chapter, the location of protests also serves to communicate 
specific messages. Protesting in the capital is often the best way to communicate mes-
sages directly to the government, and protesting in front of specific institutions may 
amplify this message. For example, following issues of electoral fraud, intimidation, 
and ballot stuffing, protesters in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa frequently protested 
directly in front of their respective electoral commissions. In South Africa on several 
occasions, protests occurred in front of the Constitutional Court to send a message con-
cerning pending challenges to the constitution. 
Including geographic information further allows for the identification of specific 
‘hotspots’ that may facilitate (or hinder) contention in several ways. Some regions will 
observe more contention due to factors ranging from increased infrastructure that 
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allows protesters to march and congregate to high population density that allows SMO 
organizers to mobilize participants. Salmenkari (2009) also identifies symbolic spaces 
– spaces that seem to be imbued with symbolic meaning. Understanding where protest 
incidents occur provides additional information about the content of the protest and the 
likelihood of future events. 
Likewise, time plays an important role in shaping contention. Electoral protests, unsur-
prisingly, take place in the short periods before, during, and after elections. This is par-
ticularly salient in Kenya, where elections have often been marked by allegations of 
fraud, rigging, and intimidation. Protests often cluster together in cascading waves 
(Hussain & Howard, 2013; Lohmann, 1994), beginning with small, vulnerable demon-
strations that soon give way to large-scale mobilization. This occurred in Nigeria with 
the #EndSARS campaign, where protests against the abusive Special Anti-Robbery 
Squad (SARS) began tepidly, but soon grew into nation-wide demonstrations against 
police abuse, corruption, and brutality. These cascades of protest reveal the importance 
of timing in understanding who mobilizes and why they do.  
Grievances and Contention in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa 
In order to examine the relationship between different types of corruption and diverging 
calls for reform and revolution at the group-level, I turn to three countries: Nigeria, 
Kenya, and South Africa. These countries are Africa’s three most contentious countries, 
and all three have experienced calls for reform and revolution during the third wave of 
protest. Additionally, all three countries experience both types of corruption. As such, 
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they are excellent candidates for study, and I focus on these three countries in this chap-
ter as well as in the next. 
Nigeria 
Nigeria sits in the crook of Africa’s Gulf of Aden. It is Africa’s most populous country, 
and is comprised of myriad ethnic and religious groups. The country became independ-
ent in 1960, and enjoyed very little time as a new nation before its first secessionist war. 
Nigeria has long been an oil-producing country, and its reliance on oil exports emerged 
as a primary challenge to governance and economic development once the country be-
came independent of the United Kingdom. Petroleum became a primary flash-point for 
tension in Nigeria, as leaders enriched themselves and their ethnic groups to the detri-
ment of the rest of the country. 
Nigeria has long experienced inter-group ethnic and religious tension, owing in large 
part to the creation of its borders by western politicians. As a result, ethnic and religious 
groups have often contended with one another over access to resources, public services, 
and public goods. This dynamic followed through from the colonial state into Nigeria’s 
early years of independence with the attempted secession of Biafra following a coup 
and subsequent counter-coup that put the northern and southern populations at logger-
heads and fed into concerns by both the north and the south about the potential capture 
of the state by one group or another (McCauley, 2017). The Biafran War, which ran 
from 1967 to 1970, was an effort by the Igbo population in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger 
Delta region to gain autonomous rule and control over the rich petroleum wealth of 
Nigeria’s south. The Nigerian state responded harshly, both in combat with the 
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secessionist forces as well as in blockading the region from receiving aid. It is estimated 
that over two million Nigerians died of starvation alone (Onuoha, 2011, 2017). Shad-
ows of the Biafran War remain today, exacerbated in large part by the accession of a 
northern Muslim (Muhammadu Buhari) to the Nigerian presidency in 2015. 
Following the end of the Cold War and under the corrupt military rule of Sani Abacha, 
a northern Muslim, southerners began once again to agitate for increased autonomy and 
control over resources. Following the repression against a non-violent group of Ogoni 
activists, southerners began to organize into armed militant groups, and calls for reform 
turned into calls for revolution. This has ebbed and flowed since the beginning of Ni-
geria’s Fourth Republic in 1999, and has most recently become salient with the election 
of President Buhari, a Muslim northerner in 2015. Despite the overall improvements in 
anti-corruption under Buhari, southerners have rallied together around Igbo national-
ism (Duruji, 2012; Onuoha, 2012), charging the government with deep systemic cor-
ruption. Perhaps most prevalent has been the emergence of the Movement for the Ac-
tualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) (2001), which employs both 
violent and non-violent tactics in calling for the secession of Biafra. 
Kenya 
If one draws a line directly east and slightly south of Nigeria to the other end of the 
African continent, one finds Kenya. Kenya, like Nigeria, is a multi-ethnic democracy 
with a history of both material and systemic corruption. Leading up to its independence, 
some Kenyan politicians and many British colonial officials strove to develop a system 
of politics that defied ethnic and tribal identity; however, first president Jomo Kenyatta 
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relied on rallying votes from Kikuyu (D. Branch, 2011). Kenyatta’s patronage helped 
generate ethnic fault lines that continue to drive much of Kenyan politics (Elischer, 
2013). As a result, contentious politics in Kenya is often drawn along ethnic lines. 
Kenya’s second president, Daniel Arap Moi, often resorted to the use of repressive 
force by way of the police to shut down his critics. According to Adar and Munyae 
(Human Rights Watch, 2008), “…Moi systematically usurped the functions of the other 
institutions of governance to the extent that the principle of the separation of powers 
was rendered ineffectual.” This violation of the system has led to an often highly violent 
police force at the use of the Chicago-style political machine of patronage that Moi 
helped build. 
Kenya’s systemic grievances are tightly clustered and are found in the Rift Valley and 
Nyanza regions of Kenya. It was in the shadow of this historical political landscape 
that the highly disputed 2007 elections took place between incumbent Mwai Kibaki 
and presidential challenger Raila Odinga. The elections were widely considered to have 
been, at a minimum, interfered with by Kibaki’s administration, leading to wide-spread 
ethnic and anti-government revolutionary violence and contention (Raleigh, Linke, 
Hegre, & Karlsen, 2010). The majority of this violence took place in the Rift Valley, a 
focal point in tensions between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu people of Kenya. The defeated 
supporters of Odinga were often subject to police brutality. Many claimed that the elec-
tions had been rigged, and were fraudulent. The revolutionary violence was partly suc-
cessful – the Kibaki government was forced to enter into a power-sharing agreement 
with Odinga, reviving the position of Prime Minister and fundamentally changing the 
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structure of the state. Kenya’s electoral violence is worthy of note because it occurred 
largely without the intervention of highly organized social movement organizations 
committed to revolution.  
Discontent over elections is by far the most prominent systemic grievance observed in 
the data. In 2017, concerns over the presidential elections once again came to a head. 
By this election, prominent Kikuyu Uhuru Kenyatta had taken office (elected in the 
2013 elections). Kenyatta is the son of former president Jomo Kenyatta. Mirroring the 
2007 election, the 2017 election was marred by widespread claims of vote rigging and 
abuse. Unlike 2007, when it was caught unprepared to address major systemic griev-
ances, in 2017 the Kenyan government was able to rely on the newly created (in 2011) 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The IEBC annulled the 
elections, leading to a new election that Kenyatta again won. 
South Africa 
South Africa lies at the southernmost tip of Africa, spanning the bottom section of the 
continent and stretching from Namibia to Mozambique, and bordering Botswana and 
Zimbabwe along the way. Contained within South Africa are two former regions under 
British rule. Swaziland (officially: the Kingdom of eSwatini) was disincorporated from 
South Africa’s Transvaal region in the early 20th century, while Lesotho declared in-
dependence in 1966. Unlike Kenya and Nigeria, which are post-colonial states, South 
Africa is a settler states in which many government officials from the previous regime 
have remained in power. As such, South Africa’s political institutions have been 
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substantially more resilient in the face of attempted state capture by the African Na-
tional Congress (ANC) and president Jacob Zuma. The contours of ethnic and religious 
politics are also different. The primary ethnic cleavage in South Africa is between 
‘blacks’ and ‘whites,’ defined largely by the racist political ideology of apartheid, in-
stituted by the white government in 1948 and lasting through the early 1990s. The spec-
ter of apartheid lingers in South Africa today, where whites and blacks struggle to trust 
one another, and the country remains largely economically segregated along color-lines. 
Owing to its well-developed civil society and tradition with trade unions, South Africa 
is Africa’s most contentious nation. In all, there are 8,824 observations of contention 
in South Africa between 1997 and 2018. The goals of the majority of these are unspec-
ified. Protests that specifically target material corruption, such as the personal enrich-
ment of Jacob Zuma, were found primarily in the Democratic Alliance (DA) stronghold 
of the Western Cape and in Gauteng province, where most civil society organizations 
reside. 
Data 
The principal data used in the analysis are comprised of 5,259 observations of conten-
tious politics, including non-violent protests and violent riots, derived from the Armed 
Conflict Location Event Data (Raleigh et al., 2010). The full size of the dataset of all 
recorded incidents of contention during this time is 15,863. Of this larger dataset, the 
5,259 observations used for testing make up 33.15 percent, and are comprised of all 
observations with reasonable connection to issues of corruption. This includes anti-
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corruption protests (that directly address corruption) as well as grievances that indi-
rectly address corruption, like those about service delivery and fuel subsidies. Each 
observation is ranked on the tightness of its recorded grievance with issues of govern-
ment corruption, so that observations directly addressing electoral fraud are weighed 
more highly than observations whose grievances concern service delivery. 
Importantly, all grievances tested within the dataset are at least indirectly linked to cor-
ruption. In the African context, it is extremely difficult to decouple anger over corrup-
tion with more immediate anger over ‘hearth and table’ issues like poverty, school fees, 
and lack of access to economic opportunities. Because of the manner in which elite 
corruption directly shapes opportunities and public services, corruption is often a cen-
tral concern of protesters.  
The data include all recorded riots and protests in both Nigeria and Kenya over 20 years 
(from 1997 to 2016) and are geocoded. The data are presented below in Figure 13. Of 
the observations, there are 1,898 incidents of contention in Kenya and 2,787 incidents 
in Nigeria. The data indicate that the number of incidents of contention increase signif-
icantly over time; however, this may be a function of increased access to sources of 




FIGURE 13 - CONTENTIOUS INCIDENTS FROM 1997 TO 2016 
 
I run two main models in this section. The first model examines the determinants of 
reformative contention. The theory hypothesizes that reform contention will be posi-
tively correlated with material grievances. The second model examines the determi-
nants of revolutionary contention. The theory hypothesizes that revolution will be pos-
itively correlated with systemic grievances. The dependent variables are thus dichoto-
mous variables that indicate whether an incident of contention is labeled as being either 
reformative or revolutionary. Thus, the reformative variable is coded 0 when an inci-
dent is not considered reformative, and 1 when it is. The same goes for revolution. 
These are two different variables. 
Coding the variable was done by using information from the “notes” column in the 
ACLED data. The initial coding was conducted by an undergraduate student and then 
checked by me. This minimizes the potential of bias in coding the variables. Each ob-
served protest, riot, and demonstration has a short description of what happened. Some 
of these notes are too short to be useful. For example, a June 2013 protest in Kenya 
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information – the primary actor is a group of nurses; however, it does not provide either 
a grievance or a goal. Other notes are substantially more detailed, though still provide 
imperfect information: 
Residents of Imenti South block the Meru-Nairobi highway to protest over late 
arrival of ballot materials at Kaguru Agricultural Centre during the Jubilee 
Party primaries on April 21, 2017 
This note identifies the primary actor (residents of Imenti South) and the grievance – 
the late arrival of ballot materials. Based on the contents of the note, this was coded as 
reformative, as it is likely that protesters demanded the timely delivery of their ballot 
papers, but there is no evidence that they sought to overturn the elections or fundamen-
tally change the structure of the government. Finally, there are notes that include es-
sentially all of the information needed to code: 
Hundreds of youth from the Niger Delta area have staged a protest in Warri 
demanding the immediate sack of the embattled Minister of Petroleum Affairs, 
and her counterpart at the Ministry of Interior Affairs over alleged misconduct. 
The protest was attended by many groups, including the Niger Delta People 
Salvation Front (NDPSF) and Niger Delta Freedom Movement. 
This note identifies the primary actor (youths from Niger Delta), the grievance (alleged 
misconduct), and the goal (the firing of the Minister of Petroleum Affairs. This protest 
took place in 2014. In 2015, this minister was investigated for money laundering and 
was fired in 2016. In 2018, an arrest warrant has been issued for her (Alison-Madueke, 
2018). 
Coding Reformative Goals 
Reformative goals are coded when it is either clear or very likely that the overall goal 
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of the protest was to induce reformative change in the government. For example, re-
formative goals include improving access to jobs and the economy, bringing about eco-
nomic and infrastructural development to certain regions, improving education, and 
improving access to public goods and services. In some rare cases, the detailed nature 
of the data allowed for very specific coding, including demands by protesters to change 
specific pieces of legislation, the removal of specific individuals from office, or specific 
demands for change of the electoral commission. More frequently, demands were 
coded under slightly larger umbrella terms, including protests over service delivery, 
support for democracy, education, and economic development. 
Below, Table 19 displays the most frequent reform goals found within the data. The 
reform goals reveal strong support for Mueller’s (2018) emphasis on the importance of 
‘bread and butter’ issues. In Political Protest in Contemporary Africa, Mueller focuses 
on the interaction between the concerns of protest leaders from the middle class and 
the needs of the protest participants, generally from the lower classes. This insight is 
particularly important when measuring popular responses to corruption. Corruption 
pervades nearly every aspect of economic and systemic development in Africa. Extrac-
tives industries, including petroleum and mineral mining, have long been linked to both 
corruption and low levels of development. This has led to growing inequalities between 
mine workers and managers (Malala, 2012; Bhorat et al., 2017) and widespread anger 
at the ‘paradox of plenty’ in resource-rich regions (Ikelegbe, 2001; Udosen, Etok and 
George, 2010; Eneh, 2011). Africans watch as government officials cavort and profit 
from relationships with business leaders (Marinovich, 2016) while average Africans 
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remain poor and regions remain underdeveloped. 
TABLE 19 - MOST FREQUENT REFORM GOALS 
 Kenya Nigeria South Africa 
Development 28 101 62 
Economic Reform 29 114 233 
Education Reform 66 142 393 
Electricity 4 138 180 
Pro-Democracy 59 119 205 
Service Delivery 8 17 884 
Wages 119 459 327 
In Nigeria, petroleum companies sign contracts in which they make commitments to 
provide job training and economic/infrastructural developments to the regions from 
which they extract their resources. For sixty years, citizens in the Niger Delta and Bia-
fra regions have watched as companies shirk their commitments and responsibilities, 
failing to train and employ locals (Ghazvinian, 2008) and standing motionless as the 
environment suffers (Okonta and Douglas, 2003; Akpabio and Akpan, 2010). Petro-
leum companies are able to do this only because they are allowed to do so by venal 
government officials who stand to grow wealthy by dint of illicit side-payments from 
these oil companies (Obi, 2009; Badmus, 2010). Ahonsi (2011) states, “[t]he relatively 
high levels of poverty in the Niger Delta in the midst of stupendous oil wealth have led 
to a large and growing proportion of the youth population seeing violence as a solution 
to their problems.” Widespread fraud in the extractives industry has led to systematic 
underdevelopment and corruption that leaves citizens in poverty while local governors 
get rich. This is due in part to the culture of ‘grabbing’ and lack of oversight from the 
central government: “…since the allocation of revenues from the state is discretionary, 
the local councils and indeed the citizens may not benefit commensurately from such 
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an increase [in revenues from petroleum rents]. Thus, while the states will receive sub-
stantially more oil revenues, without any institutional provisions and firm guarantees 
on the democratic utilization of such funds, the funds may be misappropriated … the 
evidence shows that, like the [Niger Delta Development Commission] and its progenies, 
these state commissions are afflicted by the malaises of under-funding, revenue misap-
propriation and corruption.” (Ako, 2011)  
Thus, when social movements rise up in response to corruption, they do so by linking 
corruption to issues of economic development, education, infrastructure, and other ma-
jor issues. Underlying the #FeesMustFall student protests in South Africa is frustration 
with the failure of the South African state to control rising costs of education in an era 
of growing inequality and poverty in South Africa. In an op-ed for the Daily Maverick, 
Paul Hoffman (2016) wrote, “Another feature of the debate around the protests is that 
everyone appears to be ad idem that if the country were less corrupt in its procurement 
system and general governance there would be more than enough resources to make it 
possible for fees to fall sufficiently for the state to be able to afford the cost of further 
education out of its general revenue from the taxpayers.” In countries where material 
corruption siphons state funds away from important public services, economic oppor-
tunities, and education, all roads lead back to the underlying government cultures of 
graft. 
Below, Table 20 displays several representative examples of how reform incidents were 
coded. The full dataset is publicly available online, and incidents were coded by me 
and by a student coder. After the initial coding, one additional student coder was used 
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to cross-check the coding. 
TABLE 20 - EXAMPLES OF REFORM CODING 
Note Grievance Goal 
Protesters shut down pumping station in protest over compen-









Khoisan activists take over block of flats to protest lack of 
housing. Leaders of the ethnic group claim the land they were 





Residents of Modderspruit riot for a third day. The demonstra-
tors accuse a nearby mine of failing to provide employment for 










Operations at the governor's office in Nyahururu Town were 
paralysed following protests against the County Public Service 
Board. Residents want the board removed over claims of in-





Coding Revolutionary Goals 
Revolutionary incidents were coded when there was clear evidence that the contentious 
actors sought to significantly change or replace part or the entirety of the system in 
order to put in a new or better system. The events were hand-coded by using the re-
search note included for each observation. Revolution is often assumed to refer to the 
complete social or political upheaval of a state, resembling the great revolutions of 
America, France, and Russia. Skocpol (1979) describes social revolutions as “rapid, 
basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied 
and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below.”  
While this definition does capture the most momentous forms of revolution, it would 
be difficult to apply in the African context. Perhaps the closest analog would be South 
Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994; yet, this transition was neither 
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rapid (it built momentum for nearly fifty years before succeeding) nor did it completely 
reconfigure the structures of the state – the police force changed names, but remained 
relatively intact. So did the revenue service and all of the major political institutions. 
Yet, it would not serve to simply call the transition from apartheid to democracy a pro-
cess of ‘reform’ – it was more structural than that. Similarly, the pro-democracy protests 
of Africa’s second wave of protest that ultimately ushered in the transition to multi-
party democracy were something less than full-scale revolution while also more than 
reform. 
As such, I operate under the definition that revolution can be identified when it consists 
of mobilization for and demands of substantial structural change to society or the state. 
Re-writing the constitution, as the Burkinabe did in 2014 (Mampilly, 2014) counts as 
revolutionary contention because it fundamentally changed the overarching political 
document guiding the state. Calls for socialism and land reform count as revolution 
because they fundamentally change the manner in which the state conceives of and 
enforces one of Locke’s (1690) basic principles of the government – the protection of 
private property. Calls in Kenya for the overturning of elections count as revolutionary 
goals because, if realized, they would constitute the abrogation of the fundamental 
democratic process of election. 
In Kenya, many of the revolutionary incidents occurred following the highly contested 
elections of 2007. Immediately preceding these revolutionary incidents, the Kenyan 
government had conducted elections that “were so badly flawed that it [was] impossible 
to know who won” (Smith, 2014). What followed was a period of anti-government and 
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ethnically-based violence that left over 1,000 Kenyans dead, and forced the government 
to enter into a power-sharing agreement between the two parties to the election. This 
electoral and constitutional compromise emerged after Raila Odinga’s supporters “re-
jected the results and vowed to inaugurate its leader … as ‘the people’s president,’ 
which the government warned would be tantamount to a coup.” (Gettleman, 2007). The 
Kenyan election in August 2017 also triggered concerns over fraud. Raila Odinga, once 
again the opposition challenger, alleged that “[t]he 2017 general election was a fraud … 
The electoral fraud and fabrication of results was massive and extensive.” (de Freytas-
Tamura, 2017). Following the announcement of the results of the election, Odinga’s 
supporters took to the streets, demanding that the election be overturned.  
In Nigeria, the majority of revolutionary incidents occurred from 2015 onward, includ-
ing 14 in 2015 and 17 in 2016. These incidents are largely calls for secession of the 
Biafran state by two major separatist groups, the Movement for the Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB). 
Both groups claim to be non-violent, though violence does occur at their rallies, demon-
strations, and protests. Many residents of Nigeria’s Delta region believe the federal 
government is thoroughly corrupt, and operates against the interests against one of Ni-
geria’s most politically relevant ethnic groups, the Igbos (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004a; 
Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Weinstein, 2006). Renewed agitation for the Biafran state 
emerged as early as 2004, though it began to build momentum following the election 
of northern Muslim Muhammadu Buhari to the presidency.  
The independent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the grievance claims 
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made by the contentious mobs and organizations are centered on material or systemic 
violations. As described above, material violations concern issues of money, food, elec-
tricity, and other public services and goods. Systemic violations are coded when they 
address deep-rooted structural dysfunctions, such as elections, police abuse and cor-
ruption, etc. The distribution of grievances is detailed below in Table 21. 
TABLE 21 - MOST FREQUENT REVOLUTIONARY GOALS 
 Kenya Nigeria South Africa 
Constitutional Changes 29 2 5 
Secession/Independence 0 61 0 
Overturning elections 154 64 24 
Implementing Religious Law 1 70 0 
Socialist/Land Reform 3 8 23 
Below, Table 22 displays representative examples of revolutionary coding, ranging 





TABLE 22 - EXAMPLES OF REVOLUTIONARY CODING 
Note Grievance Goal 
Local government workers on the aegis of the Nigerian Union of 
Local Government Employees (NULGE) stormed the National As-
sembly to demand the inclusion of local government autonomy in 






During second round of the National Constitutional Conference. 
Youth rioted in response to the creation of the post of executive 
Prime Minister. They demanded that senior cabinet minister Raila 






During second round of the National Constitutional Conference. 
Youth rioted in 136response to the creation of the post of executive 
Prime Minister. They demanded that senior cabinet minister Raila 






Rioting after the controversial announcement of Kibakis presiden-
tial election and alleged vote-rigging. Violence, arson and looting 








Youths in Anambra State, under the aegis of National Youth Coun-
cil of Nigeria (NYCN), marched out en masse on two non-consec-
utive days in protest, calling on the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) to cancel last Saturdays (16/11) gubernatorial 
elections in the state. On the first day of protest police in the area 









Both models – the model testing reform and the model testing revolution – include the 
same covariates. In order to test the primary theoretical hypothesis, I include measure-
ments of the grievances claimed by the protesters and riots. First, the models include a 
measurement of material grievance. As described earlier in this chapter, material griev-
ances largely concern issues of poverty, service delivery, and upward economic move-
ment. Previous work on the onset of violent conflict has emphasized the importance of 
opportunity costs in determining whether an individual will mobilize into a contentious 
group (Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Viterna, 2006, 2013; Wood, 2003). Furthermore, thick 
qualitative work has emphasized the importance of personal circumstance in driving 
citizens to either rise up or stay home (2018). Second, the models include a 
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measurement of systemic grievances, ranging from concerns over electoral fraud and 
police corruption concerns over third-terms and constitutional amendments. 
Unlike many other statistical approaches to contention, I do not rely on country-level 
variables. Other works have examined national-level contention (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004b; Fjelde, 2009; Neudorfer & Theuerkauf, 2014) compare levels of conflict be-
tween countries. The theory presented in this text can be adapted to country-level com-
parisons (as done in the previous chapter), but is adapted to the subnational level in this 
chapter. As such, using country-level variables would be statistically inappropriate. 
Moreover, country-level variables are generally updated yearly. As such, an indicator 
such as GDP would be repeated at the country-level for every incident of contention 
within that country in the year. As a result, it would explain nothing about within-year 
or subnational variation. 
In the previous chapter, I focused largely on the importance of mobilization into social 
movement organizations. These groups are generally in charge of charting their con-
tentious goals as well as mobilizing either broad or narrow bases. In order to address 
the important role that groups play, I include three group-level variables. 
The first group-level variable addresses the ethnic and religious makeup of the group. 
There is a large body of work that has focused on the importance of ethnic issues, such 
as relative deprivation and marginalization, in producing revolution (Auerbach, 2003; 
Faull, 2017; Kasambala, 2008). In order to address this, I include a variable that 
measures whether the group making contentious claims identifies along ethnic or reli-
gious lines. Second, I include a variable that measures whether a group represents a 
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specific community. Communities play an important role in African contention, and 
Branch and Mampilly (2015) detail the importance of localized protests in driving Af-
rica’s third wave. Finally, I include a variable that measures the level of organization 
of the mobilized group. Groups range from being completely unorganized (“citizens 
took to the streets…”) to being loosely collected (“Muslims in Nigeria protested …”) 
to being highly trained and organized, including civil society organizations and politi-
cal parties. Importantly, political parties participate substantially in African protests, 
mobilizing large groups of individuals and bringing them to the streets in support (or 
opposition) of a cause. 
In order to incorporate subnational level data, I include measurements of population 
and GDP, both of which are sourced from NASA and Columbia University’s Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network (2009). The CIESIN population data 
include observations for every five years, ranging from 2000 to 2020. In order to ad-
dress this, data for the intervening years were interpolated by assuming a linear growth 
rate between each five-year interval. These variables are measured at the second-ad-
ministrative district level and then applied to the events that occur in those regions. In 
South Africa, for example, this means that protests that occur in Pretoria include dif-
ferent population and GDP information that incidents that occur in Johannesburg, de-
spite them both occurring within the larger Gauteng Province. 
Drawing on a growing literature of the geography of contention. Salmenkari (2014) 
describes multiple categories of protest spaces that draw protest. One particular type of 
space is the ‘communicative space’. Communicative spaces are those spaces whereby 
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a protest will directly communicate a message to a specific authority. A Kenyan dissat-
isfied with the election may choose to gather with his peers in front of the Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission, whereas a Nigerian protesting pollution by the 
extractives industry might picket either the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
or a particular Shell plant. In order to account for the geography of protest, I code the 
incidents to include a variable that measures whether a contentious incident took place 
in the capitol city of either Kenya, South Africa or Nigeria, since the majority of work-
ing agencies and bureaus are found in either Nairobi, Gauteng province (with Johan-
nesburg and Pretoria), or Federal Capitol Territory. The distribution of incidents is 
found below in Table 23. 
TABLE 23 - CONTENTION IN CAPITAL REGIONS 
 Other Region Capital Region 
Kenya 523 162 
Nigeria 1351 220 
South Africa 2174 830 
Addressing Autocorrelation 
One major challenge to any research on political contention is the potential for an en-
dogenous autocorrelative response of the dependent variable to earlier incidents of the 
same dependent variable. For example, perhaps revolutionary contention simply hap-
pens in regions in which citizens have experienced or observed revolution before. Cit-
izens who have gotten used to revolutionary claims or political instability may simply 
be more likely to opt for revolution. In order to address this concern, I include a cate-
gorical variable derived from a polynomial that measures the amount of time in a given 
region since the last incident of contention. Categories were used because interpreting 
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polynomials – particularly when they are logged for normality – can be extremely dif-
ficult. The categorical variable is ordinally structured as follows in Table 24. 
TABLE 24 - CATEGORICAL TIME VALUES 
Value Interpretation 
0 0 days since last incident contention 
1 1 day since last incident of contention 
2 2 – 7 days since last incident of contention 
3 8 – 45 days since last incident of contention 
4 46 – 365 days since last incident of contention 
5 More than 1 year since last incident of contention 
I include three such variables. The first measures the amount of time since the last 
incident of contention within the specific second-administrative district. Because the 
distribution of incidents is not randomly assigned, there are large disparities between 
districts with regard to the number of days since the last incident. For a region that has 
never or only rarely seen incidents of contention, the passage of an additional day with-
out incident may not be noteworthy. For a region in which incidents of contention hap-
pen frequently, the passage of that same day may be very striking. The second measures 
the amount of time since the last incident of contention in the specific first-administra-
tion district. The final temporal variable measures the amount of time since the last 
incident of contention at the country level. 
The grievances considered to be directly connected include anti-corruption protests, 
elite theft, electoral fraud, police and security corruption, and others. These represent 
the types of corruption listed within the typology. Grievances considered to be closely 
but indirectly connected to corruption include service delivery, extractives industries 
like mining, general concerns over democracy, wages, and economic opportunities. 
These are grievances that are very often linked to corruption and are often the direct 
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consequences of corruption. For example, protests over extractives industries very fre-
quently invoke charges of corruption, including those at the Marikana mines in South 
Africa (Bond and Mottiar, 2013; Sinwell and Mbatha, 2016) and anger at petroleum 
industries like Shell and BP in the Niger Delta (Ibaba, 2011). In Nigeria, trade unions 
angry over low wages and sparse economic opportunities regularly voice concern over 
material corruption (Mohamed and Allah, no date; Sahara Reporters, 2015). Finally, 
grievances considered to be loosely connected to corruption include education, 
healthcare, environmental degradation 26 , and sanitation. These grievances are fre-
quently accompanied by charges of corruption, but not always. For example, while 
some education protests are closely linked with anger over corruption, like the #Fees-
MustFall student protests where students called out corrupt politicians (Ndelu et al., 
2016), not all protests about education are. Below, Table 25 displays the frequency of 
each different category of connection to corruption across each country in the dataset. 
This variable is included in the full model. 
TABLE 25 - DIRECTNESS OF CONNECTION TO CORRUPTION 
 Kenya Nigeria South Africa 
Loosely Connected 234 478 1055 
Indirectly Connected 263 935 2114 
Directly Connected 347 385 295 
                                                 
26 It is important to note that many environmental protests, such as those run by the Movement for the 





The model employed is a multi-level mixed-effects binomial logistic model. The model 
employs random slopes and intercepts at the second-level administrative district as well 
as at the country-level to address potential unforeseen factors that are particular to each 
region. The inclusion of random slopes and intercepts at the regional level allows for 
meaningful subnational comparison. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, a 
binomial model is the most appropriate means of testing the argument. 
The models are run in a step-wise manner to ensure that coefficients do not flip with 
the inclusion of new variables. Flipped coefficients may indicate high levels of collin-
earity. This does not present as a challenge in these models. The first model is a biva-
riate regression between the independent and dependent variables. The second model 
includes both forms of grievance (violations) and the temporal autocorrelational varia-
bles. The third model includes group-level information. The final model (model 4) in-
cludes the log of the local population. Additionally, the fourth model is repeated thrice 
– once per country to measure country-level variation. 
Results 
Reformative Contention 
The results for the analysis of reformative contention are found in Table 26. Across 
each model, I find strong support for the hypothesis that material violations are posi-
tively and significantly correlated with the probability that a contentious incident will 
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be structured around a reformative goal. In models one through four, material violations 
are positively correlated with the likelihood of reform, and the result is statistically 
significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. Moreover, the coefficient is very large 
for a logistic regression, indicating a robust relationship. In real terms, when grievances 
are not material in nature, there is just 27 percent chance that protesters will seek re-
formative outcomes. When grievances are material, on the other hand, the probability 
jumps to 97 percent. The correlation between material and reform is strongest in Kenya 
– likely the product of Kenya’s highly contentious elections and the role that ethnic 
politics play in its electoral politics. Nigeria and South Africa demonstrate nearly 
equivalent correlations. 
The corruption connection variable indicates that the more directly linked to corruption 
a grievance is, the more likely that contention is to seek reform. This positive correla-





TABLE 26 - MATERIAL CORRUPTION & REFORMATIVE CONTENTION 












-1.09** -0.75 0.77 -2.92* -1.54* -0.87 
 (0.37) (0.35) (0.65) (1.29) (1.34) (0.76) (0.72) 
Hypotheses        
Material Violation 4.49*** 4.75*** 4.91*** 4.95*** 8.88*** 5.03*** 2.45*** 




0.99*** 1.23*** 0.35 1.88*** 2.21*** -
5.08*** 
  (0.15) (0.16) (0.27) (0.51) (0.27) (0.47) 
Temporal Varia-
bles 
       
Admin 2 Level 
 
-0.11 -0.14* -0.18 -0.42* -0.02 -0.14* 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.19) (0.09) (0.07) 
Admin 2 Level 
 
0.08 0.09 0.05 0.57** -0.03 0.08 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.20) (0.10) (0.07) 
Country Level 
 
0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.18 -0.00 0.06 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.18) (0.11) (0.08) 
Group Varia-
bles 














-0.50 0.44 -0.35 -0.19 




0.30** -0.57* 0.31 0.82*** 0.31** 
   (0.10) (0.23) (0.18) (0.16) (0.11) 




-0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.05 
   (0.06) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.06) 
In Capital City   -0.03 0.17 0.03 0.03 -0.05 
   (0.26) (0.48) (0.67) (0.40) (0.28) 
Corruption Con-
nection 
      
3.27*** 
       (0.22) 
AIC 2806.57 2702.11 2624.10 757.17 386.94 1402.95 2364.02 
BIC 2859.11 2780.53 2735.01 830.98 448.95 1486.92 2481.45 





-364.58 -179.47 -687.48 -1164.01 
Num. obs. 5259 5088 5034 1440 620 2974 5034 




Interestingly – and unexpectedly – systemic violations also correlate positively with 
reformative outcomes, though the effect size is substantially smaller. Moreover, varia-
bles measuring group characteristics correlate with the likelihood of reformative con-
tention. Across the board, ethnic and religious groups are inversely correlated with the 
chance of reformative contention. This likely indicates one of two things. Either ethnic 
and religious groups generally seek more radical, revolutionary outcomes (as one ob-
serves with groups like Boko Haram and the Luo protesters in Kenya), or countries in 
which groups tend to be ethnic or religious also tend to be countries in which citizens 
rise up in revolution. 
Communal groups demonstrate inverse correlation with reformative contention. This 
effect is statistically significant in the full model (Model 4), but is not significant in any 
of the individual country models. One potential explanation for this is that communal 
groups are often made up of ethnically and religiously similar individuals. As such, 
communal groups may share similar grievances and goals to religious and ethnic 
groups. Interestingly, when disaggregated by country, communal groups are positively 
correlated with reform in Kenya. Finally, the group’s organizational level plays an im-
portant role in the model. As groups become more organized – moving from loose col-
lectives to professionalized social movement organizations – they are more likely to 
make reformative demands. The effect is small, but statistically significant at the 99 





The results for the primary model are presented in a step-wise manner below in Table 
27. I include a step-wise results table to demonstrate the relative stability of the coeffi-
cients as new factors are introduced. Across the board, on average and inter alia, sys-
temic violations are positively and statistically significantly correlated with revolution-
ary contention. The results are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
The results are substantively very large, and indicate that when citizens and civil soci-
ety organizations take to the streets to protest in response to systemic corrupt violations 
such as electoral fraud and police abuse, they are significantly more likely to agitate in 
favor of revolutionary goals. The variable indicating the directness of connection of the 
grievance to corruption displays an inverse and statistically significant relationship 
with revolutionary contention, indicating that most revolutionary movements agitate 




TABLE 27 - SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION & REVOLUTIONARY CONTENTION 















4.93*** -4.53** -7.88** -7.46*** 
-
4.74*** 
 (0.28) (0.40) (0.80) (1.43) (3.02) (1.80) (0.00) 
Hypotheses        
Systemic Viola-
tion 4.69*** 3.79*** 3.59*** 3.34*** 9.66*** 3.44*** 5.84*** 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.26) (0.37) (2.28) (0.46) (0.00) 




1.45*** 0.82 -0.83 
-
0.09*** 
  (0.29) (0.30) (0.41) (1.83) (0.49) (0.00) 
Temporal Varia-
bles 
       
Admin 2 Level  0.20* 0.24** 0.17 0.46* 0.06 0.23*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.22) (0.21) (0.00) 
Admin 1 Level  -0.10 -0.11 0.24 -0.61** 0.17 -0.11*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.23) (0.23) (0.00) 
Country Level  0.11 0.06 0.18 0.13 -0.17 0.07 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.22) (0.25) (0.09) 
Group Varia-
bles 
       
Ethnic/Religious   1.84*** 2.33*** -1.26 2.43** 1.87*** 
   (0.34) (0.39) (1.02) (0.79) (0.00) 
Communal   -0.15 0.54 -2.85** -0.73 -0.47*** 
   (0.26) (0.37) (0.87) (0.78) (0.00) 
Level of Organi-
zation 
  0.42** 0.94*** -0.34 1.40*** 0.41*** 
   (0.14) (0.28) (0.22) (0.36) (0.00) 
Covariates        
In Capital City   0.08 0.14 0.86 0.50 0.09*** 
   (0.27) (0.44) (1.21) (0.48) (0.00) 
Local Population 
(Log) 
  0.06 -0.12 0.02 0.06 0.04*** 
   (0.07) (0.12) (0.25) (0.17) (0.00) 
Corruption Con-
nection 
      -
1.15*** 
       (0.00) 
AIC 1305.19 1239.89 1200.06 490.71 323.76 345.63 1190.45 
BIC 1357.73 1318.30 1310.97 564.52 385.78 429.60 1307.88 
Log Likelihood -644.59 -607.94 -583.03 -231.35 -147.88 -158.82 -577.22 
Num. obs. 5259 5088 5034 1440 620 2974 5034 




Material violations present an inverse correlation with revolution. This relationship is 
statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level, and indicates that citizens 
are unlikely to seek major revolutionary overhauls to address grievances surrounding 
economy, jobs, infrastructure, and service delivery. The temporal variable at the second 
administrative district level presents a positive correlation with revolutionary outcomes. 
This means that second administrative districts are more likely to observe revolutionary 
contention as more time passes since the last incident of contention. This outcome is 
puzzling, and may have one of several explanations. First, it may be that regions that 
experience revolutionary contention do not experience reformative contention, and thus 
when revolution does occur, it happens in regions that have been relatively quiet. This 
seems unlikely, given the high levels of both reformative and revolutionary contention 
that occur in the capital regions.  
Group dynamics play an important role in revolutionary contention. Groups that are 
ethnic or religious are highly likely to engage in revolutionary contention – an effect 
most pronounced in Nigeria and South Africa. This is no surprise, as many times ethnic 
groups with narrowly-focused goals take to the streets to protest perceived and real 
ethnically-oriented injustices. These results provide additional support for scholars 
studying ethnic conflict, and particularly those that link ethnic conflict with increased 
revolutionary contention, such as Neudorfer and Theuerkauf (2014). This effect does 
not present itself in the Kenyan model, though it is worth mentioning that much of the 
revolutionary contention occurs on behalf of the aggrieved Luo people of Western 
Kenya. Communal groups are not statistically correlated with revolution in the main 
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models, but display a large and strong correlation in the Kenyan model. Finally, group 
organization matters: more highly organized groups are slightly more likely to engage 
in revolutionary demands. 
Predicted Probabilities of Reform and Revolution 
Below, Figure 14 displays the predicted probabilities of each contentious outcome – 
reform or revolution – based on the two types of grievances tested as well as a third 
“other” group. These predictions were generated using a bootstrapping method that 
maintains all values at their observed levels (Hanmer and Kalkan, 2013). This allows 
for meaningful standard errors to be calculated and included in the visualization. The 
results are striking. On the left of the plot, predictions for reformative contention are 
presented. While the model predicted that the presence of a systemic grievance leads 
to a 42 percent likelihood of reformative contention, material grievances generates a 
97 percent likelihood of observing reformative contention. These results strongly sup-




FIGURE 14 - PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF REFORM & REVOLUTION 
 
On the right of the plot, predictions for revolutionary contention are presented. When 
grievances are material, there is only a one percent likelihood of observing calls for 
revolution. When grievances are systemic, on the other hand, there is a 59 percent like-
lihood of observing calls for revolution. These results provide very strong support for 
Hypothesis 1b. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I find strong support for both hypotheses 1a and 1b. When citizens make 
claims about material violations, they generally seek reformative outcomes designed to 
alleviate the specific problem or problems that they ascribe to their discontent. Citizens 
angry about poor service delivery do not demand revolution – they simply want im-
proved service delivery. On the other hand, when citizens make claims about systemic 
violations that reshape the government itself – fraudulent elections, subversion of the 
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constitution, etc. – they make major revolutionary demands. Given Africa’s turbulent 
history with elections, one may be tempted to interpret calls to overturn the election – 
or, in some cases, simply to install a leader in power despite losing an election – as 
‘more of the same’. But these demands, if taken seriously, would completely subvert 
the electoral structure of a state. Citizens of Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa have 
strong histories of political participation and voting records. As this chapter has argued 
and tested, when citizens have concerns over the welfare of the state structure itself, 
they rise up. As African institutions strengthen and formalize (Cheeseman, 2018), such 
as the 2017 annulment of Kenya’s problematic election by the Independent Electoral 
and Boundaries Commission, it is likely that one might observe both a decrease in sys-




Case Studies of Corruption, Reform, and Revolution 
Introduction 
In order to test the theory in more detail, I turn now to the three case studies that have 
served as context for much of this dissertation: Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa. These 
three countries represent, in many ways, as Africa’s three major Anglophone giants. 
Located respectively in West, East, and Southern Africa, these countries have typically 
exerted substantial influence over their neighbors, and serve as core members in each 
of their respective regional economic groupings. I describe each case in detail in three 
sections in this chapter. In this chapter, I provide short histories for each of the three 
cases, and begin to map out their structures of corruption and contention. 
These three cases were selected in order to best test the model. Cases were selected 
prior to visiting any of these countries, which ensured that I did not have to engage in 
ad-hoc case justification. No two countries are identical, but several selection criteria 
were put in place to control for any glaring differences between the cases to the best 
extent possible. 
The selection criteria were founded on several primary factors. First, each country is 
an English-speaking country with a history of British colonialism. This helps to reduce 
potential issues that switching between English and French might have introduced. This 
is particularly important in Chapter 3, where a survey experiment was conducted using 
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nearly identical language between countries. Second, each country is highly populated, 
geographically large, and ethnically and religiously diverse (Arnold, 2017). Third, eco-
nomically-speaking, each country is a regional powerhouse, and exercises relatively 
strong state penetration throughout its territories. Each country is classified as an elec-
toral democracy, and has held multiple elections (Lindberg, 2006). Each of these three 
countries experiences the four major categories of corruption, and I detail examples of 
corruption and contentious responses in each country. I present two cases from each 
country. 
In Nigeria, I focus on the agitation in the southern Niger Delta, detailing the contentious 
behavior of two different campaigns. The first campaign includes the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People, a reformative group that sought redress over material 
grievances in the 1990s in southern Nigeria. The second campaign includes multiple 
organizations, but is largely spearheaded by the Movement for the Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra, and calls for the secession of the Biafran region from Nigeria. 
In Kenya, I focus on two very different campaigns. In responding to allegations of sys-
temic electoral fraud, I document the largely unstructured (though, later captured by 
political parties) calls for overturning the elections in 2007, 2012, and 2017. I also focus 
on broad anti-corruption campaigns conducted by civil society and students. In South 
Africa, I include the broad anti-Zuma campaigns that shook the nation for 4 years fol-
lowing a cascade of revelations of Zuma’s personal enrichment to the detriment of the 




Nigeria sits nestled in the crook of Africa’s Gulf of Guinea, surrounded by its neighbors 
Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Nigeria is one of Africa’s powerhouses, and hosts 
the largest population on the continent. Nigeria is a tropical country populated by many 
different ethnic and religious groups, and rich with petroleum, natural gas, and other 
minerals. The country is ethnically and religiously diverse (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2018). The most powerful among these ethnic groups include the Igbo and Ijaw in the 
southern Niger Delta region, the Hausa and Fulani in the northern region, and the Yo-
ruba in the west. As a state-building project, Nigeria has never quite commanded the 
full commitment of its population (Osaghae, 1998), and there has long been tension 
and ‘pull’ between ethnic, religious, and regional interests that have confounded cen-
trally-led efforts to unify the country (Campbell, 2013). The northern regions were tra-
ditionally populated by conservative Muslims that mixed traditional African religions 
with Islamic practice (Lubeck, 2010). 
In 1914, Nigeria emerged as an amalgam of British protectorates and trading interests, 
forcing together disparate regions with different languages, cultures, and political in-
terests. The British colonial masters ruled Nigeria by taking advantage of existing net-
works of governance and patronage rather than establishing a unified bureaucracy and 
civil service across the entire country (Campbell, 2013, p. 5). Because the British never 
colonized Nigeria in the way that they colonized Kenya, existing power structures were 
able to persist, running on established networks of patronage, referred to as ‘prebends’ 
by Richard Joseph (1987, p. 8). Joseph argues that prebendal politics define Nigerian 
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modes of governance, stating that Nigerian democracy has largely been characterized 
by “the justifying principle that [government] offices should be competed for and then 
utilized for the personal benefit of office holders as well as of their reference or support 
group.” More recently, this was described by Bratton and van de Walle (1994) as de-
fining the ‘neopatrimonial state.’ 
Nigeria emerged into independence on October 1, 1960 following Britain’s determina-
tion that it would no longer maintain its colonies on the continent. In a rather rushed 
departure from the continent, the British left the shell of a state to a people without the 
means or knowhow to manage it. The discovery of massive reserves of petroleum in 
the early 20th century had spurred foreign interest in Nigeria, and seemed to stand as a 
promise of wealth and good fortune for the newly independent state. This was not to 
be. Nigeria did not enjoy a peaceful independence; tensions between the Igbo in the 
south and the Hausa and Fulani in the north fueled distrust between the groups as they 
vied for control over the state and access to the plentiful export receipts that the export 
of oil provided the government (Adewoye, 1967; McCauley, 2017). Rather than uniting 
under the great ‘project’ of Nigeria, the three main regions – the North, the East (South-
South), and the West – tolerated each other via the apparatus of the state (Arnold, 2017, 
p. 191), which ensured that “no one tribe could easily dominate the rest” (Schwarz, 
1968). 
Corruption has long posted a major challenge to Nigerian governance; indeed, Nigeria 
has often been described as having a ‘culture of corruption’ (Smith, 2007), with politi-
cal relations built around networks of patronage and ‘prebends’. In 1967, following 
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increasing agitation by the Igbo against the perceived domination of the northern 
Hausa-Fulani people, civil war broke out. The people of Biafra, a large southern region 
of Nigeria in the oil-producing Niger Delta, were dominated largely by the Igbo, but 
were populated also by the Ijaw, Efik, Ekoi, and others. The Biafran War was condi-
tioned by a set of grievances and social cleavages that emerged from pre-independence 
dynamics and remain in place today. These grievances centered on access to and control 
of political power and economic resources. The civil war lasted from 1967 to 1970, and 
the Nigerian state – dominated by northern Muslims by that time – prevailed only after 
starving the region of Biafra, leading to the deaths of nearly 2 million civilians (soldiers 
non-inclusive). The specter of the Biafran War continues to haunt Nigerian politics, 
conditioning perceptions of ethnically-driven inequality (Smith, 2014), and generating 
support for social movements in the region. 
Contentious Coalitions and Claims in Nigeria 
Nigeria is one of Africa’s most conflict-prone countries, and houses many contentious 
coalitions that range from nonviolent social movements to violent militant organiza-
tions. Nigeria is second only to South Africa in terms of the number of social move-
ments, and climbs to the top of the rankings when incidents of terror and militant action 
are included. Below, Figure 15 displays the amount of contention in Nigeria from Jan-
uary 1997 to December 2018, drawn from the ACLED data used in the previous chapter. 
The dotted line near the bottom displays the average level of contention across all of 
Africa during the same time. Across time, Nigeria generally experiences more conten-
tion than its counterparts, though following the beginning of Africa’s ‘Third Wave’ in 
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2010, Nigeria observes substantially more contention than the rest of the continent. 
FIGURE 15 - CONTENTION IN NIGERIA 
 
There are many examples of anti-corruption contention in Nigeria that merit attention.  
Nigeria’s history is rife with examples of elite theft, ranging from military strongman 
Sani Abacha, who was able to squirrel away billions of dollars during his time as the 
military dictator of the country (Smith, 2015), to allegations of massive theft of re-
sources by presidents Obasanjo and Jonathan in recent years. Recently, starting in 2012 
and continuing through 2018, broad coalitions of Nigerians have risen up together to 
challenge rampant corruption. These protests have been organized by two major Nige-
rian trade unions: the Nigerian Trade Union Congress and the Nigeria Labour Congress 
(Hinshaw, 2012), who have opposed myriad economic policies that they believe privi-
lege the elites while putting the poor at a disadvantage. Anti-corruption protests began 
in earnest with the removal of fuel subsidies by Goodluck Jonathan’s government, and 
have continued in response to charges that the state cannot support its pensioners due 
to unbridled corruption. In December of 2018, the NLC stated, “If government is de-
sirous of addressing the issue of corruption in Nigeria, government must also address 
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the issue of retirees because the current workers will look at the condition of retirees 
and now begin to think, ‘will that be my situation when I retire’. That is why people 
will continue to help themselves. The best way is to make sure that we are able to take 
care of our citizens so that the workers of today will have the confidence that the future 
will take care of them” (Olayinka, 2018) 
Nigerians have contended electoral rigging, including the annulment of the 1993 gen-
eral election (Noble, 1993), which saw the rightful election of Moshood Abiola as a 
civilian, democratic president, and was cancelled by Ibrahim Babangida (Campbell, 
2013). This cancellation was designed largely to benefit Babangida rather than to 
strengthen the position of Muslims in Nigeria, as Abiola was also a Muslim, and Ba-
bangida has previously overthrown Muslim dictator (and later democratically elected 
president) Muhammadu Buhari. As a result, citizens from across the country rose up in 
violent protest against the government, pressuring it to recant, which it refused to do 
(Associated Press, 1993). Unlike many electoral protests, which pit supporters of con-
tending political parties together, these protests emerged from pro-democracy support-
ers across the country, including human rights groups and civilian protesters. 
In this section, I focus on two related organizations that explicitly complain about cor-
ruption in Nigeria’s oil-producing Niger Delta region. First, I detail the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People, who rose up against a violent military dictatorship to 
challenge material corruption. They called for reform, demanding increased access to 
petroleum rents and remuneration for the environmental destruction of their homelands. 
Agitation in the Niger Delta fundamentally changed upon the faulty trial and political 
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execution of the nine leading members of the organization (known informally as the 
“Ogoni Nine”). The second case study addresses the ongoing revolutionary movement 
for the secession of the southern region. The Nigerian government increased its use of 
security force abuse to stifle further complaints by the Niger Delta people. Importantly, 
revelations of the capture of key government institutions, such as the Armed Forces 
and the police, helped push those in the Niger Delta to begin renewed calls for revolu-
tion – namely, the secession of the Biafra from the Nigerian state. These are detailed 
below in the Nigerian case study. 
MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE OGONI PEOPLE 
Corruption in Nigeria’s oil-producing regions thrives largely due to the Nigerian state’s 
history as a largely corporatist government. This is detailed excellently in Okonta and 
Douglas’ Where Vultures Feast (2003), where the authors detail the linkage between 
the corporate interests of the oil companies Shell and British Petroleum and the embed-
ded interests of the political elites, who squirreled billions of dollars of petroleum rents 
into private bank accounts and patronage networks that benefited the north, primarily. 
A 1996 Greenpeace report stated that “For years Nigeria’s oil-rich southeast has been 
considered a colony by the Nigerian political and military elite. Those oil revenues that 
the elite did not use to acquire luxury goods and top up foreign bank accounts were 
spent exclusively in the north or southwest.” The production of petroleum out of the 
Niger Delta has led to widespread elite theft within the Nigerian government, both 
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historically and currently.27 
In an attempt to assuage the growing concerns of the people living in Niger Delta in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Nigerian Government established, upon pressure by 
Shell, to develop a government agency known as the Oil Mineral Producing Areas De-
velopment Commission (OMPADEC), which was billed as a way of redistributing 
more oil rents into the Niger Delta. Despite its promises of material benefits and eco-
nomic development, OMPADEC quickly became an operating node in a growing net-
work of patronage: “as soon as it was established in 1993, OMPADEC quickly devel-
oped a reputation as a government agency where favors were sought and sold for cash” 
(Okonta and Douglas, 2003). 
This corruption has led to major material consequences, which in turn formed the core 
of MOSOP’s contentious frames and claims. MOSOP’s primary platform consisted of 
seeking remuneration for the massive environmental damage caused by the extraction 
of petroleum – and the unwillingness of major petroleum companies to fix leaks and 
clean spills, as well as frustration with the perceived unfairness of the distribution of 
rents and public goods funded by the petroleum industry (Harshe, 2003). The Ogoni 
people watched as elites enriched themselves while the Ogoni suffered increasing pov-
erty in a rapidly degrading environment. And the cozy relationship between corrupt 
elites and the petroleum companies allowed for a form of corruption known as 
                                                 
27 For example, in 2016 the Minister of Petroleum was fired and prosecuted after $43 million was found 
in cash in her apartment in Lagos (Yemisi Adegoke, 2017) 
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‘exchange of favors’28 whereby petroleum companies never experienced major politi-
cal pressure to clean their petroleum spills or remunerate the Ogoni people. 
The consequences of this corruption were widespread; the environment of Ogoniland 
became polluted and, in many areas, unusable for agriculture or habitation (Akpabio 
and Akpan, 2010; Akpan, 2010), indigenous tribes reported high levels of cancer and 
other illnesses (Ojakorotu, 2009), and the region remained woefully underdeveloped 
despite massive profits that were ‘eaten’ by the national government. Despite promises 
of jobs training and positions by petroleum companies, the Ogoni people remained un-
deremployed and highly impoverished (Ghazvinian, 2008). 
MOSOP describes the ongoing corrupt structures as the result of an “unholy alliance 
between the political class and transnational oil corporations.” The structure of corrup-
tion linked three major political actors: political elites that stood to be enriched by rent-
seeking and corrupt behavior, oil companies that used bribes to ‘capture’ political elites, 
and the military, who were captured by the political elites and engaged in repression 
and violence toward MOSOP.  
Southern agitation began again in earnest with the emergence of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Unlike the Biafran separatists of the 1960s, 
the Ogoni people of the central Niger Delta agitated for compensation for the massive 
pollution and environmental destruction of their lands by multinational oil companies 
                                                 
28 Discussed in length by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) 
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including Shell and BP, and, by extension, the federal government. While MOSOP was 
active in the 1980s, it gained international recognition in the early 1990s, when, under 
the leadership of Ken Saro Wiwa, it led a sustained multi-year campaign against cor-
ruption and environmental degradation. MOSOP demanded compensation for the de-
struction of the Ogoniland environment and agitated for reform of the system by rea-
ligning the distribution of extracted petroleum revenues. In 1995, MOSOP’s campaign 
came to an abrupt end when, following fraudulent charges by the Nigerian government, 
Saro Wiwa and eight of MOSOP’s activists were hanged (Soyinka, 1996; Osha, 2006). 
The grievances of MOSOP were perhaps most succinctly stated by Ken Saro Wiwa, 
who stated that, “The Ogoni took stock of their condition and found that in spite of the 
stupendous oil and gas wealth of their land, they were extremely poor, had no social 
amenities, that unemployment was running at over 70 percent, and that they were pow-
erless, as an ethnic minority in a country of 100 million people, to do anything to alle-
viate their condition. Worse, their environment was completely devastated by three 
decades of reckless oil exploitation or ecological warfare by Shell” (Saro-Wiwa, 1995). 
MOSOP was formed in 1990 and acted nonviolently to call attention to their plight and 
to the structures of material corruption and greed that led to the destruction of Ogoni-
land and failed promises of development made by the government and Shell. By the 
standards of today’s Niger Delta activists, their demands were reasonable. They de-
manded remuneration of $6 billion in unpaid royalties, the cessation of gas flaring and 
other environmentally destructive behaviors, the burying of high-pressure oil pipelines, 
remuneration to the tune of $4 billion in environmental damages, and increased access 
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to a dialogue between the Ogoni people, the government, and Shell (Okonta and Doug-
las, 2003). In short, their demands were reformative – they did not seek to overthrow 
the government, but instead to change policies and behaviors that would bring them 
their fair share of oil revenues. 
Rather than reform, the Nigerian government opted to double down on its corruption, 
and began a campaign of military and police harassment, detention, and assassination 
that successfully silenced MOSOP, but opened the door to more radical and violent 
groups. The government’s employment of systemic corruption by using the police and 
military to repress the Ogoni helped to prepare the ground for the renewal of revolu-
tionary movements, one of which is the subject of the following case study. 
MOVEMENT FOR THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF BIA-
FRA 
Following the political murder of the Ogoni Nine, an era of extreme political violence 
in the Niger Delta emerged. According to Tunji Olaopa (2017), the rise of the renewed 
calls for Biafran secession have emerged at strategic points in time where southerners 
have believed that the state has been captured by the north. State capture is a systemic 
form of corruption in which the institutional rules of government institutions are re-
written to be more favorable toward certain political parties or private interest groups 
(Meirotti and Masterson, 2018). State capture can take many forms, including election-
rigging, the capture of political institutions, or the co-optation of police and security 
forces. In Nigeria’s south, there are pervasive fears that the state has been captured by 
northerners and elites, particularly with the rise of Muhammadu Buhari to the 
 
164 
presidency in 2015. 
Thus, I link the transition from demands for reform to demands for revolution with the 
transition in types of corruption that the Nigerian government engaged in with regard 
to the south. As Niger Delta grievances shifted from anger over material corruption to 
fears over the capture of the state, they switched from seeking reform to seeking revo-
lution. Following the murder of the Ogoni Nine, southerners engaged in substantial 
violence toward not only the Nigerian state but also oil companies, kidnapping oil 
workers and holding them hostage “as a means of redistribution.” This violence settled 
down under president Olusegun Obasanjo, but remerged in force after the 2015 election 
of northerner Muhammadu Buhari. Undergirding these reinvigorated calls for revolu-
tion have been concerns and complaints over the capture of the Nigerian state by cor-
rupt government elites. Importantly, anger over corruption in the police and security 
forces have helped drive growing support for revolution (Deckard and Pieri, 2017).  
As I have just asserted, the case of MASSOB and other Biafran separatists is linked to 
the experiences and failure of MOSOP to successfully challenge material corruption 
through reform. With the violent repression of MOSOP and the adoption of more sys-
temic forms of corruption by the government, groups in the Niger Delta began to revive 
revolutionary calls for secession and independence from the state altogether. 
One important dynamic worth noting is that, in Nigeria, corruption is often ‘othered.’ 
By ‘othered,’ I refer to a process by which the ills and missteps of the government are 
recognized only when they are disadvantageous to one’s own politically relevant ethnic 
or religious group. Endemic political corruption, which is very real in Nigeria, is 
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recognized primarily by groups who are not on the receiving end of active patronage 
distributions. Daniel Jordan Smith links what he calls ‘corruption complaints’ specifi-
cally to the rise of Biafran and Igbo nationalism as perceptions of corruption rose in 
the south toward the end of former president Goodluck Jonathan’s reign and the begin-
ning of the rise of northern Muslim President Muhammadu Buhari to power: 
Ethnic nationalist organisations capitalise on frustrations about corruption to 
build support for their causes, interpreting corruption and inequality in a lan-
guage that highlights ethnic discrimination. (Smith, 2014, p. 789) 
Corruption is frequently interpreted and challenged through the lenses and languages 
of ethnicity and religion. Resurging ethnic nationalisms and burgeoning participation 
in popular religious movements, in both the mostly Muslim North and the predomi-
nantly Christian South, have created cultural spaces in which ever-larger numbers of 
citizens interpret and challenge corruption and inequality in contemporary Nigeria. 
This exclusion leads to a dual-frustration that puts two competing principles in tension 
with one another. On the one hand, when an ethnic group feels excluded from distribu-
tions in a patronage network, they become angry that they are not receiving their just 
desserts. On the other than, that same ethnic group feels umbrage at the existence of a 
corrupt network of patronage in the first place. Turning once again to Daniel Jordan 
Smith: 
On the one hand, cries of marginalization – particularly the focus on Igbo ab-
sence in the highest offices in the federal government, the military, and the oil 
industry – must be read as an expression of dissatisfaction over being excluded 
from the mechanisms of corruption through which most people believe that the 
national cake is shared ... On the other hand, ethnic nationalist rhetoric builds 
on and stokes anger and discontent over the very system of corruption itself. 
(Smith, 2007, p. 193)  
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As a result of growing agitation in the South, several major revolutionary groups have 
emerged. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a violent 
front-runner in the campaign (Boas, 2011), the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), 
and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 
is the primary non-violent organization. Because MASSOB is largely non-violent, they 
are the focus of this case study. MASSOB’s grievances emerged out of the confluence 
of historical and contemporary factors. Historically, southerners – and particularly Ig-
bos – have expressed concerns over high levels of economic inequality and ethnic mar-
ginalization by the federal government (Onuoha, 2017), which links back to the Biafran 
War of 1967-1970. For example, since the Biafran war, Igbos have been excluded from 
the presidency, the upper echelons of the military, and the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation, which regulates the petroleum flow from the Biafran region. According 
to Daniel Jordan Smith, “[e]xclusion from these institutions is more than symbolic; in 
Nigeria’s military and oil-dominated postcolonial history, controlling the center has 
translated into controlling the preponderance of the nation’s wealth and power” (2007, 
p. 193). 
More recently, Biafran groups such as MASSOB have renewed agitation in response 
to a growing perception that the state targets Biafrans unfairly, both by rigging elections 
(Opejobi, 2019) and by co-opting the police to engage in targeted and politically-moti-
vated abuses (Africa Research Bulletin, 2016). With the growing popularity of MAS-
SOB, the federal government has increasingly sought to repress and stifle the group, 
often by detaining its leaders using the police to open fire on protesters (Africa 
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Research Bulletin, 2016). MASSOB has regularly protested increasing police harass-
ment and corruption. For example, the on-again, off-again political detention of its 
leader, Ralph Uwazuruike, has led MASSOB to protest in the streets. The detentions of 
Uwazuruike began largely in 2010, and thousands of MASSOB supporters took to the 
streets to demand his immediate release.29 MASSOB engages with non-violent tactics 
including protest marches and demonstrations. 
MASSOB has responded to systemic corruption within the Nigerian government by 
seeking a revolutionary goal: seceding away from Nigeria and receiving international 
sovereignty. As Daniel Jordan Smith notes, the renewed interest in secession and ethnic 
nationalism has been driven by growing sentiments that the system is corrupt and bro-
ken (Smith, 2014). These cases, taken together, show how dynamic contentious de-
mands can be. The rampant material corruption and elite theft of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s drove calls for reform from the Ogoni, who demanded remuneration for 
the externalities of material corruption. But as the Nigerian state began more and more 
to resemble a captured state – with the arbitrary detention of local leaders and the use 
of police to repress peaceful movements, there was a decided shift toward demanding 
revolution. 
Kenya 
Tracing a line directly to the east across Africa from Nigeria, one arrives at Kenya. Like 
                                                 
29 Sourced from observations within the ACLED data described in the previous chapter. 
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Nigeria, Kenya is a former British colony, achieving independence in 1963 following 
a bloody campaign against the British by an armed group known as the Mau Mau in 
the 1950s. The Mau Mau were largely made up of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru people. 
The movement was put down harshly by the British (Arnold, 2017: 257), but helped to 
form a core constituency for Jomo Kenyatta, who used language that alluded to the 
Mau Mau uprising once he was president. Moreover, while the uprising did not directly 
result in the independence of Kenya, it did influence the pace at which independence 
was achieved. The spirit of the Mau Mau – a rebellious, untamed Kikuyu nationalism 
– has remained influential in contentious politics in Kenya; the criminal Mungiki group 
that participated heavily on the post-electoral violence of 2007/8 model themselves as 
the “true sons” of the Mau Mau (Branch, 2011: 236). 
Ethnic politics play a large role in Kenyan politics, and politically relevant identity 
groups are largely drawn along ethnic lines. Kenya is dominated by five major ethnic 
groups – the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Luhya, and Kamba – that compete for access to 
the presidency. Ethnic competition for power and resources remains central to the Ken-
yan political experience, and shapes much of the country’s combative political dynam-
ics today. As such, patronage networks are largely drawn along ethnic lines, which 
lends corruption a distinctly ethnic character. 
The emphasis on ethnicity in Kenya is the product of two major factors. The first is 
simply the comparative populations of the different ethnic groups in Kenya. The “big 
five” ethnic groups comprise nearly 65 percent of the total population, and dwarf all 
other ethnic groups. The importance of building political coalitions from these five 
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groups is thus paramount for politicians. The ethnic logic of Kenya politics is largely 
the result of decisions made by first president, Jomo Kenyatta, who forsook advice 
from his political contemporaries and pursued a highly ethnic campaign for the position 
of Prime Minister, which he held from 1963 to 1964, and then as the first President 
(from 1964 to 1978) (Hornsby, 2013). During Kenyatta’s rule, patronage flowed to his 
native Kikuyu people, generating inter-ethnic enmity between the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, 
and Luo. 
Much like Nigerian politics, Kenyan politics can largely be characterized by the alter-
nation of power between two major politically relevant identity groups. While ethnic 
politics was first implemented officially by Kenyatta, it was perfected by his predeces-
sor Daniel Arap Moi, who diverted state goods and resources to his native Kalenjin 
people. The result has been the development of powerful and entrenched networks of 
patronage that flow from Kenya’s ‘big man’ leaders to their respective political coali-
tions (Owiti, 2014). Moi’s fondness for personal enrichment and his reliance on ethnic 
patronage networks resulted in an attempted coup by Luo members of the Kenyan Air 
Force in 1982. Speaking from the Voice of Kenya radio station, the would-be over-
throwers stated, “Rampant corruption, tribalism, [and] nepotism have made life almost 
intolerable in our society. The economy of this country is in shambles due to corruption 
and mismanagement” (Branch, 2011: 155). The coup failed, ultimately, and Moi was 
able to remain in office for an additional two decades. During that time, Moi was able 
to extract nearly $2 billion from the Kenyan state (Scher, 2005; Hornsby, 2013). 
In the Kenyan government, widespread corruption permeates bureaucracies and the 
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civil service. This looting is in part due to the Kenyan tradition of recruiting the civil 
service through networks of patronage rather than competitively (Hornsby, 2013, p. 
357). In ministry after ministry, funds go missing, leaving Kenyans without jobs train-
ing, access to education, or electricity (BBC, 2018). This corruption exacerbates pov-
erty and inequality (Owiti, 2014), generating anger at the government. 
Contentious Coalitions and Claims in Kenya 
Like Nigeria, Kenya also experiences substantially more contention than the African 
average. Below, Figure 2 displays overall levels of contention in Kenya from 1997 to 
the end of 2018. Notably, there are major spikes of contention during and after elections. 
The first major bump in contention occurred during and after the marred 2007 elections 
that destabilized the country and forced the Kibaki government into a power-sharing 
agreement with Raila Odinga. The second major bump in contention occurs following 
the 2012 election, which brought Uhuru Kenyatta – the son of former president Jomo 
Kenyatta – to power. This contention occurred along with the general rise of Africa’s 
third wave of contention, and never settled back to its 2011-level equilibrium. The third 
bump in contention occurred during and after the failed 2017 elections, which were 




FIGURE 16 - CONTENTION IN KENYA 
 
As with Nigeria, I present two cases from recent Kenyan history in which contentious 
groups directly challenge government corruption. The first case examines very recent 
calls for reform following revelations of material corruption, while the second case 
examines the calls for the revolutionary overturning of an election following evidence 
of systemic corruption. Whereas the cases presented in Nigeria were continuous in the 
sense that they followed the shift from reformative to revolutionary contention within 
the southern region of the Niger Delta, these cases address broader concerns over the 
state of the Kenyan government. I begin with an example of how material corruption 
has driven calls for reform and then move to an example of how systemic corruption 
has led some in Kenya to seek revolutionary actions by overturning of elections and 
the dissolution of the electoral commission. 
#STOPTHESETHIEVES 
In May of 2018, revelations that over $100 million had been stolen from the coffers of 
the National Youth Service launched broad coalitions to the streets demanding an end 
to corruption (Mohammed Yusuf, 2018). Protesters, who marched with signs that 
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declared “#StopTheseTHIEVES,” clogged the streets of Nairobi, tired of the seemingly 
constant corruption scandals that characterized Uhuru Kenyatta’s government. In 2018, 
nearly 50 individuals were charged with the plunder of the National Youth Service, 
which is responsible for preparing youths for jobs and education (BBC, 2018). In a 
cascade of prosecutions, it was revealed that the National Youth Service had served as 
a way to enrich elites by issuing contracts to delinquent vendors who did not produce 
the services and products they owed. Below, Figure 17 shows Kenyan anti-corruption 
protesters. The tee-shirt of the foremost activist reads, “Corruption is bleeding Kenya 
to death” (Mohammed Yusuf, 2018). 
FIGURE 17 - STOPTHESETHIEVES PROTESTERS 
 
Corruption in Kenya’s civil service has thrived in a governing environment in which 
patronage networks remain a primary source of fiscal distribution. The Kenyan system 
consists of a series of nesting patronage networks, in which local ‘big men’ integrate 
their patronage networks into regional ‘big men,’ who then integrate into elite level 
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networks. As such, civil service positions are seen as lucrative ways to fund patronage 
networks rather than to generate and disseminate public goods (Branch, 2011). One 
major enabler of this system is the relative impunity with which elites and civil servants 
operate, combined with the rather toothless office of the Auditor-General. In 2018, Au-
ditor-General Edward Ouko lashed out, saying that elite corruption would ‘engulf’ all 
of Kenya. Ouku’s audits have found that billions of Kenyan shillings go missing in 
corrupt schemes, but that his reports and recommendations are ignored by parliament 
(Fick, 2018). 
According to the BBC (2018), “According to a March report by the auditor general, 
some $400m of public funds could not be accounted for … fraudulent payments of 
$30m [were] uncovered at the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB). Mean-
while, multi-million dollar contracts were awarded to friends and families of employees 
at electricity utility Kenya Power.” Corruption in Kenya’s civil service and government 
have been a persistent presence since independence, and the consequences have been 
felt by Kenyans of all stripes. The consequences of elite corruption in Kenya – partic-
ularly that which extracts resources directly from agencies – are manifold. High levels 
of unemployment remain a fixture of the social landscape, and sentiments of hopeless-
ness begin to creep in. Jobs are acquired through connection and bribes rather than 
acumen and training, leaving a bulge of young Kenyans without access to employment 
(Max Bearak, 2018). In a style similar to the anti-Zuma campaign in South Africa from 
2015 to 2018, Kenyans have risen up. 
“We are tired of the theft that is going on in this country. We have waited for so 
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long for action to be taken but nothing is happening …The kind of money that 
they have stolen this time is money that is embarrassingly huge,” - Ndungi 
Githuku (Associated Press, 2018) 
The #StopTheseTHIEVES protest of 2018 was an inaugural march, and was the prod-
uct of efforts by Transparency International, Action for Transparency, and the Kenya 
Human Rights Commission (Mariita, 2018). The march brought together a broad group 
of Kenyans, including civil society and private citizens to protest material corruption 
in the civil service. The protesters demanded improved policies to crack down on cor-
ruption, as well as the implementation of ‘lifestyle audits’ designed to provide a check 
on the personal enrichment of government elites and officials by examining their assets 
(Max Bearak, 2018). 
ELECTORAL CONTENTION AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IN KENYA 
Contention and violence during and after Kenyan elections has become almost routine, 
to the detriment of the Kenyan people. Similarly, expectations of widespread vote rig-
ging and fraud are not the exception, but unfortunately the rule. Due to the high stakes 
of Kenyan elections – access to state coffers and control over the means of distribution 
– elections are both actually and perceived to be highly corrupt and rigged (Wangui 
Kanina, 2008). In 2007, several technical hitches in the electoral process led to a false 
expectation of victory by the long-suffering Luo people, who revolted upon hearing 
that they had lost, not won, the election (Branch, 2011, p. 271). The Luo candidate, 
Raila Odinga, declared the election a sham, and the outbreak of ethnic violence that 
followed has been widely studied in electoral and African politics (Snow, 2007; Ruteere, 
2011; Klaus and Mitchell, 2015). 
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But what corruption did occur during the 2007 election? And how has it repeated itself 
in the following 2013 and 2017 elections? There is substantial evidence that vote rig-
ging and fraud occurred on both sides in the 2007 election. Branch (2011: 271) states, 
“As the reports of domestic and foreign observers made clear, the elections were at best 
marked by significant irregularities, the extent of which made it impossible to declare 
a true winner; at worst they had been fixed … rigging took place on both sides, the 
paper trail was retrospectively tampered with, and the margin of victory for either can-
didate was almost certainly tiny.” 
Evidence of tampering in Kenyan elections has remained relatively constant since the 
end of Moi’s reign. In 2011, the Kenyan Independent Electoral Boundaries Commis-
sion was re-established to replace the former electoral commission (Africa Research 
Bulletin, 2011). In 2013, it was revealed that there were approximately 20,000 double 
registrations on the voter rolls (allAfrica, 2013); a number that ballooned to 400,685 in 
2017 (Olick, 2017). According to the argument of this dissertation, the systematic na-
ture of corruption should reduce trust in the system, and specifically with the electoral 
commission. 
This is exactly what the data show. Trust in the IEBC had declined drastically following 
the 2007 elections, but was generally restored with the introduction of the IEBC. Yet, 
irregularities with the voting systems in the 2013 election began to erode trust in the 
IEBC, presaging concerns of voter fraud and rigging in the 2017 election (Gettleman, 
2013). Below, Figure 18 displays levels of absolute distrust in the electoral commission. 
Drawing from six rounds of the Afrobarometer data, trust in the IEBC is initially very 
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strong – less than ten percent of citizens did not trust the commission at all. By 2016, 
that number was nearly 35 percent. 
FIGURE 18 – NO TRUST AT ALL IN ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
 
Note: data sourced from Rounds 2 – 7 of the Afrobarometer data 
Trust in the system took yet another blow in 2017, when a senior IEBC figure was 
found dead. Christopher Chege Musando, who was in charge of the IEBC’s information 
technology systems, went missing and then was found dead in July 2017 (de Freytas-
Tamura, 2017c). That Musando was in charge of the IEBC’s information technology 
systems was critically important, as there were already widespread concerns of vote-
rigging and ‘hacking.’ In this increasingly fraught setting, the elections proceeded in 
2017. Incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta was proclaimed the winner. Raila Odinga , alleged 
that the election was rigged (de Freytas-Tamura, 2017b, 2017d, 2017a), and following 
an investigation, the Supreme Court annulled the election, finding that the polls were 
“neither transparent nor verifiable” (Burke, 2017). Odinga stated, “[t]he electoral fraud 
and fabrication of results was massive and extensive” (de Freytas-Tamura, 2017a). 
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electoral loss. Unlike the broad movements against elite corruption in the preceding 
case study, post-electoral contention was driven largely by a narrow group of Odinga’s 
Luo supporters. Odinga’s supporters sought the overturning of the electoral results, de-
manding that Odinga be placed into office despite having lost the first election and 
boycotted the second election. The demands made were revolutionary in nature, and 
consist of installing Raila Odinga into power despite not having credibly won an elec-
tion. These revolutionary demands, I argue, are a function of systemic corruption and 
the product of the corrosion of trust in the system. The constant concerns over rigging 
have left Kenyans uncertain about the legitimacy of their system, and to the political 
losers, systemic corruption leads to the rejection of the democratic system itself. 
Together, these two case studies provide clear evidence of how Kenyan anti-corruption 
movements have responded to different types of corruption. When Kenyans learned 
about the unchecked looting that robbed the National Youth Service of millions of dol-
lars, they organized into broad contentious groups and marched together demanding 
reform. On the other hand, following the third successive election in which systemic 
electoral corruption has marred confidence in the results, a group of supporters of the 
political challenger, Raila Odinga, took to the streets in sustained violent and non-vio-
lent protests and riots demanding that he be instated as the president without another 
election. 
South Africa 
South Africa is vast and resource-rich, with mineral mining of gold, diamonds, and 
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platinum (Meredith, 2014). South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the 
world, with extremely high levels of unemployment and poverty, particularly among 
young black men (Chikane, 2018). South Africa is a country of just over 55 million 
people, made up of many different ethnic groups, and grouped under a colonial racial 
rubric that was developed by the colonial settlers. Under this rubric, South Africans are 
categorized as black (about 81 percent), coloured (about 9 percent), white (about 8 
percent), and other (comprised of Indians and Asians) (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2019). 
The colonial history of South Africa is a long, dense affair, and is too complicated to 
explain in full; however, the country was formally and effectively colonized by the 
British from the period of 1870 to 1910, when it primary drew upon South Africa’s 
major resources to generate wealth (Thompson, 2014). In 1910, South Africa became 
an officially recognized white-led union within the British Empire, and then emerged 
as a nation-state in 1934 with the Status of the Union Act. In 1961, the South African 
Union became a republic with the passage of a constitution that enshrined white dom-
ination over the majority black population. Importantly, and distinct from both Kenya 
and Nigeria, South Africa is a settler state rather than a postcolonial state, meaning that 
the British (and Dutch) colonizers did not leave the state upon its independence; instead, 
like in the United States of America and Canada, the colonizing European population 
took full control over the mechanisms of authority and governance. Following years of 
growing segregation, the white minority established the policy of apartheid, which is 
Afrikaans for “apartness” or “separation.”  
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The history of South Africa under apartheid remains firmly embedded in South African 
contentious politics, even today. First, much of the political rhetoric in South African 
social movements centers on the vestiges of apartheid and unfair white privilege 
(Chikane, 2018), ranging from protests against colonizing statues of Cecil Rhodes to 
protests against increased university fees. Social movements and political parties reg-
ularly use the terminology of ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom,’ and the ruling party, the Afri-
can National Congress (ANC), frequently reminds its constituents about its legacy as 
the independence party of Nelson Mandela (Booysen, 2015). Second, the structures of 
South African contention and society remain heavily influenced by the apartheid era. 
For example, under apartheid the trade unions were the only black-majority organiza-
tions that were not banned and repressed (Marinovich, 2016; Sinwell and Mbatha, 
2016), and thus were able to play a major role in shaping politics, both during and after 
apartheid. 
South Africa is Africa’s most contentious country, and developed symptoms of Africa’s 
third wave several years before the rest of the continent. Below, Figure 3 displays levels 
of protest and riot from January of 1997 to December 2018. South Africa’s high levels 
of contention are in part due to the well-organized labor unions as well as the role that 
several political parties – particularly through their youth wings – play in mobilizing 
and framing contention. Protests reached their zenith in 2015 with the growing cascade 
of service-delivery protests and the rise of the #MustFall movements (described below). 
For the most part, protests in South Africa revolve around material forms of corruption, 
and contentious coalitions are generally broad in scope. 
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Contentious Coalitions in South Africa 
Below, I present two cases of anti-corruption contention in recent South African history. 
In the first, broad coalitions of South Africans came together to respond to former pres-
ident Jacob Zuma’s personal enrichment via elite theft – a type of material corruption 
– with calls for reform. In the second, a rising insurgent political party has sought Marx-
ist revolution in response to the perception that the ANC has actively ‘captured’ the 
political system in order to create a political machine. This is a form of systemic cor-
ruption. 
South Africa is Africa’s most contentious country, with active civil society groups, 
trade unions, and upstart political parties taking part in anti-government protest. South 
Africa is perhaps the best embodiment of Africa’s third wave, with a clear rise in con-
tention from 2011 through 2017. The bulge between 2011 and 2016 was driven largely 
by a combination of anti-corruption protests targeting Jacob Zuma and the ANC, min-
ing-sector protests against the capture of trade unions by management and the high 
levels of inequality and wage stagnation, and a rising wave of service-delivery protests 
that shook rural townships and impoverished regions. Below, Figure 19 displays the 





FIGURE 19 – CONTENTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Recent examples of anti-corruption protest have included the broad demonstrations 
against the obscene personal enrichment by former president Jacob Zuma and the anti-
Zuma protests that shook the nation for nearly 4 years. Corruption generates grievance-
generating consequences in South Africa; at the ward and township levels, localized 
corruption conducted by regional and local governors has led to a crisis in the delivery 
of public goods and services. Communal groups have risen up in demand of improved 
service delivery to their regions. These service delivery protests were analyzed in the 
previous chapter, but are not presented here. I begin with the case of the broad anti-
Zuma protests and then turn to the insurgent Marxist revolutionaries thereafter. 
#ZUMAMUSTFALL 
Jacob Zuma was elected president of South Africa in 2009 under a haze of scandals 
about his tax records and charges of corruption (Pauw, 2017). Zuma had been a major 
played in ANC politics for decades, and had served as Vice President to his predecessor, 
Thabo Mbeki. Zuma’s presidency was plagued with scandals from the beginning, with 
outstanding concerns about Zuma’s unpaid taxes (Pauw, 2017). Once in office, Zuma 
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began to engage in two overlapping, yet distinct, forms of corruption. Zuma began to 
engage in egregious personal enrichment, in which he extracted funds from the state to 
enrich himself (Madonsela, 2014). 
Throughout his presidency, Zuma faced multiple corruption scandals. These included 
growing concerns over his slow ‘capture’ of the ANC, his relationship with foreign 
businessmen, and others. But perhaps the most damning of these scandals was the rev-
elation that he had spent 246 million South African Rand (Madonsela, 2014) of state 
funds on his personal abode, Nkandla. Nkandla is a sprawling compound in South Af-
rica’s KwaZulu-Natal state, the home of Zuma’s fellow Zulu coethnics, and one of his 
regions of political support. 
Nkandla was built over the course of several years. Initially, Zuma assured the public 
that no state funding was used on the build the complex (Basson and Du Toit, 2017). 
This was soon revealed to be a lie. In 2014, Madonsola released Secure in Comfort, a 
nearly 450-page report detailing the exorbitant expenditures of state monies on Nkandla. 
Despite these revelations, Zuma remained firmly committed to the lie that he had not 
broken the law. Below, the Telegraph detailed the increasingly ridiculous claims by 
Zuma’s team that his opulent house improvements – including a swimming pool, an 
amphitheatre, and a cattle stable – actually serve as ‘security features’: 
He showed videos including a demonstration of how a firepool works and an 
interview with a “cultural expert” about the “spiritual value” of a cattle kraal 
or pen. The police minister said a fire expert had agreed that the pool was “the 
best water source available on site to replenish the fire engine” in the event of 
a major fire. An “amphitheatre” installed in the grounds with decorative aloes 
was, he said, necessary to prevent soil erosion by heavy vehicles including fire 
engines and armoured police vehicles using the adjoining road. It also served 
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as an assembly point for polygamist Mr. Zuma’s large family in the event of an 
emergency. (Alexander and Laing, 2015) 
The brazenness of Zuma’s personal enrichment was stunning, even to those within the 
ANC. Zuma, known for his affable personality, attempted to draw upon his charm – 
backed up by his deep structures of support within the ANC – to avoid acknowledging 
his deception. His willingness to lie openly led to increasing anger in the general public, 
who were experiencing increasing interruptions in their public service delivery, their 
ability to attend college, and who felt that the ‘grand bargain’ they had struck with the 
ANC in 1994 might be unraveling. One observer spoke about the general anger toward 
Zuma, summing it up succinctly by stating, “[w]e all know that politicians eat [steal 
money], but Zuma eats like a baby – he doesn’t wipe the crumbs from his mouth!”30 A 
second anonymous source stated that Zuma’s corruption was particularly egregious be-
cause it was not sophisticated; it was bald-faced, brash, and embarrassing.31 
Zuma’s personal enrichment was made possible largely by his status within the African 
National Congress. Since its rise to political power in 1994, the ANC transformed from 
a democratic party under Mandela to a political machine under Mbeki and Zuma. In 
developing this machine, Zuma helped indemnify himself against internal attacks and 
challenges, which in turn made it difficult or external challenges to land. Known as a 
‘securocrat,’ Zuma was rumored to have used threats and blackmail to ensure political 
loyalty within the ANC (Booysen, 2015). Moreover, Zuma began to ‘capture’ key 
                                                 
30 Anonymous impromptu conversation, face-to-face. Johannesburg, South Africa, August 2018. 




political positions – ranging from ministerial positions to law enforcement and even 
tax enforcement. In doing so, Zuma sought to build a firewall against accountability 
for his outstanding tax debts and his increasingly egregious personal enrichment. More-
over, his corruption did not benefit the ANC; it was focused on his own enrichment. 
This fact rankled many ANC party members, and, combined with the growing scrutiny 
on him, led to the development of a schism within the ANC that ultimately led to his 
downfall (Basson and Du Toit, 2017). 
President Zuma’s personal enrichment was supported by an expanding cast of charac-
ters who were brought in by Zuma to insulate him against growing calls for investiga-
tion and impeachment. Zuma’s history in the ANC and his entrenched network of pat-
ronage helped insulate him initially against concerns of corruption and graft. Moreover, 
in order to strengthen his firewall against accountability. Zuma strategically began to 
replace highly qualified individuals within important institutions in the country. This 
included replacing the head of the South African Revenue Service, who had thereunto 
been pursuing him for tax evasion (Pauw, 2017) and Finance Minister, who had not 
been adequately ‘loyal’ to Zuma (Basson and Du Toit, 2017). 
The #ZumaMustFall protests emerged out of a larger established framework known as 
the #MustFall politics (Chikane, 2018), and was triggered by a series of missteps on 
Zuma’s behalf. Following the 2014 revelations of the Public Protector that Zuma had 
spent hundreds of millions of rand on his personal house, South Africans of many col-
ors and classes took to the streets to demand his removal. 
One potential alternative explanation is that Zuma’s corruption scandals occurred as 
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South Africa’s economy shrank. I treat this alternative explanation as complementary 
rather than competitive – it seems very likely that tolerance for corruption ebbs and 
flows with the economy. For example, anger over Zuma’s corruption was intensified 
by hiss mishandling of an economic crisis, in which he replaced a highly qualified and 
popular finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, with an unqualified ANC back-bencher, (and 
close ally of Zuma) David van Rooyen. The result was a near immediate devaluation 
of the rand in international markets, sending South African markets tumbling. The rev-
elations of Zuma’s entanglement with an Indian business family, the Guptas, helped to 
put the final nail in the coffin. Importantly, van Rooyen was allied with Zuma and said 
to be a pawn of Zuma’s powerful business associates, the Guptas (Hogg, 2016). 
It is in this sense that I argue that Zuma’s underlying reputation for corruption condi-
tioned the response to his removal of Nene as finance minister; because van Rooyen 
was seen as a stooge selected by the corrupt relationship between Zuma and the Guptas, 
analysts immediately downgraded economic expectations of the Rand, leading the 
economy to contract, leading to additional outrage. In one interview, opposition party 
member Solly Malatsi stated, “the entire machinery [of the South African state] was 
surrendered to a private family [the Guptas].”32 Below, Figure 20 shows protesters in 
an anti-Zuma demonstration. On the left, the woman holding the sign lists grievances 
against Zuma. The first two are forms of corruption. The third is inequality and the 
                                                 
32 Interview with Solly Malatsi, Democratic Alliance member of parliament. Face-to-face interview. Au-
gust 24, 2018. 
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fourth is hunger, which can be interpreted as economic protests. These signs are com-
mon in these protests, and demonstrate why it is important to think of corruption and 
other grievances as complementary rather than competitive. 
FIGURE 20 - ZUMAMUSTFALL PROTESTS 
 
Source: (BBC News, 2017) 
Protesters expressed outrage at the economic costs of Zuma’s inept and corrupt leader-
ship. One prominent members of civil society, Mark Heywood, stated that the protest-
ers “feel that [Zuma] has behaved recklessly with our economy and therefore with our 
lives” (Laing, 2015). During the period of Zuma’s presidency, displayed below in Fig-
ure 21, unemployment rose steadily from 23.5 percent to 27.5 percent, throwing the 
country into an increasing crisis of youth unemployment that undoubtedly led more 
youths to mobilize into protest groups. Like Zuma’s mishandling of the economy, anger 
over unemployment is amplified by underlying frustration with Zuma’s personal en-
richment and the willingness of members of the ANC to loot from the National Student 
Financial Aid Scheme (NFSAS), leaving unemployed and poor South Africans without 
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access to education (Rosa Lyster, 2016). 
FIGURE 21 - UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM 2009 TO 2018 
 
The #ZumaMustFall movement focused on two major factors: growing evidence of 
Jacob Zuma’s venality and a worsening economic situation in which unemployment 
was steadily rising. These two issues worked in tandem; without the worsening eco-
nomic crises, it is unlikely that Zuma’s corruption alone would have cost him his job. 
After all, it took not only a sustained campaign of civil society, trade unions, and citi-
zens to protest against him, but also fissures within the ANC to lead to him being re-
moved from office. The reverse can also be said: without evidence of brazen corruption, 
the myriad economic crises likely would not have signaled his downfall. But, together, 
they stoked material grievances in those who felt anger over continued unemployment, 
rising university fees, or the blatant demonstrations of corruption growing more com-
mon in the ANC. 
The #ZumaMustFall protests responded to revelations of widespread material corrup-











Africa experienced an increase in unemployment and a financial crisis. In response, 
South Africans took to the streets with calls for reform, which they achieved in Febru-
ary of 2018 with the ‘retirement’ of Zuma and his replacement within the ANC by Cyril 
Ramaphosa.33 
THE ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND THE RISE OF SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION 
The rise of Zuma in 2009 not only generated outrage against his material enrichment, 
but soon generated frustration against growing evidence of his attempted capture of the 
ANC and the South African state itself. Zuma’s capture of the state – institution by 
institution – has led to a rising backlash against the ANC’s entrenched machine politics 
and the underlying socioeconomic structure of South African society. But this form of 
systemic corruption – state capture – was not exclusively a product of Zuma. Zuma’s 
efforts continued existing work by the ANC to create a form a political machine that 
systematically controlled elections as well as the police and security forces. 
The transformation of the ANC into a political machine began before Zuma took office. 
Noted expert on South African politics, Susan Booysen (2015), called this the fused 
party-state. She writes, “[t]he ANC has become an organisation boosted (if not sus-
tained) by drawing on the state and its resources. It has almost undisputed control, a 
reality that is also evident from the state mechanisms through which the ANC regener-
ates its power. Given the ANC’s power and resources in relation to the stat it is almost 
                                                 
33 Interview with David Lewis of Corruption Watch South Africa. Face-to-face, August 22, 2018. 
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inconceivable that it could be defeated by any opposition party.” 
The rise of the ANC political machine – and particularly Jacob Zuma’s capture of the 
state – can be exemplified with several vignettes. First, the ANC engaged in collusion 
with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) leadership and the owners of mineral 
mines themselves (e.g., Lonmin) to generate an anti-labor conspiracy designed to dis-
empower laborers while aggregating wealth upward. Central to this relationship was 
now-present Cyril Ramaphosa, who had served as secretary of the National Union of 
Mineworkers and had helped the union become ‘cozy’ with the ANC. Another ANC 
official, Susan Shabangu, the Minister of Mineral Resources, had previously served as 
the deputy minister of police. In 2008, Shabangu gave a speech in which she stated, 
“you must kill the bastards if they threaten you or the community. You must not worry 
about the regulations. I want no warning shots. You have one shot and it must be a kill 
shot. I want to assure the police station commissioners and the policemen and women 
from these areas  that they have permission to kill these criminals” (Marinovich, 2016). 
In August 2012, mineworkers for the company Lonmin began to agitate in pursuit of 
higher wages for rock-drilling operators (RDOs). This agitation threatened Lonmin’s 
bottom line as well as the upward flow of profits through the managing ranks of NUM 
and the ANC. During the Marikana protests, “[a] series of phone calls and a flurry  of 
emails with Ramaphosa at the centre showed just how profoundly the former unionist 
and socialist had come around to the thinking of big capital, and how much influence 
he wielded with government ministers and the president” (Marinovich, 2016: 137). 
Ramaphosa took the side of Lonmin in the dispute, stating that the protesting miners 
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were criminals. In responding to the protests, the police, who were operating under the 
influence of Shabangu, Lonmin, and Ramaphosa, opened fire, killing 34 protesters. 
The second vignette concerns the attempts by Jacob Zuma to capture the South African 
Revenue Service (SARS). This capture is theoretically distinct to Zuma’s personal en-
richment. Whereas Zuma’s material corruption focused on stuffing his bank account, 
his engagement in systemic corruption was all about distorting the system by replacing 
qualified ministers and department-heads with stooges who would to diminish his ac-
countability to the people. Glasius describes this as an act of authoritarianism (2018). 
Zuma owed significant amounts of back-taxes to SARS, and worked hard to evade and 
then capture the institution when it became clear he could not wipe his debt clean (Pauw, 
2017). SARS was one of South Africa’s most respected institutions; it had successfully 
pursued high-level criminal and corruption activity (Pauw, 2017), and had successfully 
built trust with citizens, increasing tax-payer rolls three-fold since independence (Bas-
son and Du Toit, 2017). Zuma’s problems with SARS extended beyond his own arrears; 
many members of his family had been accused and prosecuted by the Revenue Service, 
and SARS was seen as the primary obstacle to Zuma’s capture of the South African 
state.  
The capture of SARS began in 2014, when Zuma’s appointed head, Thomas Moyane, 
began to unravel SARS’ executive leadership. As it became clear that SARS executives, 
including Johann Van Loggerenberg, would not stop pursuing and investigating Jacob 
Zuma and his family, Zuma and his supporters enacted a plan. Using a ‘journalist’ who 
also happened to be on the payroll of two tobacco companies and the State Security 
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Agency, Zuma’s administration launched a ‘shadow war’ against the SARS team, en-
snaring Loggerenberg in a ‘honey trap,’ and using the contents of his romantic relation-
ship with the journalist to sideline him. As the shadow war continued, Moyane found 
reason to disband some of the most effective anti-corruption units. In doing so, Moyane 
was able to clear out much of Zuma’s political opposition from SARS, clearing the way 
for his capture of the institution (Pauw, 2017). 
In response to the capture of the ANC and the South African state by elite interests, an 
insurgent party known as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has risen in popularity. 
The EFF is a renegade leftist party that emerged from the ANC’s Youth League after 
Zuma was elected to office, and the EFF describes its creation as a response to the 
growing attempts by the ANC to systemically capture the political system (Basson and 
Du Toit, 2017). The EFF is a nontraditional organization that merges a political party 
and a larger social movement calling for socialist revolution in South Africa. Garbed in 
red, the Economic Freedom Fighters have engaged in contentious politics both within 
the parliament and on the streets. They seek socialist revolution in South Africa, advo-
cating for the nationalization of mines, banks, and the expropriation of land. The EFF 
describes itself as a “radical and militant economic emancipation movement that brings 
together revolutionary, fearless, radical, and militant activists, workers’ movements, 
nongovernmental organisations, community-based organisations and lobby groups un-
der the umbrella of pursuing the struggle for economic emancipation” (Economic 
Freedom Fighters, 2018). 
The EFF argues that the ANC has become an anti-democratic political machine that 
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engages in neo-imperialist policies against the South African population. The EFF 
makes four primary critiques of the ANC and the South African state: high levels of 
economic inequality and poverty, the unfair distribution of land to white farmers during 
the apartheid era, the inadequate social services provided by the state, and the rampant 
corruption that remains pervasive in the ANC (Booysen, 2015). At the core of the EFF’s 
critiques of the ANC is the argument that the ANC has become a corporatist political 
machine that colludes with businesses against the interests of South Africans and la-
borers. For example, the EFF has focused on reminding South Africans about the col-
lusion between ANC elites, mining companies, and mining unions that led to the mas-
sacre of 34 miners at Marikana in 2012. The EFF was launched on the one-year anni-
versary of the Marikana massacre (Sinwell and Mbatha, 2016), and exerted substantial 
effort into reminding South Africans about the collusion between the National Union 
of Miners (NUM), mining executives, and the ANC. 
The policies that the EFF pursued are truly revolutionary proposals, including the ex-
propriation and redistribution of land and the nationalization of banks, mines, and other 
strategic institutions and economic sectors. Perhaps what differentiates the EFF from a 
leftist-reform party is the set of exemplars that the EFF proclaims: “[Malema] sees 
socialist success stories and models for the EFF in Venezuela, Cuba, China and Zim-
babwe” (Booysen, 2015, p. 230) 
The EFF uses the language of Marxist revolutionaries. The leader of the EFF, Julius 
Malema, is known as the “Commander in Chief.” Malema speaks with idealistic fervor 
in response to the systemic impunity with which ANC leaders operate: 
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One of the crucial elements of our constitutional vision is to make a decisive 
break from the unchecked abuse of State power and resources that was virtually 
institutionalised during the apartheid era. To achieve this goal‚ we adopted ac-
countability‚ the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution as values of 
our constitutional democracy. For this reason, public office- bearers ignore 
their constitutional obligations at their peril. This is so because constitutional-
ism‚ accountability and the rule of law constitute the sharp and mighty sword 
that stands ready to chop the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened neck. Eco-
nomic Freedom Fighters quoted in (Madonsela, 2016) 
It is this impunity – and the state capture that allowed it – that has mobilized the EFF. 
The EFF is a revolutionary organization seeking to implement Marxism in South Africa. 
It emerged out of the ANC’s Youth League as a response to the systemic corruption the 
ANC, which became most evident under former president Jacob Zuma. The EFF ties 
its demands for revolution directly to its claims that the ANC has captured the system, 
and form of systemic corruption that has reduced the quality of elections and led to the 
co-optation of the security forces when dealing with trade unions and miners. 
Conclusion 
These case studies have provided strong support for the major hypotheses that run 
through this dissertation. In each of the three cases presented, protests responded dif-
ferently to different types of corruption. When corruption produced material benefits, 
as seen in the Nigerian case of MOSOP, the Kenyan case of #StopTheseTHIEVES, and 
the South African case of Zuma’s personal enrichment, groups sought reformative 
goals. When corruption produced primarily systemic benefits, as in the Nigerian case 
of MASSOB, the Kenyan case of electoral fraud, and the South African case of state 
capture, groups instead sought revolutionary ends. 
 
194 
Below, Table 2834 provides a short summary of the cases presented in this chapter. Each 
case provides a unique example of how different types of corruption shape contentious 
demands for either reform or revolution. In addition to providing support for the hy-
potheses, these cases also provide important nuance to the study of contentious groups 
and corruption more generally. Anti-corruption demands take many shapes, and are 
sometimes linked with ethnic mobilization while other times motivated by broad eco-
nomic concerns. 
TABLE 28 – RECAPPING THE CASES 
Movement/Organization Grievances Contentious Demands 
Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
Material Corruption 
Extraction of oil rents to ben-
efit government elites rather 
than Ogoni 
Reformative 
Remuneration for oil rents 
extracted from the Niger 
Delta 
Movement for the Actualization of 
the Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB) 
Systemic Corruption 
Security corruption and abuse 





massive bureaucratic and elite 






Allegations of electoral fraud 
and rigging 
Revolutionary 
Demands to overturn elec-
tions and put Raila Odinga 
in power 
#Zuma Must Fall 
Material Corruption 
Personal enrichment by Jacob 
Zuma. 
Reformative 
Remove Jacob Zuma  
Economic Freedom Fighters Systemic corruption 





                                                 





Putting the Pieces Together 
Restating the Results 
Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to understand how different types of cor-
ruption shape contentious demands made by civil society groups and organizations. In 
doing so, I have sought to re-examine exactly what is meant when scholars talk about 
the rise of revolution in Africa’s uprising (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). Specifically, I 
have endeavored to better distinguish between contentious demands that work within 
the system (reform) and contentious demands that work outside the system (revolution). 
This distinction is important because it helps provide clarity to a field where the term 
‘revolution’ has been used rather loosely. 
This dissertation has also focused on drilling deep into better understanding what we 
mean when we talk about corruption. As discussed in Chapter 2, corruption is a term 
that has been used widely in the political science and economics literatures, but has 
been difficult to clearly and consistently link with contentious and conflict outcomes. 
This research has demonstrated that the seemingly contradictory outcomes may be due 
in part to treating ‘cororuption’ as a singular and monolithic term rather than unfolding 
it and perusing its contents. By looking at the consequences of different types of cor-
ruption, this dissertation has shown that contentious politics vary in accordance to 
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different types of corruption. 
I have put forth two primary hypotheses. The first is that different types of corrupt 
violations engender different corruption responses. On the one hand, when corrupt vi-
olations generate material goods, citizens rise up to reform the system. They call upon 
the system to prosecute venal officials and seek redress through official means. This is 
facilitated through trust that is maintained in the system. Citizens may band together in 
broad coalitions, like those that opposed Jacob Zuma in South Africa, or in narrow 
ethnic coalitions like the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in Nigeria. 
On the other hand, when corrupt violations distort the system and generate systemic 
benefits for some, citizens instead rise up in search of revolution. The distortion of the 
system corrodes trust in the system itself, and citizens do not believe that it can ade-
quately sanction corrupt actors in government. Sometimes, the distortion of the system 
is so great that it calls into question its legitimacy altogether. In Kenya, following mul-
tiple flawed elections, the Luo people have risen up in demand of revolution, believing 
the system is rigged against them. And in South Africa, the Economic Freedom Fights 
have responded to concerns of state capture by demanding the state be revolutionized 
according to Marxist ideals. 
Below, Table 29 restates the hypotheses and the results of the hypothesis tests. Hypoth-
eses 1a and 1b, the primary theoretical thrusts of this dissertation, receive robust sup-
port throughout each mode of testing. The survey experiment conducted in Nigeria 
provided strong causal support that citizens who observe material corruption are more 
likely to support statements that call for reform, while citizens who observe systemic 
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corruption are more likely to support statements that call for revolution. Chapter 4 
tested this across the African continent and found that when citizens perceive systemic 
corruption, they are more likely to believe that revolutionary violence is justified. In 
Chapter 5, I used analysis of nearly 6,000 incidents of contention to show that when 
contentious groups express grievance claims about material corruption, they seek re-
formative outcomes, whereas when they express systemic corruption claims, they seek 
revolutionary outcomes. Finally, in Chapter 6, I drew from rich case study support to 
demonstrate the thick connections between material and systemic corruption and calls 
for reform and revolution, respectively. 
TABLE 29 - TABLE OF HYPOTHESES & RESULTS 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
 Violations shape contentious goals Violations shape trust 
 1a: Material Corr.  Reform 1b: Systemic Corr.  Revolution 
2a: Material Corr.  Reduce trust in politi-
cians 
2b: Systemic Corr.  Reduce trust in system 
Chapter 3 Supported in Nigeria Not supported in South Africa 
Supported in Nigeria 
Supported in South Africa 
Chapter 4 Supported Supported 
Chapter 5 Supported Not Tested 
Chapter 6 Supported Not Tested 
The two hypotheses that test the trust mechanisms – hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b 
– were tested in Chapters 3 and 4, and were supported. This provides evidence that a 
major mechanism through which different types of corruption shape contentious de-
mands is the diverging effects that material and systemic corruption have on trust in 
politicians and institutions Due to limitations with the data, hypothesis 2a was difficult 
to test in Chapter 4; however, it received causal support in the survey experiment con-
ducted in South Africa. Hypothesis 2b was tested thoroughly in Chapters 3 and 4, and 
was supported robustly in each test. 
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The results of the research help expand scholarly understanding of the linkage between 
corruption and contentious demands. Specifically, the results show that material cor-
ruption reduces trust in individual politicians (but not institutions) and leads groups to 
make contentious demands for reform. Systemic corruption, on the other hand, reduces 
trust in the institutions themselves, leading groups to make calls for revolutionary con-
tentious demands. While the majority of analysis examined the direct relationship be-
tween different types of corruption and diverging contentious demands, the important 
role that trust plays as a mechanism was examined in Chapters 3 and 4. I turn now to 
an interpretation of the results. 
Interpreting the Results 
What do these results mean in the larger picture? Calls for reform and revolution are 
complex and multi-causal, and it is not my intention to insinuate that they respond only 
to variation in types of corruption. Instead, these results highlight the importance in 
understanding and disaggregating types of corruption – and, more broadly, variation in 
quality of governance – in order to improve our understanding of the complex puzzle 
of conflict and contention. This is critical to the larger research program that this dis-
sertation addresses. What stands between most African states and meaningful develop-
ment? What shapes contention and conflict, potentially destabilizing fragile countries 
on the continent? Certainly, many factors apply, but corruption occupies a central po-
sition in those factors. Corrupt incentives fortify unfair and ethnically-driven distribu-
tions of goods and services. Corrupt leaders seek unfettered access to power, bringing 
some groups in and leaving other groups out. Corrupt relationships, built through acts 
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of material and systemic corruption, shape what Johnston called syndromes of corrup-
tion that threaten to stultify growth and lock countries into unhappy equilibria in which 
elites dominate and non-elites see conflict as a meaningful way out. 
Moreover, these results shed light on the importance of understanding the contentious 
goals of different groups. It is not enough to call all mass-uprisings ‘revolutions,’ or to 
assume that contention is primarily ethnic in nature across Africa. Rather than falling 
back on traditional western assumptions of primordial identity, scholars from around 
the world should focus more closely on how political structures shape outcomes that 
might be interpreted as ethnic or religious conflict. This dissertation has shown that 
corruption is a major driver in determining not only whether countries will experience 
calls for reform or revolution, but also about how government venality shapes trust and 
sentiments of legitimacy. In countries where political legitimacy remains a major point 
of discussion – such as in Nigeria (Igbuzor, 2012) – the role of corruption cannot be 
ignored. These outcomes have wide-ranging implications for state stability across the 
continent, and they help drive the human story in the African context.  
Africans are in the process of renegotiating the social contract with their respective 
governments. Understanding what they are demanding – and why they are demanding 
it – is crucial to understanding how to improve the lives of Africans from Algeria to 
Zimbabwe.  The social contract – that crucial set of expectations about the relationship 
between the government and the governed – has perhaps never been more salient in the 
African context than now. With the success of the second wave of protest’s calls for 
multiparty democracy and the meaningful strengthening and improvement of 
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institutions in recent years, there is a real chance that the continent could fulfill the 
democratic promise that it sought during the first wave of protest in the colonial era. 
By understanding the social contract in Africa to be a dynamic and ongoing process 
rather than a stultified codex of rules ignored by elites, researchers can improve their 
understanding of African context in several ways. First, viewing social contention 
through the lens of the social contract places agency in the hands of Africans, treating 
them as actors rather than subjects. Similarly, viewing corruption as a violation of the 
social contract can drastically reshape the cynicism that some scholars have demon-
strated when discussing the prevalence of corruption throughout African governments. 
Ekeh (1975) and Joseph’s (1987) work provide a strong starting point for this. 
Expanding the Argument 
I have focused primarily on the role that different types of corruption play in generating 
diverging contentious outcomes. Yet, as I have stated earlier in this text, by no means 
do I assert that corruption is the only important driver of varying conflict outcomes. 
Rather, below, I briefly touch on several potential interactive effects that could serve as 
complementary arguments that might be able to improve the explainability of the the-
ory made herein. 
First, it is possible that different types of corruption produce different distributional 
strategies that might affect how and why citizens and groups mobilize as they do. Cor-
ruption creates winners and losers, and thus is is unlikely that a ‘winner’ would be as 
inclined to take to the streets – or demand revolutionary actions – as much as a ‘loser’ 
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would. Understanding how corruption shapes the distribution of corrupt spoils is an 
important and underexplored territory in scholarship, and could have implications on 
conflict in two ways. First, perhaps the creation of winners and losers is more readily 
perceived when material corruption occurs than when systemic corruption occurs. If 
this is the case, then citizens might be more able to accurately identify who is benefiting 
from which forms of corruption and thus more easily be able to make demands for 
specific reforms. On the other hand, because systemic corruption metasticizes across 
the government, it might be more difficult to know who exactly benefits, and thus citi-
zens are simply more likely to think the entire system needs to be brought down. 
Second, the distributions of corruption may impact overall levels of social trust. Mem-
bers of a ‘losing group’ may be more likely to distrust members of a ‘winning group,’ 
and thus be less likely to participate in broad coalitions. If this is the case, then ‘losing 
groups’ might be more likely to simply band together in a narrow contentious coalition 
and make specialized demands. While this might explain the revolutionary zeal of 
MASSOB, this would not explain the reformative mobilization of MOSOP; however, 
the issue of social trust is worthy of consideration. 
Moreover, the role that ‘hearth and home’ grievances like poverty, wages, unemploy-
ment, hunger, and feeling sof ethnic marginalization and disenfranchisement cannot 
and should not be overlooked. It is not my intention to do so, and I attempted to link 
these grievances to the types of corruption that I discussed in this dissertation. By link-
ing types of corruption to consequences, I seek to show that one cannot disentangle 
anger over rising school fees when the very pots of money designed to keep fees low 
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have been plundered by members of the ruling party. This is the case in South Africa, 
and in 2015 led to the beginning of a movement of protests known as ‘#FeesMustFall’ 
that shook campuses across the country and forged a new cohort of South African ac-
tivists (Ndelu et al., 2016; Chikane, 2018). 
Practical Applications 
The best social science is that which seeks to improve social outcomes, and to this end, 
this dissertation has several potential applications. The first application is for interna-
tional donors. International donors, like the United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID), the International Monetary Foundation (IMF), and the World 
Bank (WB), have long sought to tie humanitarian assistance with improved governance. 
Humanitarian assistance programs include post-conflict stabilization programs, politi-
cal institution building, and economic development programs. Each of these is designed 
to generate long-lasting stability and trajectories of development that will bring African 
countries out of poverty and cycles of conflict and into stable statehood. 
Yet, international donor programs rarely focus on the linkage between corruption and 
contention, and pay even less attention to targeting systemic corruption. Doing so 
would be politically difficult, as it requires host governments to approve humanitarian 
packages that constrain the ruling party; however, as this dissertation has shown, these 
forms of corruption are linked with the most destabilizing form of contention – revolu-
tion. Organizations like INES, the International Republican Institute, and the National 
Democratic Institute should seek to improve the quality of elections not only by 
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passively observing them, but actively improving their quality. And donors should seek 
to incentivize leaders to refrain from rigging the system in their favor. 
Moreover, tackling issues of police corruption is paramount, and efforts to do so should 
be redoubled across the continent. Professionalization programs should be encouraged, 
and police salaries should be prioritized in order to ensure that police are not incentiv-
ized to continue preying on citizens. At the same time, practices of accountability, in-
cluding the randomization of partners, the rotation of shifts, and the rotation of com-
mand units could serve to reduce the development of cronyist networks that permit 
misconduct to thrive.  
For African governments seeking to improve stability, the results of this dissertation 
are clear: respecting and strengthening the independence of institutions is a key factor 
in reducing the chances of the onset of revolutionary contention. As strongman leaders 
have become less common in Africa and as the middle class has become more inde-
pendent of the government, citizens should be decreasingly tolerant of system-dis-
torting corruption. Leaders should follow the lead of Nigerian president Goodluck Jon-
athan who, after losing a bid for a second term, respectively transferred power to Mu-
hammadu Buhari. Recent examples of problems with the transfer of power in the Gam-
bia, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso provide further evidence that it is in the best interest 
of leaders to respect both the spirit and the letter of the law. 
Within governments, reform-oriented ‘softliners’ should seek to build networks of 
change by working together to force reform-oriented policies that reassert the inde-
pendent character of political institutions, impose oversight protocols over processes 
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of procurement and ballot-box preparation, and drain the pool of executive power that 
dominates most African governments. Importantly, reformers should seek to implement 
e-government practices that allow citizens access to up-to-date and rigorously-col-
lected statistics, budget information, and the status of all procurements and legislative 
actions. One potential solution might include the application of distributed digital ledg-
ers, known varyingly as HyperLedger and BlockChain, to track and monitor all gov-
ernment expenses at each level of government. This could also be implemented to track 
public records, including police records, as well as voting records that might alleviate 
concerns over vote-rigging. 
Future Research 
This research helps to reveal the first step in a larger research agenda. Understanding 
the relationship between corruption and conflict requires more analysis than a single 
volume could hold, and this dissertation is no exception to that rule. This research sug-
gests several next steps. Having highlighted the important role that different types of 
corruption play in shaping contentious demands for either reform or revolution, schol-
ars of conflict should integrate corruption information into their analysis of terrorism, 
coups, and rebellion. A large body of work on conflict has focused on the drivers of 
conflict in Africa, yet only a small body of work has directly addressed corruption, and 
none have integrated information about the important differences in types of corruption. 
Doing so will help to improve studies of conflict in Africa and corruption-prone coun-
tries across the developing world. Second, the body of research that examines the im-
pact of corruption on social trust should begin to disaggregate between types of 
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corruption to test how material and systemic corruption shape social trust in different 
ways. Given the important role that trust plays in generating state cohesion and encour-
aging political cooperation and collective action, this work should be able to speak 
broadly across political science and sociology. 
Corruption has dominated much of the African political discussion, both in African 
conversations as well as in the language and frames used by western academics and 
scholars. Understanding how corruption shapes African politics is important, and this 
dissertation has shown that it is important to disaggregate between different types of 
corruption. As civil society organizations, separatist movements, rebel militias and ter-
rorist groups make demands for reform and revolution across Africa, understanding 
why they invoke corruption so frequently but seem to arrive at different contentious 
demands is a key to understanding how to improve stability and reduce conflict overall. 
This dissertation shows that material corruption leads to reformative engagement, 
which in turn may lead to the strengthening of the national conversation and social 
contract. It also shows that systemic corruption encourages revolutionary engagement, 
which has historically weakened states and left them vulnerable and unstable. This un-
derstanding of how different types of corruption shape contentious demands has broad 
applications across policy and scholarship, and helps explain diverging calls for reform 





Appendix A: Survey Experiment 
Survey Experimental Treatments from South Africa 
Elite Theft Patronage 
South African political elites, including heads of 
state such as the president or leader, have been 
caught stealing large sums of money from the 
state for themselves. Some have alleged that 
President Jacob Zuma has stolen large sums of 
state money to benefit himself and his close 
friends. When heads of state steal from the state, 
they often keep the money for themselves and 
their family, buying expensive cars and houses 
in foreign countries instead of using the money 
to help South Africa. 
South African politicians have been known to 
distribute money, public goods and services, and 
development projects to some groups but not 
others. Politicians may distribute funds along 
ethnic and geographic lines. This can include fa-
voring some ethnic groups with access to jobs, 
education, training, and public services. Former 
President Jacob Zuma was alleged to have fa-
vored the Zulu people to the detriment of other 
groups within South Africa. 
 
Electoral Fraud Police Corruption 
In recent years, there have been allegations of 
election-rigging and fraud in the South African 
political system. Some politicians have been ac-
cused of stuffing ballot boxes or intimidating 
voters that might vote for the opposition. Fol-
lowing the 2014 General Elections, there are 
concerns that the vote was neither free nor fair. 
The South African Police Service has often been 
accused of soliciting bribes from citizens, as 
well as arresting citizens unfairly and without 
charges. In some circumstances, police corrup-
tion has fueled abuses against citizens. In other 
circumstances, the police have favored some 
groups and targeted others. Some argue that the 
police operate on behalf of politicians. In recent 
years, there have been several high profile cases 










Appendix B: Individual Level Data 





TABLE 30 - HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL 
 DV: Justification for Violence  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 2.091*** 2.013*** 2.054*** 2.095*** 2.114***  
(0.034) (0.035) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044) 
Institutional Trust -0.106*** -0.112*** -0.086*** -0.068*** -0.069***  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Present Economy 
 
0.024*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.027***   
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Living Situation 
 
0.010* 0.013** 0.011* 0.013**   
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ethnic Treatment 
  
0.051*** 0.045*** 0.046***    
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Satisf. w/ Democracy 
  
-0.036*** -0.041*** -0.041***    
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Future Economy 
  
-0.013** -0.020*** -0.020***    
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trust Ruling Party 
   
-0.015** -0.016**     
(0.006) (0.006) 
Loc. Gov't Perf. 
   
0.003 0.002     
(0.005) (0.005) 
Education 
    
-0.006*      
(0.002) 
AIC 241827.857 238077.741 169011.376 150183.288 149939.717 
BIC 241865.117 238133.544 169092.046 150280.605 150045.862 
Log Likelihood -120909.928 -119032.871 -84496.688 -75080.644 -74957.859 
Num. obs. 82055 80858 57717 51379 51300 
Num. groups: country 31 31 27 27 27 
Var: country (Intercept) 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.035 
Var: Residual 1.113 1.110 1.091 1.085 1.084 





TABLE 31 - HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION 
 DV: Would Use Violence for Political Reason  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 0.204*** 0.187*** 0.148*** 0.203*** 0.233***  
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) 
Institutional Trust -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.012** -0.012**  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Present Economy 
 
0.016*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.021***   
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Living Situation 
 
-0.007** -0.006* -0.003 -0.002   
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ethnic Treatment 
  
0.034*** 0.036*** 0.038***    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Satisf. w/ Democracy 
  
-0.001 0.001 -0.000    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Future Economy 
   
-0.024*** -0.026***     
(0.003) (0.003) 
Trust Ruling Party 
   
-0.002 -0.003     
(0.003) (0.004) 
Loc. Gov't Perf. 
    
-0.004      
(0.004) 
Education 
    
-0.004**      
(0.002) 
AIC 105034.676 103483.648 83484.453 75968.036 68936.591 
BIC 105070.810 103537.762 83554.838 76054.942 69039.489 
Log Likelihood -52513.338 -51735.824 -41734.226 -37974.018 -34456.296 
Num. obs. 61916 61019 48930 43938 39136 
Num. groups: country 31 31 27 27 27 
Var: country (Intercept) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Var: Residual 0.319 0.318 0.321 0.329 0.339 




Appendix C: Case Studies Materials 
TABLE 32 - ADDITIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CASES IN NIGERIA, KENYA, AND SOUTH AFRICA 
Movement/Organization Grievances Goals 
Model 
Fit 
Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
Material. Destruction of living habitat and unfair distribu-
tions of wealth Reformative Strong 
Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
Material. Destruction of environment; economic underde-
velopment and poverty 
Reformative: massive redistribution of 
oil wealth to the Niger Delta communi-
ties 
Strong 
Ijaw Youth Council Material. Distribution of Nigerian funds and “looting of na-tional treasury by the Abacha junta” 
Reform: cultural and political auton-
omy, but remaining in Nigeria Strong 
Niger Delta Vigilantes Material. Destruction of environment; economic underde-velopment and poverty 
Reform: controlling petroleum re-
sources Strong 
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer 
Force (NDPVF) 
Material. Destruction of environment; economic underde-
velopment and poverty 
Reform: controlling petroleum re-
sources Strong 
Boko Haram Systemic: police and security corruption, adoption of West-ern values 
Revolutionary: build new Islamic state 
in the north Strong 
#EndSARS Systemic: Police corruption, abuse and violence Reformative: disband the SARS unit Weak 
Niger Delta Avengers 
Material & Systemic. Favoritism of the North, use of oil 
money to develop the north. Abuse by security forces 
against Niger Delta. 
Reformative & Revolutionary: Redis-




Niger Delta Liberation Front 
Material & Systemic. Favoritism of the North, use of oil 
money to develop the north. Abuse by security forces 
against Niger Delta. 
Revolutionary: Secession from Nigeria Moder-ate 
Indigenous People of Biafra 
(IPOB) 
Systemic. Security corruption and abuse of political oppo-
nents Revolutionary: Biafran secession Strong 
Movement for the Actualization 
of the Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB) 
Systemic: security corruption and abuse of political oppo-
nents. Revolutionary: Biafran secession Strong 
Human and Environmental De-
velopment Agenda (HEDA) 
Material: “Corruption reduces public revenue with direct 
consequences to healthcare delivery, education, and other 
Reformative: Passing anti-corruption 
laws and pro-whistleblowing laws Strong 
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social infrastructure” (Sahara Reporters, n.d.) 
End Impunity Now (campaign) Material: “Corruption is why basic services and infrastruc-tures cannot be provided …” (Premium Times, 2012) 
Reformative: implementation of report 
on fuel subsidy fraud, investigate fraud Strong 
#StopTheseTHIEVES Material: massive bureaucratic and elite theft from public programs. 
Reformative: anti-corruption policies, 
‘lifestyle audits’ Strong 
Act or Resign anti-corruption 
protests 
Material: $300 million misappropriated by Ministry of 
Health 
Reform: calling on politicians to either 
meaningfully engage in anti-corruption 
policies or resign 
Strong 
Pro-Odinga protesters Systemic: allegations of electoral fraud and rigging 
Revolutionary: demands to overturn 
elections and put Raila Odinga in 
power 
Strong 
Maasai Ethnic Protests Material: protests against misappropriation of tourist funds Reformative: removal of corrupt gover-nor Strong 
Anti IEBC Demonstrations 
(2017) 
Systemic: IEBC engaging in corruption and receiving 
bribes for election materials Revolution: disband the IEBC Strong 
Kenya Human Rights Commis-
sion Protests Material: Government corruption (indescript) 
Reformative: Demanding anti-corrup-
tion action Strong 
#Zuma Must Fall Material: personal enrichment by Jacob Zuma. Reformative: remove Jacob Zuma  Strong 
Anti-Apartheid Campaign Systemic: disenfranchisement, racialist marginalization Revolutionary: transition from oligar-chy to democracy Strong 
#Fees Must Fall Material: rising school fees in face of high levels of corrup-tion 
Reformative: free education, per the 
ANC’s proposed fee plan Strong 
Mining Campaigns Material: low wages Reformative: increase wages Strong 
#Rhodes Must Fall Material & Systemic: anger about legacy of racism and apartheid in an increasingly unequal society 
Reformative: despite rhetoric of revo-
lution, protesters sought material re-
dress with school administrators 
Me-
dium 
Service Delivery Protests Material: lack of adequate public services delivered at the local level 
Reformative: improve public service 
delivery Strong 
Zulu Secessionist Movement Material & Systemic: anger over the potential expropriation of Zulu land by the ANC government 




KhoiSan Secessionist Movement Material & Systemic: anger over perceived political domi-nation by the ANC and high levels of corruption 
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